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The world has come a long way since the first 
World Happiness Report in 2012. Happiness is 
increasingly considered a proper measure of 
social progress and a goal of public policy. So it  
is worth beginning with some history, before 
summarizing the present report. 
The first World Happiness Report was published 
in support of the April 2, 2012 United Nations 
High Level Meeting on Happiness and Well- 
Being. That meeting itself followed the July  
2011 Resolution of the UN General Assembly, 
proposed by the Prime Minister of Bhutan, 
inviting member countries to measure the 
happiness of their people and to use this to help 
guide their public policies.
The initial World Happiness Report reviewed the 
scientific understanding of the measurement 
and explanation of subjective well-being, and 
presented a wide range of internationally  
comparable data, including a ranking of national 
average life evaluations, based on Gallup World 
Poll data from 2005-2011 for 156 countries. 
Following an introduction outlining the history 
and rationale for the use of happiness and 
well-being as touchstones for public policy, there 
were two parts to that Report. The chapters in 
Part 1 presented the global data and analysis, 
accompanied by a review of some policy  
implications of the available data and research, 
while Part II presented three case studies. The 
first was a full presentation of the Bhutanese 
Gross National Happiness framework while the 
other two included a description of the United 
Kingdom’s then-recent efforts to devise and 
collect measures of subjective well-being, and the 
OECD’s in-progress development of subjective 
well-being measurement guidelines for the  
use of National Statistical Offices. The Report 
was broadly successful in its aim of bringing  
comparable data and a scientific understanding 
to a broad global audience. The online readership 
of the first Report has grown broadly, and has by 
now exceeded one million.
The breadth of public and policy interest in local 
and national measures of subjective well-being 
was so great, and the need to develop regular 
reporting compelling enough, to encourage  
the production of the World Happiness Report 2013, 
this time published under the auspices of the 
Sustainable Development Solutions Network.  
In the WHR 2013 the main data analysis, which 
covered both the 2010-2012 levels and also the 
changes from 2005-2007 to 2010-2012, were 
supplemented by a series of invited chapters 
covering key subject areas. The topics of the  
six invited chapters included mental health; a 
survey of the evidence on the variety of positive 
outcomes likely to flow, especially at the individual 
level, when people are or become happier; a 
review of the thought and evidence showing the 
importance of a strong ethical foundation for the 
support of better lives; a survey of the ways in 
which well-being data and research can be used 
to improve well-being; a review of the OECD 
Guidelines on Measuring Subjective Well-being for 
National Statistical Offices to use in measuring 
subjective well-being; and finally a comparison 
of life evaluations and the UNDP’s Human 
Development Index as alternative ways of 
measuring national well-being. The UNDP has 
also, since 2010, included national average life 
evaluations as part of their compendium1 of 
important human development statistics.
The data and analysis in the World Happiness 
Report 2013 have helped to satisfy, and perhaps to 
fuel, growing public interest in applying the 
science of happiness to public affairs. Reader-
ship thus far is about 1.5 million, 50% more 
than for the first World Happiness Report. That 
interest in turn encouraged a number of local 
and national experiments in measuring and 
improving happiness, as well as the production 
of the World Happiness Report 2015. 
JOHN F. HELLIWELL, RICHARD LAYARD, AND JEFFREY SACHS
Chapter 1.
SETTING THE STAGE
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the happiness of those living and working in  
the city.10 Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the 
Bristol Happy City11 project has a structure that 
could well be emulated elsewhere.
Harnessing Happiness Data and  
Research to Improve Sustainable 
Development
The year 2015 is a watershed for humanity, with 
the pending adoption of Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) to help guide the world community 
towards a more inclusive and sustainable pattern 
of global development. The UN member states 
called for SDGs on the occasion of the Rio+20 
Summit, marking the 20th anniversary of the 
Rio Earth Summit. The SDGs will be adopted  
by heads of state at a special summit at the 
United Nations in September 2015, on the  
70th anniversary of the UN. The concepts of 
happiness and well-being are very likely to help 
guide progress towards sustainable development. 
Sustainable development is a normative concept 
calling for all societies to balance economic, 
social, and environmental objectives in a holistic 
manner. When countries pursue GDP in a 
lopsided manner, forgetting about social and 
environmental objectives, the results can be 
adverse for human well-being. Many countries 
in recent years have achieved economic growth 
at the cost of sharply rising inequalities of income 
and grave damage to the natural environment. 
The SDGs are designed to help countries to 
achieve economic, social, and environmental 
objectives in harmony, thereby leading to higher 
levels of well-being for present and future 
generations. 
The SDGs will include goals, targets and quanti-
tative indicators. The Sustainable Development 
Solutions Network, in its recommendations on 
the selection of SDG indicators, has strongly 
recommended the inclusion of indicators of 
subjective well-being and positive mood affect  
to help guide and measure the progress towards 
the SDGs. Many governments and experts offer 
considerable support for the inclusion of happiness 
indicators in the SDGs. The final SDG indicator 
list will most likely be decided during 2015-6. 
We hope that the 2015 World Happiness Report 
once again underscores the fruitfulness of using 
happiness measurements for guiding policy 
making and for helping to assess the overall 
well-being in each society. 
Outline of Report
This report continues in the tradition of combining 
analysis of recent levels and trends of happiness 
data, with a variety of chapters providing deeper 
analysis of specific issues.
•  Chapter 2, by John Helliwell, Haifang Huang, 
and Shun Wang, contains our primary rankings 
of and explanations for life evaluations. 
•  Chapter 3, by Nicole Fortin, John Helliwell,  
and Shun Wang, presents a far broader range 
of happiness measures, and shows how they 
differ by gender, age and global region.
•  Chapter 4, by Richard Layard and Gus  
O’Donnell, advocates and explains the use  
of happiness as the measure of benefit in 
cost-benefit analysis.
•  Chapter 5, by Richard Davidson and Brianna 
Schuyler, surveys a range of important new 
results from the neuroscience of happiness.
•  Chapter 6, by Richard Layard and Ann Hagell, 
is aimed especially at the happiness of the 
young — the one-third of the world population 
that is under the age of 18 years.
•  Chapter 7, by Leonardo Becchetti, Luigino 
Bruni, and Stefano Zamagni, digs deeper into 
the ethical and community-level supports for 
happiness.
•  Chapter 8, by Jeffrey Sachs, discusses the 
importance of social capital for well-being and 
Adoption of Happiness as a  
Guide for Public Policy
The OECD Guidelines, and the generally growing 
awareness of the possibilities for well-being-
based measurement and policy, have led an 
increasing number of national and local  
governments to use happiness data and research 
in their search for policies that could enable 
people to live better lives. In the realm of national 
statistics, the OECD reports2 that almost all 
OECD countries collect at least life evaluations  
in at least one of their major social surveys, and 
several do much more. We note that for many 
European countries the collection of subjective 
well-being data is coming automatically through 
the EU-SILC module of well-being questions 
designed at the EU level for common application 
in all EU countries. Similar strategies may also 
be useful for countries in other global regions,  
as each region has good reason for wanting to 
have assessments that are comparable across all 
countries in the region. In addition, such collabo-
rative efforts may well cut the costs and increase 
the timeliness of accounting for happiness. 
Many national leaders are talking about the 
importance of well-being as a guide for their 
nations. Examples include German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel, South Korean President Park 
Geun-hye, British Prime Minister David Cameron, 
and His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin 
Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice President and Prime 
Minister of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
and Ruler of Dubai.3
The UK focus on happiness and well-being is 
special in having been based right from the outset 
on widespread consultation, data collection and 
experimentation.4 These efforts are now of 
almost five-years duration, and have produced a 
large enough body of data to permit analysis and 
policy assessments at the local as well as national 
levels. Some of the related ventures, for example, 
the UK-based NGO Action for Happiness,5 have 
a global reach, with members from many countries 
interested in learning and sharing how the 
science of well-being can be used to improve 
lives. The UK is also launching this year an 
official but independent “What Works Centre  
for Wellbeing” dedicated to making policies  
and services work for well-being.6
The case of the UAE is worth special mention  
in part for the extent to which happiness and 
well-being have been made central tenets of  
the design and delivery of the National Agenda 
“… to be the happiest of all nations.”
At the Emirate level, when Dubai Plan 2021  
was launched in December of 2014, Sheikh 
Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum said, “The 
first objective for the Dubai Plan 2021 is achieving 
people’s happiness.”7 Dubai Plan 2021 itself 
covers six themes “that describe the vision for 
Dubai: a city of happy, creative and empowered 
people; an inclusive and cohesive society; the 
preferred place to live, work and visit; a smart 
and sustainable city; a pivotal hub in the global 
economy; and a pioneering and excellent  
government. The strategy was developed after 
extensive consultations involving civil society, 
the private and the public sectors.”8
In addition, His Highness has written an open 
letter to all Federal government employees 
reminding them of their core mission: providing 
world class services to the people of UAE with the 
goal of contributing to their happiness. His open 
letter is a testament to the strong commitment 
demonstrated by the UAE leadership towards 
making happiness a national policy goal.
Since much that matters in life is local, it is  
also natural to find that many sub-national 
governments are measuring subjective well- 
being, and using well-being research as a guide 
to the design of public spaces and the delivery of 
public services. For example, the state of Jalisco 
in Mexico has made happiness a key state 
objective.9 At the urban level, the City of Santa 
Monica, in California, won a large foundation 
grant to survey and search for ways of improving 
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global picture masks big regional differences, 
with U-shapes in some countries and declines  
in others. 
For the six positive and six negative experiences, 
there are striking differences by gender, age  
and region, some of which illustrate previous 
experimental findings, and others revealing a 
larger cross-cultural differences in experiences 
than had previously been studied. 
A parallel analysis of the six main variables used 
in Chapter 2 to explain international differences 
and changes in life evaluations, also shows the 
value of considering age, gender and region at 
the same time to get a better understanding of 
the global trends and differences. In general,  
the patterns for specific emotions are such as  
to confirm the reasoning used in Chapter 2  
to explain differences in life evaluations. The 
importance of the social context shows up 
strongly in the analysis by gender and age 
group. For example, those regions where life 
evaluations are significantly higher in older age 
groups are also those regions where perceived 
social support, freedom and generosity (but not 
household incomes) are higher in the older age 
groups. All three of those variables have quite 
different levels and age group dynamics in 
different regions. By contrast, the levels and 
trends for the incidence of health problems  
(and pain yesterday) have very similar levels and 
trends in all regions. And the gender differences 
in the incidence of health problems are largely 
the same around the world, as they are for the 
related feelings of pain and depression.
Cost-benefit Analysis Using Happiness as  
the Measure of Benefit
If the aim of policy is to increase happiness, 
policy makers will have to evaluate their policy 
options in a quite new way. This is the subject  
of Chapter 4. The benefits of a new policy should 
now be measured in terms of the impact of the 
change upon the happiness of the population. 
This applies whether the policy is a regulation,  
a tax change, a new expenditure, or a mix of all 
three. Initially at least, the authors recommend 
treating total public expenditure as politically 
chosen, but using evidence to show which 
pattern of expenditure would yield the most 
happiness. This can be achieved in a fully 
decentralized way by establishing a critical level 
of extra happiness which a project must yield 
per dollar of expenditure.
This new form of cost-benefit analysis avoids 
many of the serious problems with existing 
methods, where money is the measure of benefit. 
It uses evidence to allow for the obvious fact that 
an extra dollar brings more happiness to the 
poor than to the rich. It also includes the effects 
of all the other factors beyond income, so it can 
be applied to a much wider range of policy.
But some of the traditional problems of policy 
analysis remain. First, how much priority (if any) 
should be given to reducing misery compared 
with increasing existing happiness – ultimately 
an ethical decision. Second, how much weight 
should be given to the happiness of future 
generations – the chapter suggests a pure time 
discount rate of no more than 1.5% per annum. 
Third, how should we treat the length of life? We 
advocate an approach based on “quality-adjusted 
life years” as the ultimate measure of benefit.
It is still early days for this new approach. Rhetoric 
about happiness is not enough. To build a better 
world requires that decision-makers give a central 
role to the happiness criterion in decision-making 
at every level, requiring changes both in how 
outcomes are evaluated and in how policies are 
designed and delivered. Chapter 4 deals with a 
key aspect of this, by adapting cost-benefit 
analysis to take a broader focus. 
The Neuroscience of Happiness
Chapter 5 highlights four supports for well-being 
and their underlying neural bases: 1. Sustained 
positive emotion; 2. Recovery of negative emotion; 
3. Empathy, altruism and pro-social behavior; and 
describes ways that societies may invest in 
social capital in order to promote well-being.
We now briefly review the main findings of  
each chapter.
The Geography of Happiness
The geography of happiness is presented first  
by means of a map using 10 different colors to 
show how average 2012-2014 life evaluations 
differ across the world. Average life evaluations, 
where 0 represents the worst possible life and 
10 the best possible, range from an average 
above 7.5 at the top of the rankings to below 3  
at the bottom. A difference of four points in 
average life evaluations separates the 10 happiest 
countries from the 10 least happy countries. 
Three-quarters of the differences among countries, 
and also among regions, are accounted for by 
differences in six key variables, each of which digs 
into a different aspect of life. The six factors are 
GDP per capita, healthy years of life expectancy, 
social support (as measured by having someone to 
count on in times of trouble), trust (as measured 
by a perceived absence of corruption in govern-
ment and business), perceived freedom to make 
life decisions, and generosity (as measured by 
recent donations, adjusted for differences in 
income). Differences in social support, incomes 
and healthy life expectancy are the three most 
important factors, with their relative importance 
depending on the comparison group chosen. 
International differences in positive and negative 
emotions (affect) are much less fully explained 
by these six factors. When affect measures are 
used as additional elements in the explanation 
of life evaluations, only positive emotions  
contribute significantly, appearing to provide  
an important channel for the effects of both 
perceived freedom and social support. 
Analysis of changes in life evaluations from 
2005-2007 to 2012-2014 shows big international 
differences in how the global recession affected 
national happiness. These were found to be due to 
differing exposure to the crisis and differences in 
the quality of governance, trust and social support. 
Countries with sufficiently high-quality social 
capital appear to be able to sustain, or even improve 
subjective well-being in the face of natural disasters 
or economic shocks, as the shocks provide them 
an opportunity to discover, use and build upon 
their communal links. In other cases, the economic 
crisis triggered drops in happiness greater than 
could be explained by falling incomes and higher 
unemployment. In this respect the new data 
continue to support the evidence and analysis in 
the World Happiness Report 2013.
How Does Subjective Well-being Vary Around 
the World by Gender and Age?
This chapter digs into some crucial detail, by 
considering how well-being differs by region, 
gender and age. To keep the sample size  
sufficiently high, most of the analysis includes 
together all of the Gallup World Poll data  
collected for each country between 2005 and 
2014. The analysis extends beyond life evaluations 
to include a range of positive and negative 
experiences that show widely different patterns 
by gender, age and region. The positive items 
include: happiness, smiling or laughter, enjoy-
ment, feeling safe at night, feeling well-rested, 
and feeling interested. The six negative items 
are: anger, worry, sadness, depression, stress and 
pain. For life evaluations, differences by gender 
are very small relative to those across countries, 
or even across ages within a country. On a global 
average basis, women’s life evaluations are slightly 
higher than those for men, by about 0.09 on the 
10-point scale, or about 2% as large as the 4.0 
point difference between the 10 most happy and 
10 least happy countries. The differences among 
age groups are much larger, and differ consider-
ably by region. On a global basis, average life 
evaluations start high among the youngest 
respondents, and fall by almost 0.6 point by 
middle age, being fairly flat thereafter. This 
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whole conduct and ethos of the school. There 
should also be explicit teaching of life-skills 
using evidence-based materials. And, to record 
progress and notice children in difficulty, 
schools should consider measuring the well- 
being of their children on a regular basis.
Both schools and healthcare systems should give 
much more priority to the well-being of children. 
It is one of the most obvious and cost-effective 
ways to invest in future world happiness.
Human Values, Civil Economy and  
Subjective Well-being
Chapter 7 presents history, evidence, and  
policy implications of the Italian Civil Economy 
paradigm. The approach has its roots in the 
“classic” Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition of 
moral philosophy, which has had a significant 
expression in social sciences within the Italian 
tradition of Civil Economy. This tradition  
represents an important attempt to keep alive 
within modernity the tradition of civil life based 
on friendship (Aristotle’s notion of philia) and a 
more socialized idea of person and community. 
It is contrasted with other approaches that give  
a less central role to reciprocity and benevolence.
The empirical work surveyed in Chapter 7 
echoes that presented in Chapter 2, and also  
that surveyed in the WHR 2013, in emphasizing  
the importance of positive social relations, as  
characterized by trust, benevolence and shared 
social identities, in motivating behavior,  
contributing positively to economic outcomes  
as well as delivering happiness directly.
The authors recommend changes to democratic 
mechanisms to allow these human capacities for 
pro-social actions to have more space. Happiness 
of course requires participation, but not just the 
formal variety as expressed at the polling station. 
Full participation is achieved when citizens are 
given the opportunity to take part in the deliberative 
process and to consider their consumption and 
saving actions as voting choices which then lead 
to decisions and agreed actions. Because  
happiness lies more in the process than in the 
final outcome, giving citizens a real chance to 
participate in the deliberative process increases 
their happiness regardless of the level of GDP.
Investing in Social Capital 
Well-being depends heavily on the pro-social 
behavior of members of the society. Chapter 8 
digs into this more deeply. Pro-sociality entails 
individuals making decisions for the common 
good that may conflict with short-run egoistic 
incentives. Economic and social life is rife with 
“social dilemmas,” in which the common good 
and individual incentives may conflict. In such 
cases, pro-social behavior – including honesty, 
benevolence, cooperation, and trustworthiness 
– is key to achieving the best outcome for society. 
Societies with a high level of social capital – 
meaning generalized trust, good governance, and 
mutual support by individuals within the society 
– are conducive to pro-social behavior. Some 
countries show evidence of high social capital, 
while others show the opposite: generalized 
distrust, pervasive corruption, and lawless 
behavior (e.g. widespread tax evasion that 
deprives the government of the needed funds  
to invest in public goods).   
High social capital directly and indirectly raises 
well-being, by promoting social support systems, 
generosity and voluntarism, and honesty in 
public administration, and by reducing the costs 
of doing business. The pressing policy question, 
therefore, is how societies with low social capital 
– riven by distrust and dishonesty – can invest 
in social capital. The chapter discusses various 
pathways to higher social capital, including 
education, moral instruction, professional codes 
of conduct, public opprobrium towards violators 
of the public trust, and public policies to narrow 
income inequalities, since social and economic 
equality is associated with higher levels of social 
capital and generalized trust.
4. Mind-wandering, mindfulness and “affective 
stickiness” or emotion-captured attention. A 
growing body of evidence supports the importance 
of these four constituents, which are linked to 
emotions and life evaluations in different ways. 
In some cases, effects are stronger for certain 
supports for life evaluations, such as purpose in 
life, or positive relations with others. In other 
cases, the findings hold directly for overall 
measures of well-being. The neural circuits that 
underlie each of these four elements are partly 
separable, though with some overlap. 
There are two overall lessons that can be taken 
from the neuroscientific evidence. The first is the 
identification of the four highlighted elements, 
since they are not commonly emphasized in 
well-being research. The second is that the 
circuits we identify as underlying these four 
supports for well-being all exhibit plasticity and 
thus can be transformed through experience and 
training. There are now training programs being 
developed to cultivate mindfulness, kindness, 
and generosity. The chapter reviews evidence 
showing that some of these training regimes, 
even those as short as two weeks, can induce 
measurable changes in the brain. These findings 
highlight the view that happiness and well-being 
are best regarded as skills that can be enhanced 
through training. 
Chapters 2 and 5 are consistent in showing  
that life evaluations and measures of affect  
have separate but overlapping drivers and 
consequences, whether assessed by neural 
patterns or aggregate data. Thus it is no surprise 
to find that positive affect and life evaluations 
have separate but overlapping positive  
consequences for subsequent mortality rates.12
The Happiness of Children
Chapter 6 turns the focus of attention to the 
world’s future, as embodied in the one-third of 
the current global population who are now under 
18 years of age. Their happiness matters as much 
as the happiness of adults, or even more. For the 
child becomes the adult, so it is vital to determine 
which aspects of child development are most 
important in determining whether a person 
becomes a happy, well-functioning adult. Research 
is now providing answers to that question, based 
on studies that follow a whole cohort of children 
from birth right through into adulthood. Which 
of the three key features of child development 
(academic, behavioral, or emotional) best predict 
whether the resulting adult will be satisfied with 
life? The answer is that emotional development 
is the best of the three predictors and academic 
achievement the worst.
This should not be surprising. Mental health is  
a key determinant of adult life satisfaction (see 
WHR 2013) and half of mentally ill adults already 
showed symptoms by the age of 15. Altogether 
200 million children worldwide are suffering 
from diagnosable mental health problems 
requiring treatment. Yet even in the richest 
countries only a quarter are in treatment.
Chapter 6 suggests key steps needed to treat 
children with mental health problems and, 
equally important, to prevent these problems 
arising in the first place. Treatment arrangements 
should start from the basic principle of parity of 
esteem for mental and physical health, meaning 
that a child has the same access to evidence-based 
treatment whether their problem is with mental 
or physical health. Excellent treatments now 
exist for children’s mental health problems,  
and making them more widely available would 
generate huge savings through improved  
educational performance, reduced youth  
offending and, later on, improved earnings  
and employment, and better parenting of the 
next generation.
But prevention is even better than cure, and 
most schools could do much more to promote 
the well-being of their children. This should be 
an explicit goal for every school. Schools should 
have a well-being code, agreed by every teacher, 
parent and child, and this should influence the 
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1  This compendium is the statistical annex to the UNDP’s 
flagship Human Development Report.
2  The OECD Table showing the current state of official 
measurement of subjective well-being in OECD member 
countries is included as an online appendix to this report.
3  The UAE approach to the use of happiness as a guide to 
public policies, including its basis in Arab philosophical 
thinking, has been translated for our use, and appears as 
UAE (2015) in the reference list, and online as “Happiness- 
A UAE Perspective.” The Emirates Competitiveness 
Council has also contributed to the costs of producing 
WHR 2013 and WHR 2015.
4  See Hicks (2012), chapter 6 of the first World Happiness 
Report.
5 Their website is: http://www.actionforhappiness.org
6  Their website is: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
new-what-works-centre-for-wellbeing 
7 See UAE (2015).
8 Ibid.
9  As explained in their website:  
http://www.jaliscocomovamos.org
10  The Santa Monica project was a winning entry in the 
Bloomberg Philanthropies Mayors challenge. Their 
website is: http://wellbeingproject.squarespace.com 
11  Their website is: http://www.happycity.org.uk/content/
happy-city-index
12 See Weist et al (2011).
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It is now three years since the publication of the 
first World Happiness Report. A central purpose  
of that report, especially in Chapters 2 and 3,  
was to survey the scientific underpinnings of the 
measurement and understanding of subjective 
well-being. The main content of that review is as 
relevant today as it was then, and remains available 
for those now coming to the topic for the first 
time. Because the scientific basis has broadened 
and deepened in the past three years, it will be 
perhaps be useful for us to reiterate, and revise 
where appropriate, some of the evidence that 
underlies our choice of measures and informs 
the way we use the data to explain how happiness 
varies around the world. That will be the subject 
of the first section of this chapter.
We shall turn then to present national-level 
average scores for subjective well-being, as  
measured by answers to the Cantril ladder  
question asking people to evaluate the quality of 
their current lives on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 
represents the worst possible life for them, and  
10 the best. For each country we shall present not 
just the average scores for 2012-2014, but our 
latest attempts to show how six key variables 
contribute to explaining the full sample of national 
average scores over the whole period 2005-2014, 
and to use that information to help understand 
the sources of the 2012-2014 rankings. These 
variables include GDP per capita, healthy life 
expectancy, social support, freedom, generosity and 
the absence of corruption. We shall also show how 
measures of experienced well-being, especially 
positive and negative emotions, and judgments 
about life purpose can combine with life circum-
stances to support higher life evaluations. Chapter 
3 will present in more detail the distribution of  
life evaluations and 12 measures of experienced 
well-being by gender, age, and global region.
Then we shall study the changes in national 
average life evaluations between 2005-2007  
and 2012-2014, by country and by region. We 
will estimate how various factors, including 
changes in the quality of governance, affected 
each country’s success, in well-being terms,  
in navigating what has for many countries been 
a difficult period of history.
Measuring and Understanding  
Happiness
Chapter 2 of the first World Happiness Report 
explained the strides that had been made over 
the preceding 30 years in the development and 
validation, mainly within psychology, of a variety 
of measures of subjective well-being (SWB). 
Progress since then has been even faster, as the 
number of scientific papers on the topic has 
continued to grow rapidly,1 and as the measure-
ment of subjective well-being has been taken  
up by more national and international statistical 
agencies, guided by technical advice from 
experts in the field.
By the time of the first report there was already  
a clear distinction to be made among three main 
classes of subjective measures: life evaluations, 
positive emotional experiences (positive affect) 
and negative emotional experiences (negative 
affect); see Technical Box 1. The subsequently 
released OECD Guidelines on Measuring Subjective 
Well-being,2 as foreshadowed in a case study in 
the first report, and more fully explained in the 
OECD chapter3 of World Happiness Report 2013, 
included both short and longer recommended 
modules of SWB questions. The centerpiece of 
the OECD short module was a life evaluation 
question, asking respondents to assess their 
satisfaction with their current lives on a 0 to 10 
scale. This was to be accompanied by two or 
three affect questions and a question about the 
extent to which the respondents felt they had a 
purpose or meaning in their lives. The latter 
question, which we treat as an important support 
for subjective well-being, rather than a direct 
measure of it, is of a type4 that has come to be 
called “eudaimonic.” This is in honor of Aristotle, 
who believed that having such a purpose would 
be central to any reflective individual’s assessment 
of the quality of his or her own life.
JOHN F. HELLIWELL, HAIFANG HUANG AND SHUN WANG
Chapter 2.
THE GEOGRAPHY OF 
WORLD HAPPINESS
The authors of Chapters 2 and 3 would like to thank the Gallup Organization, and especially Gale Muller, for access to and 
assistance with data from the Gallup World Poll, and to Mingyi Hua for her help with other data used in Chapter 3. For 
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Carol Graham, Shawn Grover, Jon Hall, Daniel Kahneman, Andrew Oswald, Ewen McKinnon, and Conal Smith.
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the similarities and differences among the 
different types of measures. Earlier scholars 
often were tempted to consider all measures as 
equivalent, and then to reject them all when they 
gave inconsistent stories, or to back a preferred 
candidate. All of the official research-based 
reports on the subject have consistently argued, 
regardless of past experiences or current  
preferences, that development of the scientific 
base for well-being research requires obtaining 
multiple measures of subjective well-being in as 
many survey vehicles as possible, so as to better 
understand how they relate to one another, and 
to the lives they monitor.
Before the OECD guidelines were produced, the 
United Kingdom Office for National Statistics 
(ONS) had developed its own set of four core 
questions. The central measure was the same 
life satisfaction measure recommended by the 
OECD, accompanied by a eudaimonic question 
asking whether the respondent felt that the 
things they did in their lives were worthwhile 
and two affect questions – happy yesterday and 
anxious yesterday.5
As the OECD guidelines were being formulated, 
the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS)  
set up a panel to review measures of subjective 
well-being. This differed from the OECD study 
and guidelines as it focused on just a part of the 
spectrum of possible measures of subjective 
well-being. It concentrated on positive and 
negative affect (“experienced” or “experiential” 
well-being) rather than evaluative measures of 
well-being. The panel took pains to note that this 
was intended to explore less-developed aspects of 
well-being measurement, and not to suggest any 
lack of importance for evaluative measures.6  
The panel also echoed the OECD guidelines  
in emphasizing the importance of collecting 
experiential and evaluative measures together,  
in order to better understand their separate and 
combined contributions. The NAS panel’s 
emphasis on experiential measures (including 
especially current, remembered and diary reports 
of feelings) undoubtedly also reflected the number 
of influential US scholars who had invested 
several years of research proposing, collecting, 
and investigating experiential measures. To some 
extent this reflected a theoretical preference of 
Daniel Kahneman of Princeton University, 
whose experimental work had emphasized the 
differing sources, structures and implications of 
experiential and evaluative measures. One of his 
papers showed that the sum of momentary pain 
reports from colonoscopy patients differed from 
their subsequent overall evaluations of the extent 
of the pain.7 For Kahneman, the discrepancy was 
treated as an error on the part of the recollecting 
memory, leading him to favor,8 just as Jeremy 
Bentham had advocated two centuries ago, the 
use of averaged emotional reports as the most 
accurate way of identifying human happiness. 
We and others give more weight to the evaluative 
measures, since the remembered pains and 
pleasures have been shown to be the more 
relevant drivers of subsequent decisions about 
future medical procedures, in the case of pain,  
or holidays,9 in the case of pleasures. Evaluative 
measures are also more reflective of a person’s 
sense of living a meaningful life, a feature held 
by many, including Aristotle (and us), to be a key 
element of a life well lived.
Kahneman’s emphasis on experiential measures 
was also encouraged by his collaboration with 
Alan Krueger in the development and application 
of the “Day Reconstruction Method” using 
end-of-day diary methods to evaluate the  
emotional counterparts of the changing flows  
of daily activities.10 This has been a very fruitful 
line of research. Although the US national 
statistical agencies have otherwise been reluctant 
to collect measures of subjective well-being, 
measures of affect have been included in the 
National Time Use survey, making the United 
States the only major country whose official 
statistics include measures of affect but not life 
evaluations.11 However, the overall US system  
is much more comprehensively covered when 
non-official surveys are taken into account, as the 
world’s two largest surveys regularly assessing 
population well-being on a scale big enough to 
follow both short-term movement and to provide 
geographic detail over the longer term are based 
in the United States. One survey is private – the 
Gallup/Healthways Daily Poll – and the other 
public – the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System of the National Institutes for Health. 
Each of these surveys covers 1,000 respondents 
each day, and asks both evaluative and experien-
tial measures.
These two large surveys, along with the European 
Social Survey (ESS) and a growing number of 
national surveys, such as those in the United 
Kingdom, Canada and Europe (via the EU-SILC 
well-being module), have been able to illuminate 
Technical Box 1: Measuring Subjective Well-being
The OECD (2013) Guidelines for the Measurement 
of Subjective Well-being, quotes in its introduction 
the following definition and recommendation 
from the earlier Commission on the Measurement 
of Economic and Social Progress:
“Subjective well-being encompasses three differ-
ent aspects: cognitive evaluations of one’s life, 
positive emotions (joy, pride), and negative ones 
(pain, anger, worry). While these aspects of 
subjective well-being have different determinants, 
in all cases these determinants go well beyond 
people’s income and material conditions... All 
these aspects of subjective well-being should be 
measured separately to derive a more compre-
hensive measure of people’s quality of life and to 
allow a better understanding of its determinants 
(including people’s objective conditions). National 
statistical agencies should incorporate questions 
on subjective well-being in their standard surveys 
to capture people’s life evaluations, hedonic 
experiences and life priorities.”12
The OECD Guidelines go on to recommend a 
core module to be used by national statistical 
agencies in their household surveys:
“There are two elements to the core measures 
module. 
The first is a primary measure of life evaluation. 
This represents the absolute minimum required 
to measure subjective well-being, and it is 
recommended that all national statistical agencies 
include this measure in one of their annual 
household surveys.
The second element consists of a short series of 
affect questions and an experimental eudaimonic 
question (a question about life meaning or purpose). 
The inclusion of these measures complements 
the primary evaluative measure both because 
they capture different aspects of subjective well- 
being (with a different set of drivers) and because 
the difference in the nature of the measures 
means that they are affected in different ways by 
cultural and other sources of measurement error. 
While it is highly desirable that these questions are 
collected along with the primary measure as part 
of the core, these questions should be considered 
a lower priority than the primary measure.”13
Almost all OECD countries14 now contain a life 
evaluation on a 0 to 10 rating scale, usually a 
question about life satisfaction. However, it will 
be many years before the accumulated efforts of 
national statistical offices will produce as large a 
number of comparable country surveys as is now 
available through the Gallup World Poll (GWP), 
which has been surveying an increasing number 
of countries since 2005, and now includes almost 
all of the world’s population. The GWP contains 
one life evaluation as well as a range of positive 
and negative experiential questions, including 
several measures of positive and negative affect, 
mainly asked with respect to the previous day. In 
this chapter, we make primary use of the life eval-
uations, since they are, as we show in Table 2.1, 
more international in their variation and are more 
readily explained by life circumstances. In Chapter 
3 we also consider six positive and six negative 
experiences, and show how they vary by age and 
gender among nine global regions.
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support the more general applicability of set 
points.21 However, subsequent research using 
the same data has shown that marriage does 
indeed have long-lasting well-being benefits, 
especially in protecting the married from as 
large a decline in the middle-age years that in 
many countries represents a low-point in life 
evaluations.22
Why Happiness?
Why is this report called the “World Happiness 
Report” rather than the “World Well-being 
Report” or even the “World Subjective Well- 
being Report”? Three strands of argument have 
been used to suggest that our title choice is a bad 
one. First, it has been criticized for narrowness, 
since “happiness” is one of many emotions, so 
that it may be confusing to use it to cover the 
broader range of measures that we deal with. 
Second, it has been criticized for its breadth, 
since the appearance of happiness both as an 
emotion and as a form of evaluation may risk 
confusion.23 Thirdly, some are concerned that our 
title invites dismissal for its apparent flakiness – 
a topic to joke about, or to ignore for not being 
sufficiently serious. A number of these points 
were raised in the 2008 Princeton conference 
underlying a subsequent volume on international 
differences in well-being. The consensus view 
was that “subjective well-being” (SWB) was  
both accurate and appropriately serious to be  
the chosen generic title for the research field.24 
Nonetheless, a number of authors who were 
present, while accepting the accuracy of SWB, 
nonetheless wrote their own books with  
“happiness” in the title because they or their 
editors knew that happiness draws more reader 
interest than does subjective well-being.
There was never any doubt in the editors’ minds 
that the World Happiness Report should have the 
title it does. After all, the 2011 UN General 
Assembly Resolution (proposed by Bhutan),25 
which led to the subsequent April 2012 UN 
High Level Meeting for which the first World 
Happiness Report was prepared, was quite explicit 
in its focus on happiness, as is the Bhutanese 
national objective of Gross National Happiness. 
We have no doubt that the 2012 meeting attracted 
such wide interest because it had such a direct 
focus on happiness rather than on either negative 
emotions or some more general or technical 
description of subjective well-being. Happiness 
has a convening and attention attracting power 
beyond that of subjective well-being. Our hope  
is that it is possible to make use of that power 
while being true to the underlying science.
We find the double usage of happiness – both as 
an emotional report, and as a type of life evaluation 
– an asset. Answers about happiness yesterday 
(questions asking for an emotional report) are 
quite different in structure from answers about 
happiness with life (questions asking for a 
judgment about life). There appears to be little 
doubt that respondents understand the difference 
and answer appropriately.26 The answers to the 
emotional reports are similar in structure to 
those for other emotions, while the “happy with 
life” answers, as we have already seen, are just 
like those for other life evaluations. We turn now 
to consider the differences between emotional 
reports and life evaluations, as a prelude to our 
emphasis on life evaluations for international 
comparisons at the aggregate level, and on both 
experiences and evaluations in Chapter 3, where 
we consider how experiences and life evaluations 
differ by gender and age across the world.
Why Use Life Evaluations for  
International Comparisons of  
the Quality of Life?
In the first two World Happiness Reports we 
presented a wide range of data covering most  
of the experiences and life evaluations that were 
available for large numbers of countries. We were 
grateful for the breadth of available information, 
and used it to deepen our understanding of the 
ways in which experiential and evaluative reports 
What has been learned? First, it is now possible 
to conclude that all three of the commonly used 
life evaluations tell structurally almost identical 
stories about the nature and relative importance 
of the various factors influencing subjective 
well-being. For example, for several years it was 
thought, as is still often reported in the literature, 
that answers to the Cantril ladder question, with 
its use of a ladder as a framing device, were 
more dependent on the respondent’s income 
than were answers to questions about the 
respondent’s satisfaction with life (SWL). The 
evidence for this came from comparing modeling 
using the Cantril ladder in the Gallup World  
Poll (GWP) with that based on life satisfaction 
answers in the World Values Survey (WVS). But 
this comparison, based on two different surveys, 
unfortunately combines survey and method 
differences with the effects of question wording. 
When it subsequently became possible to ask 
both questions15 of the same respondents on the 
same scale, as it was in the Gallup World Poll in 
2007, it was shown that the estimated income 
effects and almost all other structural influences 
were identical, and a more powerful explanation 
was obtained by using an average of the two 
answers.16
It was also believed at one time that questions 
including the word “happiness” elicit answers 
that are less dependent on income than are 
answers to life satisfaction questions or the Cantril 
ladder. Evidence for that view was based on 
comparing WVS happiness and life satisfaction 
answers,17 and by comparing the Cantril ladder 
with happiness yesterday (and other emotions 
yesterday). Both types of comparison showed the 
effects of income on the happiness answers to 
be less significant than on SWL or the Cantril 
ladder. However, the first comparison, using WVS 
data, involved different scales and a question 
about happiness that might have combined 
emotional and evaluative components. The 
second strand of literature, based on GWP data, 
compared happiness yesterday, quite clearly  
an experiential/emotional response, with the 
Cantril ladder, quite clearly an evaluative  
measure. In that context, the finding that income 
has more purchase on life evaluations than on 
emotions seems to have general applicability, 
and stands as an established result.18 
But what if happiness is used as part of a life 
evaluation? That is, if respondents are asked 
how happy, rather than how satisfied, they are 
with their life as a whole? Would the use of 
“happiness” rather than “satisfaction” affect the 
influence of income and other factors on the 
answers? For this important question, no definitive 
answer was available until the European Social 
Survey (ESS) asked both life satisfaction and happy 
with life questions of the same respondents.  
The answers showed that income and other key 
variables all have the same effects on the “happy 
with life” answers as on the “satisfied with life” 
answers, so much so that once again more 
powerful explanations come from averaging the 
two answers.
Another previously common view was that 
changes in life evaluations at the individual  
level were largely transitory as people rapidly 
adapt to their circumstances. This view has been 
rejected by three independent lines of evidence. 
First, average life evaluations differ significantly 
and systematically among countries, and these 
differences are substantially explained by life 
circumstances. This implies that rapid and 
complete adaptation to life circumstances does 
not take place. Second, there is evidence of 
long-standing trends in the life evaluations  
of sub-populations within the same country, 
further demonstrating that life evaluations can 
be changed within policy-relevant time scales.19 
Finally, even though individual-level partial 
adaptation to major life events is a normal 
human response, there is very strong evidence 
of continuing well-being effects from major 
disabilities and unemployment, among other 
life events.20 The case of marriage is still under 
debate. Some recent results using panel data 
from the UK have suggested that people return 
to baseline levels of life satisfaction several years 
after marriage, a result that has been argued to 
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direct measure of subjective well-being, although 
some use SWB measures as a small fixed (Bhutan, 
Italy) or user-chosen (OECD, Legatum) part of 
the overall index. Others make some use of life 
evaluation data in picking indicators or weights 
– e.g. the Gallup/Healthways index chooses 
components in part by their correlations with 
life evaluations, and the Legatum index uses life 
evaluation measures as a means of estimating 
weights on the well-being half of their prosperity 
index. Among these indexes, the Human  
Development Index and the Canadian Index  
of Well-Being are outliers in making no use of 
subjective well-being data.41
The components of the indexes vary with the 
policy interests and objectives of their sponsors. 
For example, the Legatum Prosperity Index gives 
income an extra 50% weight on top of what it 
would have anyway as one of the determinants 
of life satisfaction. The Happy Planet Index 
attaches a large environmental weight, as the 
score is calculated as the product of a life  
evaluation multiplied by average life expectancy, 
then divided by the country’s estimated ecological 
footprint. Once the components are chosen, 
most indexes use equal weights to construct  
the overall index from the components. Since 
the number and nature of the components is  
a matter of the maker’s preference, it is no 
surprise that the different indexes give quite 
different global rankings among nations.
Why do we not rely on any of these indexes,  
or alternatively construct our own, as a basis  
for this chapter? There are many reasons why 
we think this would not be appropriate, among 
which four stand out.
First, we attach fundamental importance to  
the evaluations that people make of their own 
lives. This gives them a reality and power that  
no expert-constructed index could ever have.  
For a report that strives for objectivity, it is very 
important that the rankings depend entirely on 
the basic data collected from population-based 
samples of individuals, and not at all on what  
we think might or should influence the quality 
of their lives. Thus the average scores simply 
reflect what individual respondents report to the 
Gallup World Poll surveyors. The Report editors 
have no power to influence the averages beyond 
the choice of the number of survey years to use 
to establish sufficiently large samples.
Second, the fact that life evaluations represent 
primary new knowledge about the value people 
attach to their lives means we can use the data  
as a basis for research designed to show what 
helps to support better lives.
Third, the fact that our data come from population- 
based samples in each country means that we 
can calculate and present confidence regions 
about our estimates, thus providing a way to  
see if the rankings are based on differences big 
enough, or not, to be statistically meaningful. If 
a number of adjacent ranked countries all have 
values well within the sampling range of vari-
ance, then it can be concluded that they deserve 
to be treated as having statistically equivalent 
average life evaluations.
Fourth, all of the alternative indexes depend 
importantly, but to an unknown extent, on the 
index-makers’ opinions about what is important. 
This uncertainty makes it hard to treat such an 
index as an overall measure of well-being or 
even to work out the extent to which variations 
in individual components are affecting overall 
scores. Even where this decomposition is done, 
there is no way of establishing its validity, since 
the index itself is just the sum of its parts, and 
not an independent measure of well-being.
Finally, we note in passing that data users 
themselves, when given a chance, attach more 
weight to people’s own judgments of their lives 
than to any other well-being indicator. This is 
shown in part by the fact that when the OECD 
invited users to choose their own weights to 
attach to the various sub-indicators of the Better 
are connected. Our conclusion is that the  
measures differ from each other in ways that 
help to understand and validate both. 
For example, experiential reports about happiness 
yesterday are well explained by the events and 
circumstances of the day being asked about. 
They show that most Americans sampled in the 
Gallup/Healthways Daily Poll feel happier on 
weekends, to an extent that depends on the 
social context on and off the job. The weekend 
effect disappears for those employed in a high 
trust workplace, who regard their superior more 
as a partner than a boss, and maintain their 
social hours during weekdays.27 By contrast, life 
evaluations asked of the same respondents in 
that same surveys show no weekend effects.28 
This means that when they are answering the 
evaluative question about life as a whole, people 
see through the day-to-day and hour-to-hour 
fluctuations, so that the answers they give on 
weekdays and weekends do not differ.
On the other hand, although life evaluations  
do not vary by the day of week, they are much 
more responsive than are emotional reports to 
differences in life circumstances. This is true 
whether the comparison is among national 
averages29 or among individuals.30
Furthermore, life evaluations vary more between 
countries than do emotions. Thus almost a quarter 
of the global variation in life evaluations is 
among countries, compared to three-quarters 
among individuals in the same country. This 
one-quarter share for life evaluations is far more 
than for either positive affect (7%) or negative 
affect (4%). One of the reasons why the interna-
tional share for life evaluations is so much higher 
is that income, one of the life circumstances that 
is more powerful for explaining life evaluations 
than for explaining emotions, is also very  
unequally distributed among nations, with more 
than 40% of its variance being among nations 
rather than among individuals within nations.31
These twin facts – that life evaluations vary 
much more than do emotions across countries, 
and that these life evaluation differences are 
much more fully explained than are emotional 
differences by life circumstances – provide for 
us a sufficient reason for using life evaluations 
as our central measure for making international 
comparisons. But there is more. To give a central 
role to life evaluations does not mean we need  
to either ignore or downplay the important  
information provided by experiential measures. 
On the contrary, we see every reason to keep 
experiential measures of well-being, as well as 
measures of life purpose, as important elements 
in our attempts to measure and understand 
subjective well-being. This is easy to achieve, at 
least in principle, because our evidence continues 
to suggest that experienced well-being and a 
sense of life purpose are important influences 
on life evaluations, above and beyond the critical 
role of life circumstances. We shall provide 
direct evidence of this, and especially of the 
importance of positive emotions, in the next 
section. Furthermore, in Chapter 3 we give 
experiential reports central billing in our analysis 
of variations of subjective well-being across 
genders, age groups, and global regions.
Why Not an Index?
Why do we give a primary role for people’s  
own evaluations of their lives, in preference to 
constructing an index, or adopting an index 
prepared by someone else, designed to bring 
together the key elements of a good life? There 
are several index candidates at the global level, 
starting with the UNDP’s Human Development 
Index (HDI),32 and more recently the Happy 
Planet Index,33 the Legatum Prosperity Index,34 
and the Gallup/Healthways Well-Being Index.35 
There are also well-being indexes prepared by 
the OECD (primarily for the OECD countries)36 
and by official or private providers for specific 
countries, including Bhutan,37 the United States,38 
Canada,39 and Italy.40 Each of these indexes has 
its own history and rationale. None of them is a 
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In Table 2.1 we present our latest modeling of 
national average life evaluations and measures 
of positive and negative affect (emotion) by 
country and year. For ease of comparison, the 
table has the same basic structure as Table 2.1  
in the World Happiness Report 2013. The major 
difference comes from the inclusion of data for 
2013 and 2014, which increases by about 200 
the number of country-year observations. There 
are four equations in Table 2.1. The first equation 
underlies our attempts to explain the average 
national life evaluation differences in Figure 2.1 
and provides the basis for constructing the 
sub-bars shown in Figure 2.2. 
The equation explains national average life 
evaluations in terms of six key variables: GDP 
per capita, social support, healthy life expectancy, 
freedom to make life choices, generosity, and 
freedom from corruption.43 Taken together, 
these six variables explain almost three-quarters 
of the variation in national annual average 
ladder scores among countries, using data from 
the years 2005 to 2014.
The second and third columns of Table 2.1 use 
the same six variables to estimate equations for 
national averages of positive and negative affect, 
where both are based on averages for answers 
about yesterday’s emotional experiences. In 
general, the emotional measures, and especially 
negative emotions, are much less fully explained 
by the six variables than are life evaluations. But 
the differences vary a lot from one circumstance 
to another. Household income and healthy life 
expectancy have significant effects on life evalua-
tions, but not, in these national average data, on 
either positive or negative affect. The situation 
changes when we consider social variables. 
Bearing in mind that positive and negative  
affect are measured on a 0 to 1 scale, while life 
evaluations are on a 0 to 10 scale, social support 
can be seen to have the same proportionate 
effects on positive emotions as on life evaluations, 
with the effect only slightly smaller in the case  
of negative affect. Freedom and generosity have 
even larger effects on positive affect than on the 
ladder. Negative affect is significantly reduced by 
social support, freedom, and absence of corruption. 
In the fourth column we re-estimate the life 
evaluation equation from column 1, adding both 
positive and negative affect to partially implement 
the Aristotelian presumption that sustained 
positive emotions are important supports for a 
good life.44 The most striking feature is the extent 
to which the results buttress a central finding in 
positive psychology, that the existence of positive 
emotions matters much more than the absence 
of negative ones. Positive affect has a large and 
highly significant impact in the final equation of 
Table 2.1, while negative affect has none. 
As for the coefficients on the other variables in 
the final equation, the changes are material only 
on those variables – especially freedom and 
generosity – that have the largest impacts on 
positive affect. Thus we can infer first that 
positive emotions play a strong role in support 
of life evaluations, and second that most of the 
impact of freedom and generosity on life evalua-
tions is mediated by their influence on positive 
emotions. That is, freedom and generosity have 
a large impact on positive affect, which in turn 
has an impact on life evaluations. The Gallup 
World Poll does not have a widely available 
measure of life purpose to test whether it too 
would play a strong role in support of high life 
evaluations. However, data from the large 
samples of UK data now available do suggest 
that life purpose plays a strongly supportive role, 
independent of the roles of life circumstances 
and positive emotions.
Life Index, they found that in every country 
users typically attached high importance to life 
evaluations and health relative to other possibilities 
offered on the dashboard.42
Life Evaluations Around the World
In this edition of the World Happiness Report we 
divide our main data presentation between two 
chapters, with average national life evaluation 
and affect levels, and changes in life evaluations, 
shown and explained in this chapter. Chapter 3 
presents and analyzes life evaluations and 12 
experiential measures, split by gender, age and 
global region.
We start, in Figure 2.1, with a map showing the 
geographic distribution of the 2012-2014 average 
national values for answers to the Cantril ladder 
question asking respondents to value their lives 
today on a 0 to 10 scale, with the worst possible 
life as a 0 and the best possible life as a 10. For 
the purposes of the map, countries are divided 
into 10 groups, with the darkest green for the 
highest averages, and the darkest red for the 
lowest. The scale range shows how widely life 
evaluations differ around the world. The averages 
in the top decile of countries are more than twice 
as high as in the bottom decile. To a surprising 
extent these differences are linked to differences 
in as few as six key variables that together cover 
important aspects of the components of a good 
life. When we come to present average 2012-
2014 ladder scores for each country in Figure 
2.2, we will include our attempts to attribute 
these differences to differences among countries 
in each of the six variables.
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Table 2.1: Regressions to Explain National Average Happiness Technical Box 2: Detailed information about each of the predictors in Table 2.1
Notes: This is a pooled OLS regression for a tattered panel explaining annual national average Cantril ladder  
responses from all available surveys from 2005 to 2014. See Technical Box 2 for detailed information about each  
of the predictors. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.  
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.
1.  GDP per capita is in terms of Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) adjusted to constant 2011 
international dollars, taken from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) released by 
the World Bank in November 2014. See the 
appendix for more details. GDP data for 2014 
are not yet available, so we extend the GDP 
time series from 2013 to 2014 using country- 
specific forecasts of real GDP growth from the 
OECD Economic Outlook (May 2014 release) 
for OECD countries, and the World Bank’s 
Global Economic Prospects (June 2014 release) 
for the rest of the world, after adjustment for 
population growth. The equation uses the 
natural log of GDP per capita, since that form 
fits the data significantly better than does 
GDP per capita.
2.  Social support (or having someone to count 
on in times of trouble) is the national average 
of the binary responses (either 0 or 1) to the 
Gallup World Poll (GWP) question “If you 
were in trouble, do you have relatives or 
friends you can count on to help you whenever 
you need them, or not?”
3.  The time series of healthy life expectancy at 
birth are constructed based on data from the 
World Health Organization (WHO) and the 
World Development Indicators (WDI). The 
WHO publishes the data on healthy life expec-
tancy for the year 2012. The time series of life 
expectancies, with no adjustment for health, 
are available in the WDI. We adopt the following 
strategy to construct the time series of healthy 
life expectancy at birth: first we generate the 
ratios of healthy life expectancy to life expectancy 
in 2012 for countries with both data. We then 
apply the country-specific ratios to other years 
to generate the healthy life expectancy data. 
See the appendix for more details. 
4.  Freedom to make life choices is the national 
average of binary responses to the GWP 
question “Are you satisfied or dissatisfied 
with your freedom to choose what you do 
with your life?” 
5.  Generosity is the residual of regressing the 
national average of GWP responses to the 
question “Have you donated money to a charity 
in the past month?” on GDP per capita. 
6.  Perceptions of corruption are the average 
of binary answers to two GWP questions: 
“Is corruption widespread throughout the 
government or not?” and “Is corruption 
widespread within businesses or not?” Where 
data for government corruption are missing, 
the perception of business corruption is used 
as the overall corruption-perception measure. 
7.  Positive affect is defined as the average of 
previous-day affect measures for happiness, 
laughter and enjoyment for GWP waves 3-7 
(years 2008 to 2012, and some in 2013). It is 
defined as the average of laughter and enjoy-
ment for other waves where the happiness 
question was not asked. 
8.  Negative affect is defined as the average of 
previous-day affect measures for worry, 
sadness and anger for all waves. See the 
appendix for more details.
Dependent Variable
Independent Variable Cantril Ladder Positive Affect Negative Affect Cantril Ladder
Log GDP per capita 0.326 -0.005 0.011 0.339
(0.062)*** (0.009) (0.008) (0.061)***
Social support 2.385 0.233 -0.220 1.802
(0.462)*** (0.053)*** (0.047)*** (0.442)***
Healthy life expectancy at birth 0.028 0.001 0.002 0.026
(0.008)*** (0.001) (0.0009)** (0.008)***
Freedom to make life choices 1.054 0.330 -0.106 0.274
(0.341)*** (0.039)*** (0.046)** (0.327)
Generosity 0.787 0.169 -0.001 0.390
(0.273)*** (0.034)*** (0.032) (0.270)
Perceptions of corruption -0.632 0.031 0.092 -0.683





Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included
Number of countries 156 156 156 156
Number of observations 974 971 973 970
Adjusted R-squared 0.739 0.490 0.223 0.765
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live longer, to be more trusting, more cooperative, 
and generally better able to meet life’s demands.47 
This will feed back to influence health, GDP, 
generosity, corruption, and the sense of freedom. 
Finally, some of the variables are derived from 
the same respondents as the life evaluations, and 
hence possibly determined by common factors. 
This risk is much less using national averages, 
because individual personality differences tend 
to average out at the national level.
The seventh and final segment is the sum of two 
components. The first is a fixed baseline number 
representing our calculation of the benchmark 
ladder score for Dystopia (=2.10). The second 
component is the average 2012-2014 residual for 
each country. The sum of these two components 
comprises the right-hand sub-bar for each 
country; it varies from one country to the next 
because some countries have life evaluations 
above their predicted values, and others lower. 
The residual simply represents that part of the 
national average ladder score that is not explained 
by our model; with the residual included, the 
sum of all the sub-bars adds up to the actual 
average life evaluations on which the rankings 
are based.
What do the latest data show for the 2012-2014 
country rankings? Two main facts carry over 
from the previous editions of the World Happiness 
Report. First, there is a lot of year-to-year consistency 
in the way people rate their lives in different 
countries. Thus there remains a four-point gap 
between the 10 top-ranked and the 10 bottom- 
ranked countries, and most of the countries in 
the top and bottom 10 are the same as in the 
World Happiness Report 2013. Second, despite this 
general consistency and stability, many countries 
have had, as we shall show later in more detail, 
substantial changes in average scores, and hence 
in country rankings, between 2005-2007 and 
2012-2014.
Figure 2.2 shows the average ladder score (the 
average answer to the Cantril ladder question, 
asking people to evaluate the quality of their 
current lives on a scale of 0 to 10) for each 
country, averaged over the years 2012-2014.  
Not every country has surveys in every year; the 
total sample sizes are reported in the statistical 
appendix, and are revealed in Figure 2.2 by the 
horizontal lines showing the 95% confidence 
regions, which are smaller for countries with 
larger samples. To increase the number of 
countries ranked, we also include seven countries 
that had no 2012-2014 surveys, but did have a 
survey in 2011. This brings the number of 
countries shown in Figure 2.2 up to 158. 
The length of each overall bar represents the 
average score, which is also shown in numerals. 
The rankings in Figure 2.2 depend only on the 
average Cantril ladder scores reported by the 
respondents, and not on our research efforts 
aimed at finding possible reasons. 
Each of these bars is divided into seven segments. 
The first six sub-bars show how much each of 
the six key variables is calculated to contribute  
to that country’s ladder score, relative to that in  
a hypothetical country called Dystopia, so named 
because it has values equal to the world’s lowest 
national averages for 2012-2014 for each of the 
six key variables used in Table 2.1. We use 
Dystopia as a benchmark against which to 
compare each other country’s performance in 
terms of each of the six factors. This choice of 
benchmark permits every real country to have  
a non-negative contribution from each of the  
six factors. We calculate, based on estimates in 
Table 2.1, a 2012–2014 ladder score in Dystopia 
to have been 2.10 on the 10-point scale. The  
final sub-bar is the sum of two components:  
the calculated average 2012-2014 life evaluation 
in Dystopia (=2.10) and each country’s own 
prediction error (residual), which measures the 
extent to which life evaluations are higher or 
lower than predicted by our equation in the first 
column of Table 2.1. The residual is as likely to 
be negative as positive.45
Returning to the six sub-bars showing the 
contribution of each factor to each country’s 
average life evaluation, it might help to show  
in more detail how this is done. Taking the 
example of healthy life expectancy, the sub-bar 
for this factor in the case of Brazil is equal to  
the amount by which healthy life expectancy in 
Brazil exceeds the world’s lowest value, multiplied 
by the Table 2.1 coefficient for the influence of 
healthy life expectancy on life evaluations. The 
width of these different sub-bars then shows, 
country-by-country, how much each of the six 
variables is estimated to contribute to explaining 
the international ladder differences. These 
calculations are illustrative rather then conclusive, 
for several reasons. First, the selection of candidate 
variables was restricted by what is available for 
all these countries. Traditional variables like 
GDP per capita and healthy life expectancy are 
widely available. But measures of the quality of 
the social context, which have been shown in 
experiments and national surveys to have strong 
links to life evaluations, have not been sufficiently 
surveyed in the Gallup or other global polls. 
Even with this limited choice, we find that four 
variables covering different aspects of the social 
and institutional context – having someone to 
count on, generosity, freedom to make life 
choices and absence of corruption – are together 
responsible for 55% of the average differences 
between each country’s predicted ladder score 
and that in Dystopia in the 2012-2014 period. The 
average country has a 2012-2014 ladder score that 
is 3.28 points above the Dystopia ladder score of 
2.1. Of this 3.28 points, the largest single part 
(30%) comes from social support, followed by 
GDP per capita and healthy life expectancy (26% 
and 19%), and then by freedom (13%), generosity 
(7%) and corruption (4%).46
Our limited choice means that the variables  
we do use may be taking credit properly due to 
other better variables, or to un-measurable other 
factors. There are also likely to be vicious or 
virtuous circles, with two-way linkages among the 
variables. For example, there is much evidence 
that those who have happier lives are likely to 
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Figure 2.2: Ranking of Happiness 2012-2014 (Part 1) Figure 2.2: Ranking of Happiness 2012-2014 (Part 2)











































96. Bosnia and Herzegovina (4.949)
97. Lesotho (4.898)

















9. New Zealand (7.286)
10. Australia (7.284)
11. Israel (7.278)
12. Costa Rica (7.226)
13. Austria (7.200)
14. Mexico (7.187)





20. United Arab Emirates (6.901)




















41. Trinidad and Tobago (6.168)
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When looking at the average ladder scores, it is 
important to note also the horizontal whisker lines 
at the right hand end of the main bar for each 
country. These lines denote the 95% confidence 
regions for the estimates, and countries with 
overlapping errors bars have scores that do not 
significantly differ from each other. Thus it can 
be seen that the four top-ranked countries 
(Switzerland, Iceland, Denmark and Norway) 
have overlapping confidence regions, and all 
have national average ladder scores above 7.5. 
The next four countries (Canada, Finland, 
Netherlands and Sweden) have overlapping 
confidence regions and average ladder scores 
above 7.35, while the final two (Australia and 
New Zealand) have almost identical averages 
just below 7.3.
The 10 countries with the lowest ladder scores 
2012-2014 all have averages below 3.7. They span 
a range twice as large as the 10 top countries, 
with the three lowest countries having averages 
of 3.0 or lower. Eight of the 10 are in sub-Saharan 
Africa, while the remaining two are war-torn 
countries in other regions (Syria in the Middle 
East and Afghanistan in South Asia).
Average life evaluations in the top 10 countries 
are more than twice as high as in the bottom 10, 
7.4 compared to 3.4. If we use the first equation 
of Table 2.1 to look for possible reasons for these 
very different life evaluations, it suggests that of 
the 4 point difference, 3 points can be traced to 
differences in the six key factors: 1 point from 
the GDP per capita gap, 0.8 due to differences 
in social support, 0.6 to differences in healthy 
life expectancy, 0.3 to differences in freedom, 
0.2 to differences in corruption, and 0.14 to 
differences in generosity. Income differences  
are as much as one-third of the total explanation 
because, of the six factors, income is the most 
unequally distributed among countries. GDP 
per capita is 25 times higher in the top 10 than 
in the bottom 10 countries.48
Overall, the model explains quite well the life 
evaluation differences within as well as between 
regions and for the world as a whole.49 However, 
on average the countries of Latin America have 
average life evaluations that are higher (by about 
0.5 on the 10 point scale) than predicted by the 
model. This difference has been found in earlier 
work, and variously been considered to represent 
systematic personality differences, some unique 
features of family and social life in Latin countries, 
or some other cultural differences.50 In partial 
contrast, the countries of East Asia have average 
life evaluations below those predicted by the 
model, a finding that has been thought to reflect, 
at least in part, cultural differences in response 
style. It is also possible that both differences are 
in substantial measure due to the existence of 
important excluded features of life that are more 
prevalent in those countries than elsewhere.51 It 
is reassuring that our findings about the relative 
importance of the six factors are generally 
unaffected by whether or not we make explicit 
allowance for these regional differences.52
Navigating the Recession
In this section we consider how life evaluations 
have fared from 2005-2007, before the onset  
of the global recession, to 2012-2014, the most 
recent three-year period for which data from the 
Gallup World Poll are available. In Figure 2.3 we 
show the changes for all 125 countries that have 
sufficient numbers of observations for both 
2005-2007 and 2012-2014.53
Of the 125 countries with data for 2005-2007 
and 2012-2014, 53 had significant increases, 
ranging from 0.15 to 1.12 points on the 0 to 10 
scale, while 41 showed significant decreases, 
ranging from -0.11 to -1.47 points, with the 
remaining 26 countries showing no significant 
change. Among the 10 top gainers, all of which 
showed average ladder scores increasing by 0.77 
or more, five are in Latin America, three are in 
sub-Saharan Africa, and two are in the transition 
countries. Among the 10 top losers, all of which 
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Figure 2.2: Ranking of Happiness 2012-2014 (Part 3)
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120. Congo (Kinshasa) (4.517)
121. Nepal (4.514)
122. Ethiopia (4.512)

























148. Central African Republic (3.678)
149. Chad (3.667)
150. Guinea (3.656)
151. Ivory Coast (3.655)
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showed ladder reductions of 0.63 or more,  
three were in the Middle East and North Africa, 
three were in Western Europe, and four were in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa thus 
displayed the greatest variety of experiences, 
while the other regions were all more unevenly 
split between gainers and losers.
Figure 2.3: Changes in Happiness from 2005-2007 to 2012-2014 (Part 1)
Figure 2.3: Changes in Happiness from 2005-2007 to 2012-2014 (Part 2)



































35. Trinidad and Tobago (0.336)
36. Albania (0.325)
37. Mauritania (0.287)
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62. Bosnia and Herzegovina (0.049)
63. Slovenia (0.036)






70. United Kingdom (-0.019)
71. Mali (-0.019)
72. Australia (-0.026)
73. Costa Rica (-0.032)
74. Venezuela (-0.037)







82. Sri Lanka (-0.108)
83. Chad (-0.121)
84. Nepal (-0.143)
85. New Zealand (-0.146)
86. Niger (-0.155)
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These gains and losses are very large, especially 
for the 10 most affected gainers and losers.  
For each of the 10 top gainers, the average life 
evaluation gains exceeded those that would be 
expected from a doubling of per capita incomes. 
For the 10 countries with the biggest drops in 
average life evaluations, the losses were more 
than would be expected from a halving of GDP 
per capita. Thus the changes are far more than 
would be expected from income losses or gains 
flowing from macroeconomic changes, even in 
the wake of an economic crisis as large as that 
following 2007. Thus, although we expect life 
evaluations to reflect important consequences of 
the global recession, there are clearly additional 
forces at play that have moderated, exacerbated or 
overridden global economic factors as drivers of 
national well-being from 2005-2007 to 2012-2014.
On the gaining side of the ledger, the inclusion 
of five Latin American countries among the top 
10 gainers is emblematic of a broader Latin 
American experience. The analysis in Figure 3.10 
of Chapter 3 shows that Latin Americans in all 
age groups reported substantial and continuing 
increases in life evaluations between 2007 and 
2013.54 The large increases in some transition 
countries supported average increases in life 
evaluations in the transition countries. The 
appearance of sub-Saharan African countries 
among the biggest gainers and the biggest losers 
reflects the variety and volatility of experiences 
among the 25 sub-Saharan countries for which 
changes are shown in Figure 2.3.
The 10 countries with the largest declines in 
average life evaluations typically suffered some 
combination of economic, political and social 
stresses. Three of the countries (Greece, Italy 
and Spain) were among the four hard-hit Euro-
zone countries whose post-crisis experience was 
analyzed in detail in the World Happiness Report 
2013. The losses were seen to be greater than 
could be explained directly by macroeconomic 
factors, even when explicit account was taken  
of the substantial consequences of higher 
unemployment.55 The four countries in the 
Middle East and North Africa showed differing 
mixes of political and social unrest, while the 
three sub-Saharan African countries were more 
puzzling cases.56
Looking at the list as a whole, and not just at the 
largest gainers and losers, what were the circum-
stances and policies that enabled some countries 
to navigate the recession, in terms of happiness, 
better than others? The argument was made in 
theWorld Happiness Report 2013 that the strength 
of the underlying social fabric, as represented by 
levels of trust and institutional strength, affects  
a society’s resiliency in response to economic 
and social crises. In this view, the value of social 
and institutional capital lies not just in the direct 
support that it provides for subjective well-being, 
but also in its ability to support collaborative 
rather than confrontational responses to external 
shocks and crises. The case of Greece, which 
remains the biggest happiness loser in Figure 
2.3 (almost 1.5 points down from 2005-2007 to 
2012-2014), was given special attention since the 
well-being losses were so much greater than could 
be explained directly by economic outcomes. The 
case was made that there is an interaction between 
social capital and economic or other crises,  
with the crisis providing a test of the quality  
of the underlying social fabric. If the fabric is 
sufficiently strong, then the crisis may even lead 
to higher subjective well-being, in part by giving 
people a chance to work together towards good 
purpose, and to realize and appreciate the 
strength of their mutual social support; and in 
part because the crisis will be better handled and 
the underlying social capital improved in use. 
On the other hand, should social institutions prove 
inadequate in the face of the challenges posed by 
the crisis, they may crumble further under the 
resulting pressures, making the happiness losses 
even greater, since social and institutional trust 
are themselves important supports for subjective 
well-being. The example of Greece was used as 
evidence for the latter possibility, with trust data 
from the European Social Survey used to document 
the erosion of the perceived quality of the Greek 
climate of trust.57
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Switzerland and including Iceland and Norway. 
The 10 top countries are once again all small or 
medium-sized western industrial countries, of 
which seven are in Western Europe. Beyond the 
first ten, the geography immediately becomes 
more varied, with the second 10 including 
countries from four of the nine global regions.
In the top 10 countries, life evaluations average 
7.4 on the 0 to 10 scale, while for the bottom 10 
the average is less than half that, at 3.4. The 
lowest countries are typically marked by low 
values on all of the six variables used here to 
explain international differences – GDP per 
capita, healthy life expectancy, social support, 
freedom, generosity and absence of corruption 
– and often subject in addition to violence and 
disease. Of the 4-point gap between the 10 top 
and 10 bottom countries, three-quarters is 
accounted for by differences in the six variables, 
with GDP per capita, social support and healthy 
life expectancy the largest contributors.
When we turn to consider life evaluation  
changes for 125 countries between 2005-2007 
and 2012-2014, we see lots of evidence of  
movement, including 53 significant gainers  
and 41 significant losers. Gainers especially 
outnumber losers in Latin America, the  
Commonwealth of Independent States (former 
Soviet states) and Central and Eastern Europe 
(CIS/CEE). Losers outnumber gainers in  
Western Europe and to a lesser extent in South 
Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.63 Changes in the 
six key variables explain a significant proportion 
of these changes, although the magnitude and 
natures of the crises facing nations since 2005 
has been such as to move countries beyond the 
range of recent past experience, and into poorly 
charted waters. In particular, we found further 
evidence that major crises have the potential  
to alter life evaluations in quite different ways 
according to the quality of the social and  
institutional infrastructure. In particular, as 
analyzed first in the World Happiness Report  
2013, we found evidence that a crisis imposed  
on a weak institutional structure can actually 
further damage the quality of the supporting 
social fabric if the crisis triggers blame and strife 
rather than cooperation and repair. On the other 
hand, we found evidence that economic crises 
and natural disasters can, if the underlying 
institutions and fabric are of sufficient quality, 
lead to improvements rather than damage to the 
social fabric. These improvements not only 
ensure better responses to the crisis, but also 
have substantial additional happiness returns, 
since people place real value on feeling that they 
belong to a caring and effective community.
The evidence establishing the social and  
institutional context as an important part of  
the mechanisms linking external crises to their 
national happiness consequences, to be really 
convincing, needs examples on both sides of  
the ledger. It is one thing to show cases, such  
as Greece, where the happiness losses were very 
big and where the erosion of the social fabric 
appeared to be a part of the story. How about 
evidence on the other side, of countries with 
strong social fabrics being able to face comparably 
large shocks with better happiness consequences? 
With respect to the post-2007 economic crisis, 
the best examples of happiness maintenance in 
the face of large external shocks are Ireland and 
especially Iceland. Both suffered decimation of 
their banking systems as extreme as anywhere, 
and yet have suffered incommensurately small 
happiness losses. In the Icelandic case, the 
post-shock recovery in life evaluations has been 
great enough to put Iceland second in the global 
rankings for 2012-2014. That there is a continuing 
high degree of social support in both countries 
is indicated by the fact that of all the countries 
surveyed by the Gallup World Poll, the percentage 
of people who report that they have someone to 
count on in times of crisis is highest in Iceland 
and Ireland.58
If the social context is important for happiness- 
supporting resilience under crisis, it is likely to 
be equally applicable for non-economic crises. 
To add to earlier evidence about differential 
responses following the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami,59 there is now research showing that 
levels of trust and social capital in the Fukushima 
region of Japan were sufficient that the Great 
East Japan Earthquake of 2011 actually led to 
increased trust and happiness in the region.60 
This shows how crises can actually lead to 
improved happiness, by providing people with  
a chance to use, to cherish, and to build their 
mutual dependence and cooperative capacities.61
There is also evidence that broader measures  
of good governance have enabled countries to 
sustain or improve happiness during the economic 
crisis. Recent results show not just that people 
are more satisfied with their lives in countries 
with better governance, but also that actual 
changes in governance quality since 2005 have 
led to significant changes in the quality of life. 
This suggests that governance quality can be 
changed within policy-relevant time horizons, 
and that these changes have much larger effects 
than those flowing simply through a more 
productive economy. For example, the 10 
most-improved countries, in terms of changes  
in government service delivery quality between 
2005 and 2012, when compared to the 10 
countries with most-worsened delivery quality, 
are estimated to have thereby increased average 
life evaluations by as much as would be produced 
by a 40% increase in per capita incomes.62
Summary and Conclusions
In this Report the main global happiness data  
are split between two chapters. In this Chapter 
we have presented and attempted to explain the 
national levels and changes of life evaluations, 
positive affect and negative affect. In Chapter 3 
there is a much larger body of data showing life 
evaluations and a number of specific positive 
and negative experiences split by gender, age 
and region. These more detailed data reveal 
many important similarities and many important 
differences among cultures, genders and ages.
In presenting and explaining the national-level 
data in this chapter, we make primary use of 
people’s own reports of the quality of their lives, 
as measured on a scale with 10 representing the 
best possible life and 0 the worst. We average 
their reports for the years 2012 to 2014, providing 
a typical national sample size of 3,000. We then 
rank these data for 158 countries, as shown in 
Figure 2.2. The traditional top country, Denmark, 
this year ranks third in a cluster of four European 
countries with statistically similar scores, led by 
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29  Table 2.1 of the World Happiness Report 2013 shows that  
a set of six variables descriptive of life circumstances 
explains 74% of the variations over time and across 
countries of national average life evaluations, compared  
to 48% for a measure of positive emotions and 23% for 
negative emotions. See Helliwell & Wang (2013, 19).
30  Using a global sample of roughly 650,000 individual 
responses, a set of individual-level measures of the same 
six life circumstances (using a question about health 
problems to replace healthy life expectancy) explains 
19.5% of the variations in life evaluations, compared to 
7.4% for positive affect, and 4.6% for negative affect. 
31  As shown in Table 2.1 of the first World Happiness Report. 
See Helliwell et al. (2012, 16).
32 See Anand & Sen (1994) and Hall (2013).
33 See Marks et al. (2006) and Abdallah et al. (2012).
34 See http://www.prosperity.com
35 See http://info.healthways.com/wellbeingindex 
36 See OECD (2011).
37 See Ura et al. (2012).
38 See http://info.healthways.com/wellbeingindex
39 See https://uwaterloo.ca/canadian-index-wellbeing
40  The BES Equitable and Sustainable Wellbeing index for 
Italy is an equally weighted average of 12 domain indicators, 
one of which is subjective well-being. It is a collaborative 
venture of the Italian National Council for Economics and 
Labour and the Italian National Institute of Statistics. See 
ISTAT (2014) and http://www.misuredelbenessere.it/
fileadmin/upload/Bes___2014_Media_summary.pdf 
41  Yang (2014) provides a much larger inventory of composite 
indexes for various aspects of human progress.
42 See http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/responses
43  The definitions of the variables are shown in the notes to 
Table 2.1, with additional detail in the online data appendix.
44  This influence may be direct, as many have found,  
e.g. De Neve et al. (2013). It may also embody the idea, 
made explicit in Fredrickson’s broaden-and-build theory 
(Fredrickson [2001]), that good moods help to induce the 
sorts of positive connections that eventually provide the 
basis for better life circumstances. 
45  We put the contributions of the six factors as the first 
elements in the overall country bars because this makes  
it easier to see that the length of the overall bar depends 
only on the average answers given to the life evaluation 
question. In the WHR 2013 we adopted a different ordering, 
putting the combined Dystopia+residual elements on  
the left of each bar to make it easier to compare the sizes  
of residuals across countries. To make that comparison 
equally possible in the WHR 2015, we include the alternative 
form of the figure in the online statistical appendix.
46  These calculations are shown in detail in Table 9 of the 
online Statistical Appendix.
47  The prevalence of these feedbacks was documented in 
Chapter 4 of the World Happiness Report 2013, De Neve  
et al. (2013).
48  The data and calculations are shown in detail in Table 10 
of the Statistical Appendix. Average annual per capita 
incomes average $43,000 in the top 10 countries, 
compared to $1,770 in the bottom 10, measured in 
international dollars at purchasing power parity. For 
comparison, 94% of respondents have someone to count 
on in the top 10 countries, compared to 61% in the bottom 
10. Healthy life expectancy is 71.5 years in the top 10, 
compared to 50 years in the bottom 10. 93% of the top 10 
respondents think they have sufficient freedom to make 
key life choices, compared to 64% in the bottom 10. 
Average perceptions of corruption are 38% in the top 10, 
compared to 71% in the bottom 10.
49  Plots of actual and predicted national and regional average 
2012-2014 life evaluations are plotted in Figure 4 of the 
online Statistical Appendix. The 45 degree line in each 
part of the Figure shows a situation where the actual and 
predicted values are equal. A predominance of country dots 
below the 45 degree line shows a region where actual values 
are below those predicted by the model, and vice versa. 
50  Mariano Rojas has correctly noted, in partial exception to 
our earlier conclusion about the structural equivalence of 
the Cantril ladder and SWL, that if our figure could be 
drawn using SWL rather than the ladder it would show an 
even larger Latin American premium (based on data from 
2007, the only year when the GWP asked both questions 
of the same respondents.). 
51 For example, see Chen et al. (1995).
52  One slight exception is that the negative effect of corruption 
is estimated to be larger if we include a separate regional 
effect variable for Latin America. This is because corruption 
is worse than average in Latin America, and the inclusion 
of a special Latin American variable thereby permits the 
corruption coefficient to take a higher value. Veenhoven 
(2012) has performed a number of related tests of the 
sources and consequences of these regional differences, 
and concluded that they do not unduly dampen the ability 
to measure and explain happiness differences across 
countries. 
1   Diener (2013) estimates the number of new scientific 
articles on subjective well-being to have grown by almost 
two orders of magnitude in the past 25 years, from about 
130 per year in 1980 to more than 1,000 per month in 2013.
2 See OECD (2013).
3 See Durand & Smith (2013).
4  See Ryff & Singer (2008). The first use of a question about 
life meaning or purpose in a large-scale international 
survey was in the Gallup World Poll waves of 2006 and 
2007. It was also introduced in the third round of the 
European Social Survey (Huppert et al. 2009). It has since 
become one of the four key well-being questions asked by 
the UK Office for National Statistics (Hicks et al. 2013).
5  See Hicks et al. (2013, 78) for the exact wording of the 
questions, which are all asked with 0 to 10 response scales.
6  “It should be made explicit that the panel’s interpretation 
of its charge was to provide guidance primarily for 
measurement and data collection in the area of experienced 
(hedonic) well-being (ExWB). While acknowledging that 
measurement of the multiple dimensions of SWB is 
essential to a full understanding of it, this focus reflects 
the status of research on ExWB, which is less developed 
than it is for evaluative well-being, another dimension of 
SWB.” See Stone & Mackie, eds. (2013, 2).
7  See Redelmeier & Kahneman (1996).
8 See Kahneman et al. (1997).
9 See Wirtz et al. (2003).
10 See Kahneman et al. (2004).
11  As is shown in the online appendix supplied by the 
OECD, experiential data are collected by the United States, 
France and Canada. Life satisfaction measures are 
collected by all OECD countries except the United States, 
Japan and Chile.
12 Stiglitz et al. (2009, 216).
13 OECD (2013, 164)
14  The latest OECD list of reporting countries is available as 
an online annex to this report.
15  The Gallup Organization kindly agreed to include the 
SWL question in 2007 to enable this scientific issue to  
be addressed. Unfortunately, it has not yet been possible, 
because of limited space, to establish SWL as a core 
question in the continuing surveys.
16 See Table 10.1 of Helliwell et al. (2010, 298).
17  See Table 1.2 of Diener et al. (2010), which shows at the 
national level GDP per capita correlates more closely  
with WVS life satisfaction answers than with happiness 
answers. See also Figure 17.2 of Helliwell & Putnam 
(2005, 446), which compares partial income responses 
within individual-level equations for WVS life satisfaction 
and happiness answers. One difficulty with these  
comparisons, both of which do show bigger income 
effects for life satisfaction than for happiness, lies in the 
different response scales. This provides one reason for 
differing results. The second, and likely more important, 
reason is that the WVS happiness question lies somewhere 
in the middle ground between an emotional and an 
evaluative query. Table 1.3 of Diener et al. (2010) shows a 
higher correlation between income and the ladder than 
between income and life satisfaction using Gallup World 
Poll data, but this is shown, by Table 10.1 of Helliwell et al. 
(2010), to be because of using non-matched sets of 
respondents.
18  For an example using individual-level data, see Kahneman 
& Deaton (2010), and for national-average data Table 2.1 of 
Helliwell & Wang (2013, 19) or Table 2.1 of this chapter.
19  Barrington-Leigh (2013) documents a significant upward 
trend in life satisfaction in Québec, compared to the rest 
of Canada, of a size accumulating over 25 years to an 
amount equivalent to more than a trebling of mean 
household income.
20 See Lucas et al. (2003) and Yap et al. (2012).
21 See Lucas et al. (2003) and Clark & Georgellis (2013).
22 See Yap et al. (2012) and Grover & Helliwell (2014).
23  For example: “‘Happiness’ has been used in reference to 
momentary emotional states and also as a way of describing 
overall life evaluations; such lack of specificity has at times 
muddled the discourse.” Stone & Mackie (2013, 4).
24 See Diener et al. (2010, xi).
25  UN General Assembly Resolution A/65/L.86 (13 July 2011).
26  The ability of people to see and apply this logic as a natural 
conversational skill is well accepted within linguistic 
philosophy. The case is well made by Grice (1975), recently 
reprinted as Grice (2013).
27  See Stone et al. (2012) and Tables 3 and 4 of Helliwell & 
Wang (2014). The presence of day-of-week effects for 
mood reports is also shown in Ryan et al. (2010). 
28  See Stone et al. (2012) and Tables 3 and 4 of Helliwell & 
Wang (2014). The absence of day-of-week effects for life 
evaluations is also shown in Bonikowska et al. (2013).
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Introduction
In this chapter we present subjective well-being 
data split by gender and age. Although our initial 
primary interest was in gender differences, we 
soon realized that the data need to be divided by 
both gender and age to become really informative 
about gender aspects of life around the world. In 
order to keep our sample sizes sufficiently large, 
we do most of our analysis using data covering 
the whole 10-year period for which the Gallup 
World Poll (GWP) has been conducted. Our first 
section deals with life evaluations, first at the 
global level and then for nine global regions.  
We then consider six positive and six negative 
experiences, mostly relating to feelings or emotions 
on the previous day, that are collected regularly 
in the Gallup World Poll, chosen to include 
especially those that previous research has 
shown to have interesting variations by gender, 
age or culture. We then consider variations by 
gender and age, globally and by region, in the six 
variables used in Chapter 2 to explain country 
level differences in life evaluations and affect.
In the final two sections we dig deeper into two 
aspects of the data already presented. First we 
make a preliminary attempt to disentangle 
cohort and age effects, limited by the relatively 
short time span for which Gallup World Poll 
data are available. Then we turn to consider 
gender differences in labor force participation 
across countries to see to what extent they help 
to explain international differences in gender 
gaps in variables already studied, for example 
feeling well-rested. 
Life Evaluations by Gender and Age
As we have already seen in Chapter 2, there are 
very large differences among countries throughout 
the world in their average life evaluations. In the 
current section of this chapter we examine how 
these differences compare with those between 
genders and among age groups, for the world as 
a whole and in each of nine global regions. 
Figure 3.1 shows our global distribution of 
ladder scores by gender and age. The global 
totals combine the regional average scores using 
weights for each region’s share of global population. 
In order to increase sample size, and because 
the relations we have uncovered are fairly 
constant from year to year, Figures 3.1 to 3.9 are 
based on all the data collected by the Gallup 
World Poll from 2005 through most of 2014. 
This large sample size means that the 95% 
confidence intervals (shown by the shaded areas 
surrounding each of the lines) for our estimates 
of average values are fairly narrow. Thus we are 
able to say, in Figure 3.1, that on a global average 
basis females have higher life evaluations than 
do males,1 by an amount that is highest about 
the age of 30. Over all age groups taken together 
females average 0.09 points higher on the 0 to 
10 life evaluation scale, or 1.5% of the global 
average life evaluation.
There are substantial variations among regions in 
gender differences in life evaluations.2 Females 
have higher life evaluations than males, of slight 
but statistically significant size, in five of the eight 
global regions: NANZ (+0.17 points), Southeast 
(SE) Asia (+0.09), South Asia (+0.05), East Asia 
(+0.09) and MENA (+0.28). Females have life 
evaluations significantly lower than males in two 
regions: CEE+CIS (-0.07) and sub-Saharan Africa 
(-0.03). There are very small and insignificant 
gender differences in Western Europe and Latin 
America. The differences among age groups are 
much larger, and more prevalent. Both males and 
females show, on a global average basis, a life 
evaluation decline with age in the early decades. 
It drops by 0.6 points, or more than 10% of the 
global average, from the teenage years (15 to 19) 
until the low point in midlife, and then stays 
roughly constant over the rest of the age distri-
bution. The global figures in this chapter are all 
defined as averages of the regional figures, using 
the average total population of each region as 
weights. This ensures that the global and regional 
figures are consistent, and permits the shape of 
the global figures to be explained by examining 
the shapes of the regional figures.3
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Europe (CIS+CEE) display little gender difference, 
and a sharply falling trend from lower to higher 
age groups. Latin America has little by way of 
gender differences, but has a much less steep 
downward trend across age groups. The biggest 
gender differences favoring women are in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where 
the gap for women in their early 20s is almost 
10% of the national average, falling thereafter 
among the older age groups.6 Western Europe 
follows a mainly downward trend to age 50, and 
is flat thereafter, with a gender gap favoring 
women before the age of 50 and men after 50. 
In sub-Saharan Africa there is little trend across 
age groups, and no gender differences until about 
age 40, after which the gender gap favors men.
The different gender and age patterns among 
regions no doubt reflect some combination  
of differing stages of development, differing 
mixtures of age and cohort effects, and local 
circumstances with uneven impacts across ages 
and genders. We shall return later in the chapter 
to show how the key explanatory variables used 
in Chapter 2 differ by age and gender, and hence 
provide a basis for the life evaluation differences 
shown in Figure 3.2. We shall also present a 
preliminary analysis by birth cohort, tracking 
people born in the same year, to see if the 
number of years in the Gallup World Poll is now 
large enough to permit us to distinguish age and 
cohort effects.
In Figure 3.3 we turn to consider gender differences 
in life evaluations at the country level, thus 
helping to illustrate the underlying sources of 
the regional variations already shown in Figure 
3.2. There are seven different colors used to 
represent countries, each representing the 
average size of the life evaluation gap favoring 
The first and most obvious point to make is that 
differences by age and gender are very small 
relative to international differences in average 
ladder scores, or even between the top and bottom 
groups within a country or region. As already 
noted in Chapter 2, the difference between the 
top 10 and the bottom 10 countries in average 
ladder scores is four points, which is almost  
50 times larger than the average gender gap.
Differences among age groups are more marked. 
Some but not all regions display a U-shaped 
pattern established previously in many but not all 
countries.4 But almost all countries and regions 
show a decline in life evaluations over the early 
years, falling by 0.6 points, almost eight times 
larger than the average gender gap. Thereafter, 
life evaluations follow patterns that differ among 
regions, as can be seen in Figure 3.2.
Our second main conclusion, easily demonstrated 
in Figure 3.2, is that the patterns by gender and 
age vary substantially from region to region. 
Average life evaluations of course differ a lot 
among regions, as foreshadowed in Chapter 2 
using somewhat different data. The average life 
evaluations reported in Figure 3.2 contain all 
years of the Gallup World Poll from 2005 to 
2014, while Chapter 2 presented data from the 
more recent years of the same poll, mainly 2012 
to 2014. In both cases the highest regional 
averages are in the NANZ group of countries5 
and the lowest in sub-Saharan Africa, over 7.2 in 
the former case and less than 4.5 in the latter.
U-shapes over the age distribution appear in the 
East Asia and NANZ groups of countries, but 
with less recovery in the older age groups in East 
Asia. The groups of countries including Russia 
and other countries in Central and Eastern 
Figure 3.1: World: Cantril Ladder by Gender and 5-Year Age Groups Figure 3.2: Regions: Cantril Ladder by Gender and 5-Year Age Groups
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reflect a mixture of circumstances and responses 
to those circumstances. Hence the answer 
differences between genders will reveal some 
combination of underlying gender differences in 
reactions to external triggers, and the distribution 
between genders in the type and frequency of 
such triggers. For example, if in a given culture 
men report feeling anger more often than do 
women, it could be either because they are more 
likely than women to feel anger in the face of a 
particular challenge, or that their lives are such 
that they face more situations of a type that 
might make anyone angry.
The situation is complicated even more by the 
existence of gender stereotypes, whereby it is 
commonly believed, for example, that feeling 
anger is more stereotypically male than female, 
and that fear, worry and sadness are more typically 
female than male. The complication comes when 
the existence of the stereotype itself changes the 
prevalence of subsequent feelings.8 This is 
through three possible channels. First, the 
stereotype may lead people to perceive situations 
in ways that match the stereotype – e.g. to focus 
on behaviors that support the stereotype. Second, 
the stereotypes may lead people to act in a 
stereotypical fashion.9 Third, the existence of 
stereotypes provides the basis for what is taught 
to children about appropriate behavior.10
The likely consequence is that gender stereotypes 
and reported frequency of feelings are both likely 
to vary with cultural contexts, even in cases where 
there is little factual underpinning for the stereo-
types. Thus we may expect to find differences 
across global regions, to the extent that they 
mark separate cultural streams with different 
gender norms, without thereby being able to 
assume the presence of fundamental differences 
in human behavior. If, as we expect, there are 
important two-way linkages between gender norms 
and reported feelings, then the international 
differences along with the underlying social 
norms may be subject to change over time.
Therefore, although we are able to establish 
some interesting differences in the global data 
we analyze, we can make no claims about the 
extent to which they represent something 
fundamental that is likely to continue.
A second general point is worth making before 
we turn to the details. One broad feature of the 
literature and data we have surveyed is that while 
there are relatively few universal gender differences 
in the frequency and intensity of feelings and 
experiences, there are well-established gender 
differences, at least in some cultures, in the 
emotional responses of males and females to 
particular circumstances. One example will 
suffice. Although the general stereotype that 
males feel and express anger more than females 
does not get much support from the data,11 there 
are nonetheless significant gender differences  
(at least in some cultures) in what triggers anger, 
especially within close relationships. Females are 
more often angered than are men following 
betrayal, condescension, rebuff, unwarranted 
criticism, or negligence, while males are more 
frequently angry if their partner is moody or 
self-absorbed.12 That particular example may be 
culture-bound, but it helps to show the situational 
logic of emotions, and how the outcome depends 
on gender and typical gender roles.
Positive Experiences
We show first, in Figure 3.4, population-weighted 
global average answers relating to the six positive 
experiences, with a separate line for each gender, 
and with respondents combined into 5-year age 
groups. The shaded area surrounding each bold 
line covers the 95% confidence region, so that 
any gap between the shaded lines denotes a 
difference that is statistically significant. The 
global averages in Figure 3.4 are averages of the 
regional results shown in Figure 3.5, using total 
population in each region as the weights. Each 
of the six parts of Figure 3.5 covers a different 
positive experience, with a separate sub-panel 
for each of nine regions. We will consider the 
women, ranging from dark blue and dark green 
for the largest gaps, and red and orange for 
countries where the gap favors men. A small 
white diamond in the country space shows that 
the estimated effect is statistically significant at 
the 95% level. The countries with the largest 
female gender gap, shown in blue or dark green, 
are in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
and a few industrial countries (Japan, South 
Korea, Finland, Canada). The countries with 
significant gender gaps favoring men are in 
sub-Saharan Africa, with a few others scattered 
about the globe. Much of Europe and Asia, and 
several Latin American countries, lie in the 
intermediate zone where the estimated gaps  
are small and statistically insignificant.
Experiences by Age and Gender
In this section we search for similarities and 
differences by age and gender in a variety of 
experiences drawn from answers to the Gallup 
World Poll. These include both positive and 
negative emotions7 of the sort already studied  
in Chapter 2, but also feelings of safety at night, 
experience of smiling and laughter, interest, and 
pain on the previous day. We include six positive 
items: happiness, smiling or laughter, enjoyment, 
feeling safe at night, feeling well-rested, and 
feeling interested. The six negative items are: 
anger, worry, sadness, depression, stress and 
pain. The scales run from 0 to 1, and reflect the 
fraction of respondents who reported significant 
amounts of the particular emotion or experience 
during the previous day. We report differences 
in terms of the percentage of respondents giving 
one answer rather than another.
Differences among respondents can be due to 
differences in the circumstances in which they 
are living, as well as to differences in the extent 
to which any given circumstances are likely to 
trigger responses that vary by gender and age. 
There are middle cases as well, whereby any 
given set of objective circumstances, e.g. the local 
night-time street scene, might pose objectively 
higher risks for females than males, and would 
hence reduce feelings of night-time safety for 
females more than males even if their reactions 
to any degree of objective risk were the same. 
Thus we recognize that the data we are assessing 
Figure 3.3: Gender Happiness Gap (Cantril Ladder)
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Happiness
From Figure 3.5a we can see that the global 
happiness boost for young women has its main 
sources in SE Asia (+2%), East Asia (+1%) and 
the countries of the Middle East and North 
Africa (+1%). In general, men and women  
report feeling happy yesterday in almost equal 
proportions, with a small but statistically  
significant difference favoring women (+0.5%). 
Women report significantly less frequent  
happiness yesterday in Western Europe (-1%) 
and Latin America (-3%). It is also worth noting 
the difference in happiness trends by age  
(for men and women combined) among the 
regions. For happiness, as for the other positive 
experiences, the largest downward trends with 
age are in the CIS and Eastern Europe.13 In four 
regions – Western Europe, Latin America, East 
Asia and SE Asia – the incidence of happiness 
yesterday is high for both men and women 
(about 80%) and constant across age categories. 
In South Asia, the incidence of happiness is also 
about 80% for the young age groups, but falls 
fairly steadily to about 60% at the older end of 
the age spectrum. Sub-Saharan Africa is similar, 
from a slightly lower starting point. The smaller 
NANZ group has the highest average reported 
incidence, with some slight U-shape, with the 
highest reported happiness at the two ends of 
the age distribution. In several regions, there  
is some small but significant happiness gap 
favoring men in the highest age groups.
Smiling and Laughter
Experimental evidence, relying mainly on data 
from western countries, has shown that on 
average females smile and laugh more than 
males and that the “difference between female 
and male smiling is greatest when they are teens 
or young adults and drops off significantly with 
different experiences one by one, with reference 
both to global averages and on a regional basis, 
with some links to what has been shown by 
previous research. By way of preview, the largest 
and most sustained gender gap is for feeling 
safe at night. For the other experiences, significant 
gender differences (as represented by spaces 
between the shaded bands, which measure the 
95% confidence regions for the estimated 
averages) appear only at certain ages.
Younger women report significantly more 
frequent experiences of happiness, laughter, 
enjoyment and feeling rested than do young 
men, but in all four instances the reported 
frequency drops significantly as women  
approach middle age, at which time there is  
a gender cross-over. Thereafter, both genders 
become better rested, but men significantly 
more than women, with the gap approaching 
10% when both are over 70. For laughter and 
enjoyment, after middle age both genders trend 
downward at roughly the same rate, although 
enjoyment levels are generally significantly 
greater for men than women at ages over 50. 
The remaining positive experience, which is 
“having learned or done something interesting 
yesterday,” favors males over females across the 
whole age range.
We now consider the six positive experiences  
in more detail, before turning to analyze the  
six negative experiences.
Figure 3.4: World: Positive Experiences by Gender and 5-Year Age Groups
Figure 3.5a: Happiness by Gender and Regions
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Well-rested
There are many differences across genders, 
regions and age in the frequency with which 
people report feeling well-rested. Globally, there 
is a U-shape for feeling well-rested for both men 
and women, but the shapes are different, with 
men aged 30 being the least well-rested, compared 
to a low point for women about age 50. Below 
the age of 50, men are less well-rested than 
women, and the reverse is true in later life. The 
biggest gender gap is the late-life gap of about 
7% favoring men; the early gap favoring women 
has its peak of about 4% at age 30. Averaging 
over the ages there is a small gender advantage 
for women (+0.3%).
Feeling Safe at Night
As already noted, there is a large gender gap for 
safety at night. At all ages men more often report 
feeling safe at night than do women, with the 
gap being largest at the two ends of the age 
distribution. For the global population considered 
as a whole, 71% of men feel safe at night,  
compared to 60% of women. Three regions 
have the largest gender gaps in feelings of 
night-time safety, with females of all ages less 
likely than men to feel safe at night – Western 
Europe (20% of respondents), Eastern Europe 
and the CIS (15%), and NANZ (22%). 
On average for men and women, feelings of 
night-time safety are lowest in Latin America, 
where fewer than half of the respondents feel 
safe at night. Only about 40% of Latin American 
women feel safe at night, a proportion that 
remains constant across the age groups. About 
half of young men feel safe at night, but that 
proportion drops steadily with age, approaching 
that for women in the highest age categories. 
Average perceived safety at night is also low in 
MENA (60%) and sub-Saharan Africa (55%) and 
subjects who are older.”14 The advantage of these 
experimental data is that they can separate gender 
response differences from the possibility that 
there are gender differences in life circumstances 
that might be expected to inspire smiles or laughter. 
There is a corresponding disadvantage, at least 
with the evidence thus far available, that the 
experimental subjects have tended to be drawn 
from smallish segments of the global population, 
thereby blunting any claims of generality.
The global data in Figure 3.4 support the experi-
mental findings, as they show the biggest laughter 
advantage for women is in the younger age 
groups, with a maximum gap of about 4% at 
about age 30. The average laughter gap favoring 
women, averaging across all age groups, is 2%. 
From Figure 3.5b it can be seen that the biggest 
contribution to the global laughter gap favoring 
young women comes from East Asia, with smaller 
contributions from South Asia and the countries 
of the CIS and Eastern Europe. There is, however, 
no contribution from the NANZ grouping.
Enjoyment
The global data for enjoyment show a general 
downward trend with age, as shown in Figure 3.4, 
with lifetime averages being identical for males 
and females. However, females on average have 
more enjoyment below the age of 40, while 
males have an enjoyment advantage at ages 
above 50. Figure 3.5c shows the biggest drops by 
age group to be in the CIS and Eastern Europe, 
although this may well involve a strong cohort 
element, as we shall consider later. The other 
regions with significant negative trends are 
South Asia and Western Europe, followed by 
MENA and sub-Saharan Africa. The age relation 
is essentially flat in Latin America, and follows a 
U-shape in the NANZ grouping.
Figure 3.5b: Smile or Laugh: Averages by Gender and Regions
Figure 3.5c: Enjoyment: Averages by Gender and Regions
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the CIS+CEE (60%), with a gender gap that 
becomes smaller at higher ages in MENA, but 
slightly larger in sub-Saharan Africa. Average 
feelings of night-time safety are highest in East 
and Southeast Asia, more than 80% for males 
and 74% for females. The gender gaps for safety 
at night are lowest (below 10%) in all three 
Asian regions and sub-Saharan Africa.
Interest
Reports of learning or doing something  
interesting yesterday are more common among 
males than females for most age groups,  
especially below middle age, with the two lines 
converging in the top age groups. For both 
genders the average rate of positive answers for 
the interest question is much lower than for the 
other positive experiences, averaging 47%, 
compared to averages above 73% for happiness, 
laughter and enjoyment.
Negative Experiences
The first thing to note when comparing the 
global averages for the six positive and six negative 
experiences, as shown in Figures 3.4 and 3.6, is 
how much more common are positive than 
negative experiences. The averages for the 
positive experiences fall between 47% and 74%, 
with most being near the upper end of the range. 
By contrast, the averages for negative experiences 
range from 14% to 32%, with most below 25%. 
Worry (31.5%) and stress (30%) are the most 
prevalent of the negative experiences, with 
depression (14%), sadness (19.5%) and anger 
(20%) the least common. There are significant 
gender differences, at least in some age groups, 
Figure 3.5d: Well Rested: Averages by Gender and Regions Figure 3.5e: Safe at Night: Averages by Gender and Regions
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Figure 3.5f: Interesting: Averages by Gender and Regions
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regions show significantly less anger among the 
higher age groups, with the average incidence 
among the oldest groups at about 10% in Western 
Europe, NANZ, the CIC and CEE, and Latin 
America. The largest gender differences are in 
Latin America and SE Asia, where women under 
the age of 50 are significantly more likely to report 
anger than are men, by amounts approaching 
5% for the youngest Latin women and over 7% 
for 30-year old women in SE Asia.
Worry
Although anger is mostly gender neutral,  
relatively low, and falling over most age groups, 
worry for women is generally more frequent 
than anger, and rises across age groups, from 
25% among the youngest women, in the global 
data in Figure 3.6, to 37% for the oldest age 
groups. Men have, in the global average data,  
the same levels and trends as women until 
middle age, and then fall to become 5% lower 
than women in the high age groups.
Figure 3.7b shows quite different regional levels 
and patterns by gender and age. In the CIS and 
CEE, worry is very low among the young and 
trends sharply upwards across age groups, from 
about 10% among the young to almost 45% for 
the oldest women and 35% for the oldest men. 
Worry rises steadily moving across age groups  
in South Asia, being about 20% in the youngest 
groups and 40% in the oldest groups, with men 
and women having the same prevalence and 
following the same age patterns. Sub-Saharan 
Africa also shows worry that is equal for men 
and women, and a rising trend with age that is 
the same for men and women, but less marked 
than in South Asia. East Asia has worry rates 
that are the lowest among all the regions, are the 
same for men and women, and show little 
variation among age groups.
for all of the negative experiences except for 
anger. We shall now consider the differences 
between genders and among age groups and 
regions, looking at each experience separately, 
thus making use of Figures 3.6 and 3.7 together.
Anger
As we have already noted, while there is an 
established gender stereotype that anger is more 
prevalent among males than females, our global 
evidence falls in line with earlier studies in 
showing very similar shares of women and men 
reporting having felt anger the previous day. Even 
the changes in the prevalence of anger among 
age groups are also similar for men and women. 
There is a slight but statistically significant 
gender difference before the age of 30, with 
females 2% more likely to report anger than 
males, a difference equal to about 10% of the 
average frequency, which itself rises until the 
early 30s. Thereafter anger becomes steadily less 
prevalent among the old age groups, and is the 
same for men and women, falling to about 15% 
in the highest age groups.
Those are the global patterns. How do they  
differ by region? Figure 3.7a shows some inter-
esting regional differences. Reported anger is 
significantly higher in the Middle East and 
North Africa than in other regions, at about 35%. 
The rates are very similar for men and women, 
with some tendency to be higher in the middle 
of the age distribution, giving a slight hump-
shaped pattern. The next highest incidence of 
anger is in South Asia, at an average rate of 
about 25% for both men and women. The 
generally decreasing prevalence of anger in the 
higher age groups is absent or highly muted in 
South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. All other 
Figure 3.6: World: Negative Experiences by Gender and 5-Year Age Groups
Figure 3.7a: Anger: Averages by Gender and Regions
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In Latin America, there is a hump-shaped worry 
pattern across ages for both men and women, 
with peak worry among those in their fifties, and 
females always being more worried than men, 
by amounts growing in the higher age groups, 
and reaching a peak difference of about 10%. 
Western Europe, NANZ, MENA and SE Asia all 
have only slight trends and gender differences, 
although all four regions reveal systematically 
higher worry for women than men in the oldest 
age groups.
Sadness
Globally, as shown in Figure 3.6, feelings of 
sadness yesterday are less common than worry, 
and also show significantly different patterns of 
variation. Feelings of sadness are always signifi-
cantly more common for women than men, and 
steadily rise from lower to higher age groups, 
with about 7% more women than men feeling 
sad in the higher age groups. The various panels 
of Figure 3.7 show that sadness is more widely 
reported in higher age groups in all regions. The 
global gender gap of females being more likely 
to report sadness yesterday applies in all nine 
regions, and generally grows with age in all regions. 
The greater frequency of expressed sadness for 
females than males is a standard finding in 
experimental psychology. It is attributed variously 
to differences in socialization,15 inherent gender 
differences in emotionality,16 and greater female 
willingness to discuss emotional problems.17 In 
some sense, the greater female reports of worry 
might be seen as part of the bridge between the 
well-established facts, applicable in many cultures, 
that while depression and attempted suicide are 
much more common among women than men, 
completed suicides are far more common 
among men than women. However, it is not 
clear how much of the differences between 
males and females in their willingness to discuss 
sadness with others would carry over in the 
same way in responses about sadness yesterday 
in a survey context.
Thus we might expect to find that gender  
differences in conversations about sadness 
might be larger than the differences we find 
among answers to the survey questions.  
Especially among younger adults, where most  
of the experimental research takes place, the 
Gallup World Poll frequencies for feelings of 
sadness yesterday are very similar for men and 
women in all regions, although higher for 
females everywhere.
Depression
Figure 3.6 shows that survey-reported depression 
starts at a low level for both men (10%) and 
women (12%) at age 20, and thereafter rises 
approximately twice as fast for women as for 
men, and exceeds 20% for women in the highest 
age group. These are still much lower reported 
frequencies than for the other negative experiences. 
The closest parallel is with pain, which also 
shows rising and diverging gender trends, and  
is always higher for women. As will be discussed 
below, pain reports rise faster with age than do 
depression reports, and on average are more 
than twice as frequent. 
The similarities between pain reports and 
depression reports are more than coincidence, 
as an international study has shown very high 
rates of co-morbidity, with more than half of 
those in each country with depression or anxiety 
disorder having experienced chronic pain in the 
previous 12 months. On average the fraction of 
depression sufferers also suffering pain is about 
two-thirds in both developing and developed 
country samples.18
Figure 3.7d once again shows a lot of regional 
variation. Significantly higher and rising female 
rates of depression are apparent in Western 
Europe, Latin America and the CIC+CEE. 
Depression rates are flat across age groups, and 
the same for men and women, at average rates 
of about 10% in both East and SE Asia.
Figure 3.7b: Worry: Averages by Gender and Regions
Figure 3.7c: Sadness: Averages by Gender and Regions
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Stress
In the global population-weighted data shown  
in Figure 3.6, males between 20 and 50 report 
significantly more stress than do women, with 
the reverse in higher age groups. The regional 
data in Figure 3.7 show that in two regions 
– Western Europe and Latin America – reported 
stress is always significantly more frequent for 
men than women. In two other regions – South 
and East Asia – it is higher for men in all younger 
age groups, while in three other regions – 
MENA, CIS+CEE, and sub-Saharan Africa – the 
reported rates are essentially the same for men 
and women. In SE Asia the rates are essentially 
the same until about age 60, after which they 
are higher for women. In NANZ stress is similar 
for men and women in the middle age groups, 
but is higher for women below the age of 30 and 
above the age of 50. These stress differences by 
age and gender correspond to the presence of an 
overall U-shape in the age distribution of aver-
age life evaluations. Those regions, genders and 
age groups where stress (often associated with 
time shortage coupled with conflicting de-
mands) is more frequently reported are where 
the U-shape in age is most apparent in life 
evaluations.
There are also striking regional differences in 
the average frequency of reported stress, ranging 
from more than 50% for middle-aged respondents 
in NANZ to a fairly stable average of less than 
20% in the CIS and CEE. Other relatively low 
and stable averages are in SE Asia (25%) and 
sub-Saharan Africa (30%). On average over all 
age groups, the highest reported stress frequencies 
are in MENA, at about 45%.
Pain
The global average data, in Figure 3.6 for  
experiences of pain yesterday show equality 
between young males and females (20% at age 
20). Prevalence rises steadily thereafter for both 
genders, but at different rates, reaching 50% for 
women and 40% for men in the highest age 
groups. This is consistent with data from  
international health surveys, which show greater 
pain prevalence among women, and among 
those in higher age groups.19 One cross-national 
study, based on many fewer countries than the 
GWP, reports the incidence of chronic pain is 
significantly higher in developing than in  
developed countries, and higher for females  
and older persons in both groups of countries. 
Figure 3.7f shows pain incidence as higher for 
females in all regions, and everywhere rising 
with age. It also shows generally lower incidence 
of pain in the two regions most closely matching 
the other study’s classification of developed 
economies – Western Europe and NANZ. 
However, in our data the lowest average incidence 
of reported pain (especially at ages below 40) is 
in East Asia, which nonetheless shows the same 
growth with age, especially for women, found in 
the rest of the regions.
In all regions except Latin America and MENA 
males and females have essentially the same 
levels and trends of reported pain until about 
age 40, with both female and male pain reports 
being more frequent in higher age groups, 
especially for females.
Figure 3.7d: Depression: Averages by Gender and Regions
Figure 3.7e: Stress: Averages by Gender and Regions
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Donation frequencies follow a rising trend with 
age for both men and women, from about 20% 
donation rates for the young to 30% in the oldest 
age groups, averaging 26% over the age range. 
Women donate less than men at ages below 50, 
and more thereafter.20
Most people, 81% globally, think that corruption 
in business and government poses problems for 
their countries. There is slight evidence of a rising 
trend in the higher age groups, and perceptions of 
corruption are slightly more prevalent among 
females. Finally, in the global distribution of 
household income, the hump shape with a peak 
reported by respondents at about age 50 that is 
typical of developed economies is masked by the 
relative growth in the household incomes reported 
by the younger groups of respondents in developing 
countries. Male respondents report higher 
household income than do females in age groups 
up to late middle age.
Figure 3.9 shows the same distributions for each 
of nine global regions. Social support, shown in 
Figure 3.9a, is highest in Western Europe, 
averaging 92% for both men and women, and 
NANZ, at 94% for women and 92% for men. 
Males and females report roughly equal amounts 
of social support in all regions, with males 
showing more downward trend than females in 
the higher age groups. In Western Europe social 
support is received equally by males and females, 
on the same steady downward trend across age 
groups, from 97% at age 20 to 90% among 
those aged 70+. In NANZ both men and women 
show slight evidence of a U-shape in social 
support, with a low point in the 40 to 50 age 
group. In the CIC and Eastern Europe, there is  
a steady downward trend across age groups at 
roughly the same level for men and women. It 
starts at 95% for the 20 year olds and falls to 
80% for men, and slightly above that for women 
in the highest age groups. Social support shows 
Gender and Age Differences  
in Six Key Variables Supporting  
Life Evaluations
Figure 3.8 shows the global average values, split 
by gender and age group, for the six variables 
used in Chapter 2 to explain international 
differences in life evaluations. For four variables 
– social support, generosity, corruption and 
freedom – we have individual-level data  
underlying the national averages used in  
Chapter 2. For the other two variables – GDP 
per capita and healthy life expectancy – this 
match is not possible, so we use reported  
household income to represent the former,  
and a Gallup World Poll question about the 
frequency of health problems for the latter.
In the global data of Figure 3.8, the largest 
differences by age and gender relate to health 
problems, which are almost four times as 
prevalent at the top as at the bottom of the  
age range (50% vs 13%), and which start out 
equally prevalent for young men and women, 
and then increase faster for women in the 
higher age groups.
Social support (having someone to count on) 
and freedom to make life choices are both very 
prevalent, with global averages of about 75% in 
both cases. Social support has a declining trend 
for both genders, but with a later-life recovery 
that is greater for women than men. Men under 
55 report less social support than women, and 
the reverse applies in the older age groups. 
Freedom to make life choices has the same 
levels and modestly upward trends for men and 
women, with average frequencies starting in  
the low 70-80% range for the younger ages,  
and two or three percentage points in the higher 
age groups.
Figure 3.7f: Pain: Averages by Gender and Regions Figure 3.8: World: Explanations by Gender and 5-Year Age Groups





































20 30 40 50 60 70+ 20 30 40 50 60 70+ 20 30 40 50 60 70+
W.Europe N.A. & ANZ CEE & CIS














Note: Weighted by Countries' Total Population



























20 30 40 50 60 70+ 20 30 40 50 60 70+ 20 30 40 50 60 70+
Social Support Freedom Generosity
















Note: Averages of Regional Averages with Fixed Regional Population Shares
(Household Income in $10000)
W O R L D  H A P P I N E S S  R E P O R T  2 0 1 5
6362
some evidence of U-shape in each of the three 
parts of Asia. Average social support is much 
higher in East Asia, followed by SE Asia, and 
then South Asia, which has the lowest average 
(58%) of all regional social support levels. East 
Asia shows the largest downward trend, from 
90% at age 20 to 70% at age 60, with a rise in 
the highest age group, especially for women. 
Latin America shows a high level (87%) and a 
U-shape. It starts at 90% for both genders, reaches 
a low point of about 80% at age 50, and then rises 
to higher levels, especially for women, at higher 
ages. MENA and sub-Saharan Africa follow 
somewhat similar patterns, but starts at a lower 
level, about 70% for the youngest age groups.
Freedom to make life choices, shown in Figure 
3.9b, is highest in NANZ, averaging 88% for 
women and 86% for men. It is a bit lower in 
Western Europe, SE Asia and East Asia, where  
it averages about 80% for both men and women. 
These regions are followed by Latin America 
and Caribbean (LAC) where freedom averages 
75% for women and 76% for men. South Asia is 
the region where gender differences in freedom 
are the largest and where women are generally 
at a disadvantage, with averages of 68% for 
women and 70% for men in South Asia. The 
experience of freedom is similar in CIS and  
CEE and in SSA where it averages about 66%. 
Freedom is at its lowest in MENA where it is 
below 60%, but where the gender differences 
are not significant. Perhaps surprisingly, few 
gender differences in freedom to make life 
choices are revealed when we consider the age 
patterns. However, U-shaped patterns across  
age groups are present in many regions, as 
shown in Figure 3.9b. Younger and older adult 
have fairly similar average levels of perceived 
freedom in most regions, with two exceptions.  
It is higher for the old in East Asia, and lower 
for the older age groups in the CIS and CEE. 
The low perceived freedom among the older age 
groups in CIS and CEE may reflect a cohort 
effect, with transition opening more doors and 
opportunities for the young than the old, as 
discussed in the next section.
Generosity in Figure 3.9c is measured by the 
percentage of respondents who have donated to  
a charitable cause in the past 30 days. In the 
analysis of Chapter 2, these ratios are adjusted to 
reflect differences in average national income, 
since financial donations play a bigger role 
relative to other forms of generosity in richer 
countries. Here we show the actual reported 
donation rates, which are highest in NANZ, 
averaging about 60%, and on a sharply rising 
trend across age groups,21 and lowest in the CIS 
and CEE, MENA and sub-Saharan Africa, at 
roughly 20%. There are relatively few gender 
differences, and these are fairly slight, with more 
generosity among younger women in Western 
Europe and SE Asia, and among younger men  
in South Asia.
Corruption in business and government is  
seen as a problem by more than 80% of global 
respondents, with gender differences appearing 
only in Western Europe, NANZ and East Asia, 
where in each case women are more likely to 
perceive a corruption problem than are men. The 
highest reported rates are in the CIS and CEE, 
(91%, and higher in the older age groups), and 
SE Asia (89%). They are followed by South Asia 
(85%), sub-Saharan Africa (83%), MENA (80%), 
East Asia (77%) and Latin America (75%), with 
little difference by age and gender. Perceived 
corruption rates are lowest in Western Europe 
(68%) and NANZ (63%), and in both cases 
women above the age of 30 are significantly 
more likely to see corruption as a problem, with 
the gender gap approaching 10% of respondents.
The patterns of reported health problems, shown 
in Figure 3.9e, are strikingly similar by age and 
gender across regions. They generally start below 
20% at age 20 and rise with age, to levels at the 
highest ages ranging from below 40% in Western 
Europe, NANZ and East Asia to 60% in the CIS/
CEE and sub-Saharan Africa. In all regions 
except Western Europe, women report health 
problems more frequently than men in most age 
groups, although the difference, while often 
statistically significant, is seldom as large as 3%.
Figure 3.9a: Social Support: Averages by Gender and Regions
Figure 3.9b: Freedom: Averages by Gender and Regions
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Figure 3.9c: Generosity: Averages by Gender and Regions Figure 3.9e: Health Problems: Averages by Gender and Regions
Figure 3.9d: Corruption: Averages by Gender and Regions Figure 3.9f: Household Income: Averages by Gender and Regions
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post-2007 gains are more prevalent in the three 
younger cohorts than in the four older ones. 
In Southeast Asia there was a sharp drop from 
2007 to 2008 in all but the eldest cohort, followed 
by subsequent gains that produced net gains for 
all cohorts, especially the three younger ones. 
Looking across the cohorts, there is a slight 
U-shape, with life evaluations highest in the 
youngest and the oldest age groups. 
In South Asia, there is a very flat gradient across 
cohorts, and an uneven but nonetheless substantial 
drop within each cohort from 2007 to 2013.
In East Asia, there were drops from 2007 to 
2009 in each cohort, followed by increases to 
2013 levels above those in 2007. Across  
cohorts, the U-shape in age is more marked  
than elsewhere in Asia. 
Latin America and the Caribbean show a quite 
different picture, with every cohort showing 
substantial gains from 2007 to 2013. The youngest 
three cohorts saw the largest gains, averaging 
more than 0.5 on the 10-point scale, from 2007 
to 2009, the same years when the economic 
crisis was causing major well-being losses in 
Western Europe and elsewhere. 
That picture is reversed in the countries of the 
Middle East and North Africa, where every 
cohort saw substantial losses in life evaluations 
from 2007 to 2013. These declines were led by 
Finally, Figure 3.9f shows, as already noted in 
Chapter 2, that of all the six key variables, 
household incomes (measured in terms of 
purchasing power parity) have by far the largest 
differences among global regions. Reported 
average annual household incomes are over 
$40,000 in Western Europe and NANZ, about 
$15,000 in MENA, CIC/CEE and East Asia, 
slightly less in Latin America, and about $5,000 
per household in South Asia, SE Asia and 
sub-Saharan Africa. Differences in per capita 
incomes at the country level show much larger 
differences still. 
Cohort Effects
In this section we attempt in a preliminary way 
to see if our overall evidence calculating well- 
being by gender and age actually matches the 
experience of people in different cohorts as they 
progress through their own lives. To do this we 
have used the Gallup World Poll data, for a 
smaller set of 99 countries with full or almost- 
full survey coverage, to construct synthetic 
cohorts for a series of 10-year birth cohorts, 
starting with those born in or before 1932, and 
ending with those born between 1983 and 1992. 
We then plot the survey-to-survey history of 
average ladder scores for each of the synthetic 
cohorts. Figure 3.10 shows the cohort analysis 
separately for each of the nine global regions, 
since cohort-specific influences are more likely 
to appear at the regional than at the global level. 
The samples are still too small to split by gender 
as well, although we will report some gender 
analysis at the global level.
Figure 3.10 adds three main sorts of detail not 
previously seen in this report. First, we can see, 
for each 10-year birth cohort, how their average 
life evaluations have changed from one survey 
round to the next, shown for each survey year 
from 2007 to 2013.22 Second, we can see how 
the levels and changes in life evaluations differ 
for people born in different decades. Third, we 
can see how the effects of the global recession 
on life evaluations differed by global region and 
people’s ages at the time the recession hit.
The first panel of Figure 3.10 shows separately 
the 2007-2013 life evaluations for each of seven 
age cohorts of GWP respondents living in 
Western Europe. The peak effects of the economic 
crisis for all cohorts lie between 2008 and 2009, 
with the effects largest for those at the beginning 
and ends of their working careers. Life evaluation 
recovery since 2009 has been slow or absent for 
all cohorts, except perhaps the eldest group. As 
has already been seen in Chapter 2, there has 
been a great variety of experiences within the 
Western Europe group of countries, which 
include three of the seven countries with the 
largest drops in life evaluations 2005-07 to  
2012-13 – Greece, Italy and Spain. But there 
were other countries in the same region where 
ladder levels had fully recovered by 2012-2014. 
Thus each cohort contains people undergoing 
quite different experiences, although averaging 
across countries, almost all cohorts had declin-
ing life evaluations.
The mixed NANZ group of countries, which by 
population weighting represents mainly the 
United States, shows a marked U-shape of life 
evaluations looking across age cohorts, and a 
mixed picture within cohorts. The youngest 
cohort shows the expected drop through time, 
but so also does the cohort in their 70s. Most 
other cohorts showed drops over the first three 
years, on average, and then recovery back to the 
starting values.
In the CIS plus Eastern Europe, the experience 
was rather different, with the economic crisis 
showing only small effects for all cohorts, but 
with both the levels and trends being worse for 
the older cohorts, who perhaps gained less  
in fresh opportunities than they lost during the 
transition process. The steep drop in ladder 
scores across the age groups, from about 5.8 in 
the youngest cohort to 4.5 in the oldest cohort, 
appears if anything to be getting steeper, as 
Figure 3.10: Cantril Ladder: Trends by Birth Cohort and Region
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Here we consider differences across countries 
and over a 10-year period centered in 2010 to 
explore women’s labor force participation. 
Because questions about one’s labor market 
participation were not asked before 2010 in the 
Gallup Survey, we use yearly country level data 
on average female labor force participation from 
the World Bank. Figure 3.11 displays a scatter plot 
of country level female labor force participation 
against the average value of the Cantril ladder 
for women, with both variables averaged over 
time. The average level of education computed 
from the Gallup Survey shows five quintiles of 
women’s education attainment with different 
colors from the fire red (less education) to the 
deep blue (more education).27 In the rather 
cloudy picture, we discern a U-shaped pattern, 
where at lower education levels more female 
labor force participation is associated with lower 
levels of subjective well-being while at higher 
education levels the reverse is true.28 For middle 
levels of education, there is hardly any relationship 
between labor force participation and the  
Cantril Ladder for women. This U-shaped 
pattern parallels the U-shaped pattern for the 
labor force participation of married women 
previously found across the process of economic 
development and through the histories of 
currently advanced countries.29 These authors 
also emphasize the role of education, particularly 
at the secondary level, which allowed women to 
enter white-collar work that carried less social 
stigma than blue-collar work. It is interesting to 
find that the Cantril ladder reflects similar 
developments. 
Summary and Conclusions
The first and most obvious summary point is that 
differences by age and gender are very small 
relative to international differences in average 
ladder scores, or even between the top and bottom 
Egypt, which was seen in Chapter 2 to have been 
second only to Greece (-1.2 vs. -1.47) in terms of 
drops in life evaluations between 2005-07 to 
2012-14. Some of the MENA drop is due to 
changes in the survey procedures, as in a number 
of Arab countries the Gallup World Poll was 
initially directed only to Arab respondents but 
from 2013 and beyond is attempting to cover the 
whole resident population. This is tending to 
lower the average evaluation in countries with a 
lot of guest workers, as the life evaluations by 
respondents born, for example, in India, tend to 
be lower than those of Arab citizens, though 
they are above those of average respondents in 
their home country. Looking across the cohorts, 
the gradient is fairly flat.
In sub-Saharan Africa the gradient across 
cohorts is also fairly flat, while also having little 
trend within each cohort, with a general modest 
trend upward reversed in 2013.
The regional data samples by cohort are  
too small for us to find significant gender 
differences. Using gender-split cohorts for  
all regions combined, the genders have equal 
matching paths for the youngest cohort, but 
above the age of 25, as full-time work becomes 
more prevalent for males than females, there  
is more evidence of an increasing ladder gap 
favoring women within and between the next three 
cohorts. For the two oldest cohorts, including all 
those born before 1942, there is a diminishing 
gender gap, so that the calculated trend lines for 
males and females meet at the top and bottoms 
of the age distribution. 
Gender Differences in the Workplace
Around the world, the more striking differences 
across genders concern labor force participation: 
averaging across the globe, 55% of women 
participate in the labor market versus 82% of 
men. Traditional gender roles have women’s 
work concentrated in child-rearing and other 
home production activities, and men’s work in 
productive and tradable activities in the market-
place. And research has shown a close link 
between gender role attitudes and women’s 
labor force participation.23 Some researchers 
have argued that the origin of this gendered 
division of labor can be traced back to the  
introduction of the plough in agricultural  
production.24 The plough required a substantial 
amount of upper body strength, typical of males, 
and was appropriate only in certain soil conditions, 
leading to differences across countries in female 
empowerment. In many countries, increased 
levels of educational attainment and changing 
gender role attitudes have allowed women to 
embrace professions once the prerogative of 
men. This may have made their lives more 
interesting and financially rewarding, and it may 
have allowed women to feel more useful to 
others and society.25 However, Figure 3.4 shows 
that likelihood of learning or doing something 
interesting is still generally higher for men.
On the other hand, work in the marketplace may 
have led to more pressure from competition, 
more stress, and more worry or guilt regarding 
their traditional female responsibilities. Indeed, 
Figure 3. 7 shows that incidence of stress is higher 
among both men and women of working age.  
In addition, some women may have experienced 
discrimination or sexual harassment in the 
workplace. Researchers have investigated changes 
over time in happiness in the United States 
from the 1970s to the mid-2000s, a time period 
that saw a substantial increase in female labor 
force participation. They found a reversal in the 
female advantage in happiness, which they 
argue is paradoxical.26 But it is possible, given 
the uneven rewards of many jobs, in terms of 
the six key variables explaining life evaluations, 
that many women who are now engaging in 
market work do not experience higher overall 
quality of life compared to women who choose 
instead to become homemakers. With the 
exception of highly educated women who likely 
enter “careers” rather than “jobs,” that seems 
consistent with our evidence.
Figure 3.11: Female Happiness and Labor Force Participation by Country
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subsequent cohorts, they have faced material 
hardships and reduced social safety nets without 
having the time and resources to make use of 
their possible new freedoms.
In general, our analysis by gender, region and 
age suggests that the questions asked are  
understood in similar terms around the world, 
and answered in line with local circumstances. 
Of course there are differences across cultures 
in the answers given, just as there are differences 
in the underlying factors that support well- 
being. Indeed, the social context and supporting 
social norms, including trust, are variables that 
are often used to define cultures and to assess 
cultural differences. No doubt we are missing 
many relevant measures that would help us to 
understand better what supports happy lives 
around the world. But we do think that the 
available data tell a coherent story, even if this 
story is being rewritten as events unfold and 
societies change, whether for better or worse.
groups within a country or region. The difference 
between the top 10 and the bottom 10 countries  
in average ladder scores is four points, which is  
50 times as large as the average gender gap, and 
seven times as large as the average difference 
between the most and least happy age groups. 
Second, we find that for life evaluations and 
experiences the global average differences by 
gender and age mask a striking variety of patterns 
among global regions. To provide just one 
example, the variations of life evaluations by age 
differ substantially from region to region, taking 
a full U-shape (with life evaluations significantly 
greater at high ages than in mid-life) for both 
men and women in only two of the nine regions, 
East Asia and NANZ. There are also significant 
U-shapes for men in Western Europe and 
women in South Asia. The left-hand side of the 
U-shape, representing significant declines from 
the late teens to age 40, exists in all regions 
except sub-Saharan Africa, where there is a 
gradual decline across all age groups. Given the 
large differences across regions, the regional 
graphs provide a more realistic picture than does 
the global average of how life has evolved for 
individuals living there.
The six positive and six negative experiences, 
split by gender, age and region, show interesting 
similarities and differences across regions. 
Happiness yesterday varies much less across 
regions than do life evaluations, and has a 
generally falling trend over the age groups, 
especially for women. Laughter, enjoyment and 
finding something of interest also show generally 
similar levels for men and women, and declining 
paths at higher ages. All three have a U-shape in 
NANZ, but not elsewhere. U-shapes appear for 
feeling well rested in all regions, although 
trends and levels differ by region. In all regions 
men are more likely to feel safe at night than 
women, with the largest gender gap in the 
industrial countries. The lowest levels for feeling 
safe at night for both genders are in Latin 
America, and the highest levels are in East  
Asia, Western Europe and NANZ.
The six negative experiences show quite different 
patterns, with anger generally lower in older  
age groups and both pain and sadness higher, 
especially for women. Despite the gender stereo-
types, anger is felt everywhere almost equally by 
men and women. Stress follows a hump shape, 
with their peaks in the middle years, happening 
earlier for men than for women. Worry rises 
over the age groups for women and falls in later 
life for men, with a worry gender gap favoring 
men of about 5%, or 15% of its average values, in 
the highest age groups. Depression is everywhere 
more frequently felt by women then men, 
especially at higher ages.
When we turn to our parallel analysis of the  
six main variables used in Chapter 2 to explain 
international differences and changes in life 
evaluations, we find once again the importance 
of considering age, gender and region at the 
same time to get a better understanding of the 
global trends and differences. In general, the 
patterns for specific emotions are such as to 
confirm the reasoning used to support the 
differences in life evaluations. The importance 
of the social context shows up strongly in the 
analysis by gender and age group. For example, 
those regions where life evaluations are signifi-
cantly higher in the older age groups are also 
those regions where perceived social support, 
freedom and generosity (but not household 
incomes) are higher in the older age groups.  
All three of those variables have quite different 
levels and age group dynamics in different 
regions. By contrast, the levels and trends for the 
incidence of health problems (and pain yesterday) 
have very similar levels and trends in all regions. 
The gender differences in the incidence of 
health problems are largely the same around the 
world, as they were previously seen to be for the 
related feelings of pain and depression.
Our cohort analysis suggests that the broad 
patterns we have seen for age and gender apply 
to all cohorts. One exception relates to those 
cohorts in the CIS and the CEE who were 
middle-aged or older in 1989-90. Compared to 
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27  To approximate the average years of female schooling in 
each country, the percentage of women with a secondary 
education (as coded in the Gallup survey multiplied by 12) 
is added the percentage of women with a college education 
(as coded in the Gallup survey multiplied by 16). The 
resulting numbers are divided into quintiles.
28  We note that the quadratic relationship of female labor 
participation at the country/year level on the female 
Cantril ladder holds in a model with country and year 
fixed effects, controlling for demographics, 10 negative 
and positive experiences, and four explanations, excluding 
household income. Furthermore, the relationship holds 
using the male Cantril ladder as dependent variable.
29 See Goldin (1995).
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1  This matches the finding of Graham & Chattopadhyay 
(2013), also based on GWP data, but for a sample ending 
in 2011.
2  The regional average data by gender and age for life 
evaluations and the 12 experiential measures are shown  
in Table 1 of the online data appendix to this chapter.
3  An alternative way to construct the global figures, which 
we previously considered, involved using for the global 
figures exactly the same procedure as we use for the 
regional figures: weighting each observation by its Gallup 
World Poll national sampling weight multiplied by the 
country’s share of total global population. This made the 
global figures quite different from the averages of the 
regional figures because the Gallup sampling weights 
reflect the age distributions of each national population, 
and a much larger share of the global population in higher 
age groups is located in regions with higher average ladder 
scores in all age groups. This produces a more pro-
nounced U-shape in the global figure for life evaluations, 
by giving a progressively higher weight to observations 
coming from happier countries. Our current procedure 
makes it easier to see how life evaluations differ across  
age groups for people living in the same region.
4  See Blanchflower & Oswald (2008), Frijters & Beatton 
(2012), Steptoe et al. (2014) and the survey by Ulloa et al. 
(2013).
5  This group contains the United States, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand. More than three-quarters of its 
population weight comes from the United States.
6  This result requires further research, as it surprises those 
familiar with the relative regional rankings on gender 
equality in the UNDP Human Development Index. It is 
worth noting that the life evaluations of young females in 
the MENA countries are about equal to global average for 
women, while male MENA life evaluations are significantly 
below the global average. Also relevant to any explanation 
will be the fact that in the MENA countries the proportion 
of young female respondents who feel they have someone 
to count on is significantly above that for young males, 
while the reverse pattern is seen at the global level. As 
noted in Chapter 2, having someone to count on is the 
most important of the six factors we use to explain 
differences in life valuations.
7  As pointed out by Stone et al. (2010), there has been less 
study of the age profiles of hedonic (affective) measures of 
subjective well-being than of life evaluations. As they note 
in their analysis of US data, which provide the majority of 
the observations in our NANZ region, the age profiles of 
hedonic measures differ from those of life evaluations.
8  This argument is made, with references to a broader 
literature, in Madden et al. (2000).
9 See Fabes & Martin (1991), and Shields (1984). 
10 See Brody & Hall (2008). 
11 See Kring (2000, 211).
12 See Kring (2000, 222).
13  We show also, in Figure 3.9e, that the prevalence of 
reported health problems is higher and rises faster with 
age in the CIS+CEE group of countries.
14  LaFrance & Hecht (2000, 227). Brody & Hall (2008, 399) 
and LaFrance et al. (2003) also report similar findings. 
15 See for example, Camarena et al. (1990).
16  This is a widely shared stereotype, as both men and 
women believe that women experience and express 
emotions, and especially sadness, more intensely and 
frequently than men. See Fabes & Martin (1991). One 
study suggests that while parent-child conversations  
about many emotions do not have a gender bias, there  
was more frequent mention of sadness in discussion 
between both parents with their daughters then with  
their sons [Adams et al. (1995)]. 
17  For example, with specific reference to sadness, see Fivush 
& Buckner (2000, 248). 
18 See Tsang et al. (2008, 988).
19 See Tsang et al. (2008).
20  The generosity data shown in Figures 3.8 and 3.9 reflect 
the actual reported donation rates, since they are built up 
from the individual responses. In our aggregate analysis 
in Table 2.1, and in the decomposition analysis in Figure 
2.3, the generosity variable is adjusted for the average level 
of GDP per capita, so that the full effect of GDP per capita 
should flow through the income variable directly.
21  Poulin & Cohen Silver (2008) also find, in a popula-
tion-based sample of US adults, feelings of benevolence 
higher for older than younger adults, and, for given 
respondents, rising over the two years of the study.
22  We use interpolation to fill in for missing survey years,  
to ensure a consistent country coverage from one survey 
wave to the next.
23 See Fortin (2005).
24 See Alesina et al. (2013).
25 See Fortin (2008).
26  See Stevenson & Wolfers (2009). They also find similar 
reversals in Western Europe.
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“ The care of human life and happiness… 
is the only legitimate object of good 
government”
Thomas Jefferson (1809)
What should be the goal of public policy? We agree 
with Thomas Jefferson. What matters is the 
quality of life, as people themselves experience 
it. And the best judge of each person’s life is that 
same person. Is she happy with her life; is she 
satisfied? In a democracy that should be the 
criterion of good policy.1
So in this chapter we ask, how would policy 
makers (in governments or NGOs) proceed  
if their goal really was the happiness or life 
satisfaction of the relevant population? First, of 
course, they would organize themselves around 
that objective. Every department would include 
people well-versed in the evidence on the causes 
of happiness. For example, the UK government 
has recently established a What Works Centre 
for Wellbeing with strong links to departments 
and NGOs. Its first aim is to marshal the mass 
of existing evidence on what causes happiness 
and what interventions have been found to be 
effective. But the second task is to help policy 
makers to evaluate new policy options. That is 
the subject of this chapter.
Both policy makers and NGOs need a new form 
of project appraisal to replace or support existing 
forms of cost-benefit analysis.2 So how would a 
policy maker decide whether a policy change 
was desirable if the goal was the happiness of 
the relevant population? What follows is a 
simplified version of how one would proceed. It 
assumes throughout that happiness is measurable 
on a cardinal scale (like temperature) and that 
levels of happiness can be compared between 
one person and another.3 Further details of our 
approach are in the Technical Annex.
A New Form of Policy Analysis
We can begin with the problem of how to spend 
a given sum of money so as to deliver the best 
value, where value is measured in units of 
happiness. Thus in the case of government 
expenditure we take the size of the state as 
given. And we assume initially that the problem 
is how to maximize the aggregate happiness of 
the relevant population, subject to that constraint.4
The correct approach is then to rank all possible 
policies in terms of the extra happiness which they 
generate per dollar of expenditure, starting with 
the most effective and working down.5 We then 
undertake as many policies as it is possible to do 
before the total money available is exhausted.
In the process of doing this we can usefully focus 
attention on the policy which only just qualifies 
to be undertaken. The extra happiness which 
that policy generates per dollar of expenditure 
provides the critical ratio which all other projects 
must exceed if they are to pass the test of value 
for money. This critical ratio can be established 
by trial and error and, once established, provides 
the criterion that can be used in taking decisions 
about individual policies, one at a time, without 
looking at all policies simultaneously. This 
decentralized approach is the essence of effective 
policy making. 
As we have formulated the approach, it is a  
form of cost-effectiveness analysis. We measure 
the benefits in one set of units (happiness) and 
the costs in another (money). And we assume 
that the total amount of money available is 
pre-determined. By contrast, in traditional 
cost-benefit analysis, both benefits and costs are 
in the same units. So traditional cost-benefit, 
applied across the board, in principle determines 
the total scale of public expenditure. This is 
politically unrealistic, so our form of cost- 
effectiveness analysis is a sensible way forward 
for the analysis of public expenditure.
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they would in principle be willing to pay to 
promote these public goods? It has been shown 
repeatedly that asking people hypothetical 
questions about how they value these things 
produces nonsensical answers.6 So data on  
the happiness effects of these activities offers  
a powerful new method of evidence-based  
policy making. 
This said, many key questions remain, which 
also arise with traditional cost-benefit analysis. 
They include: the aggregation of happiness 
across people, the aggregation of happiness over 
time (the discount rate), and the length of life 
and the birth rate.
The aggregation of happiness across people
In any policy analysis we have to aggregate its 
effects on different people: normally some 
people gain but others lose. The approach we 
have used so far is that advocated by Jeremy 
Bentham: we simply add up the effects. But 
should we not give more weight to changes  
(up or down) in the happiness of people who  
are currently miserable than of people who  
are already quite happy? This is surely right,  
but how much extra weight? The best approach 
is probably to ask the population what they  
think about the weights.7 One can also use 
sensitivity analysis to see what difference (if any) 
it makes, when comparing mutually exclusive 
project options.
Before moving on, we ought to mention some 
other more data-intensive approaches which 
focus directly on misery. One approach is to focus 
specifically on negative emotion as measured by 
replies to questions like “How sad/worried/
frustrated/angry were you yesterday?”8  
Alternatively we could use time-use data, where 
individuals are asked about each episode in the 
previous day, with questions for each episode 
about the extent of various positive and negative 
emotions. As Kahneman and Krueger have 
proposed, we could then rate an episode as 
miserable if the most powerful negative emotion 
was more powerful than the most positive 
emotion.9 From this we could find what fraction 
of the day each person spent being miserable 
– what they called the person’s “misery” index. 
And we could make the average misery index 
into our measure of social welfare. Such an 
exercise, however, is very data-intensive and 
requires the collection of time-use data. 
The discount rate
The next issue is how to add up effects occurring 
at different points in time. For most individuals 
the effects of a policy change are spread over a 
number of years, and indeed some policies 
affect people not yet born. So what discount rate 
should we use to combine effects that occur in 
different years? In traditional cost-benefit analysis 
the discount rate consists of two elements that 
are added together. The first element (the “social 
pure time discount rate”) reflects the general 
uncertainty about the future; the second reflects 
the fact that future generations are expected to 
be richer and therefore to have a lower marginal 
utility of income. In the current UK Treasury 
Green Book the first element is put at 1.5% per 
annum and the second at 2%.10 There is clearly a 
case for a pure time discount rate. But, when our 
measurements are in units of happiness, declining 
marginal utility of income ceases to be relevant, 
although there is still the distributional issue of 
how we should allow for differences in happiness 
between different generations (or indeed different 
years of one person’s life). There is no neat 
solution to this problem, and where it is severe it 
must be shown explicitly in the analysis. Where it 
is not, the pure time discount rate may suffice.11
If this is the approach to discounting happiness, 
how should we discount future public expendi-
ture? In principle there should be a separate 
price attached to public expenditure in each 
period. But in practice, if the path of public 
expenditure is reasonably smooth, we can 
probably assume that the price of public  
expenditure in units of current happiness would 
remain the same from one year to the next.  
Much information is required to do this well, as 
is true for traditional cost-benefit analysis. Ideally 
we would do a properly controlled experiment 
that would measure directly the impact of the 
policy upon happiness. The experimenters 
would also measure carefully not only the direct 
public expenditure cost of the policy but also its 
indirect cost implications. (For example, it might 
subsequently lead to savings on welfare benefits, 
or it might involve the additional cost of extra 
years of education.) The desirability of the project 
would then depend on the extra happiness it 
delivered relative to the extra expenditure involved, 
measured in net terms. 
But, for governments, there are other important 
policy problems as well as how to spend a given 
budget total. There is the issue of how to raise 
the taxes. The approach here is more direct.  
If we envisage a self-financing tax change, we 
simply evaluate how this alters the happiness of 
each member of the population and aggregate 
these changes (if we are, as assumed so far, 
simply maximizing the sum of happiness across 
all individuals). Similarly, if we are considering a 
new regulation, we simply add up its effects on 
happiness across all members of the population. 
In practice of course a new regulation may also 
affect the budget deficit, making possible more 
(or fewer) opportunities for public expenditure. 
So we need a way to value such extra money, in 
units of happiness. We already have the answer: 
the value of the extra money is the extra happiness 
which is generated by the marginal public 
expenditure project. 
Assembling the information needed for this  
new approach is a real challenge, but so it is 
with traditional cost-benefit analysis. So what 
problems can the new approach handle which 
traditional cost-benefit analysis cannot?
Problems with traditional cost-benefit analysis
In traditional cost-benefit analysis, benefits and 
costs are measured by estimating what people 
would be willing to pay for having the benefits 
or avoiding the costs. The unit of measurement 
is money, the idea being that people are willing 
to pay more for something the more it increases 
their happiness.
This is a reasonable assumption when the  
thing is something that people have choice  
over and are well informed about. But there are 
two problems with the approach. The first is  
the problem of adding up across individuals. 
Any policy affects more than one person and  
the happiness yielded by an extra dollar is 
generally greater for the poor than the rich.  
This problem can however be handled to a 
degree by showing the impact of the policy on 
different income groups.
The second problem is more profound.  
Willingness to pay works when people can  
show by their choices how much they value 
different outcomes. Sometimes they can do this 
but often they cannot. They can do it for things 
like transport, industry, education and some 
aspects of environment. But many outcomes  
are not things which people can choose – they 
are things that just happen to people through 
outside influences (what economists call  
external effects). People catch infectious  
diseases, children get abused, elderly people  
get abandoned, people get mugged. Moreover 
people are often ignorant about key areas of 
choice, as in health. And on top of that people 
have very different purchasing power. It is 
because of these classic problems of externality, 
asymmetric information and equity that most 
state activity occurs.
We cannot learn about these problems by  
observing people’s choices. So how are we to 
evaluate a vaccination program, or child protection, 
or family courts, or elderly care, or police  
protection? Happiness research can tell us a lot.
But wait a moment. Even though people can’t 
show their values by choice, couldn’t we ask 
them hypothetical questions about how much 
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In the jargon this is known as the “equivalent 
variation.” Why not use that?
The most obvious problem is that the marginal 
utility of income differs widely between people. 
It is much lower for richer than for poorer 
people. Can this problem be handled within the 
existing money-based framework of cost-benefit 
analysis? One approach would be to show 
separately the money-equivalent net benefits for 
different income groups, as the Treasury does 
now. But the problem with this is that income is 
not very closely correlated with happiness. Thus, 
for example, if mental illness were properly 
treated, it would mainly benefit people who were 
miserable, which is important.13 But if the 
breakdown were by income class, the benefits 
would be shown as evenly spread across the 
board. So the most natural approach is to do the 
analysis in units of happiness. We could then 
show net benefits separately for people with 
different levels of happiness (or of income).
That concludes our analysis of policy evaluation 
when the main effects cannot be measured 
directly in terms of willingness to pay. But there 
remain many policies where the main measure-
ments of benefit can be in money, and it is 
natural to stick to those units. These policy areas 
may include education, industry, employment, 
and transport. 
But in all of these areas there will be some 
elements of non-pecuniary effects where the 
original measurements are in units of well-being. 
For example, a policy to reduce unemployment 
will increase wage income and profits, but we 
also know that it will have major psychological 
benefits for the people who get employed (in 
addition to their extra income). A natural approach 
here is to convert these happiness changes into 
money, rather than vice versa. This can be done 
in the standard way by calculating the equivalent 
variation in money income. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, much of public policy cannot be 
evaluated in terms of willingness to pay. In such 
areas we believe that governments should 
develop new methods of analysis where  
happiness is taken as the measure of benefit. 
Even with existing knowledge, such an approach 
suggests new policy priorities. But to discriminate 
effectively between specific interventions on a 
scientific basis, such as that outlined in the 
Technical Annex, will require much more 
detailed study. This should become one of the 
main focuses for social science. It would include 
much more detailed models of the life-course, 
such as those being developed by members of the 
OECD’s Consortium for Modelling Wellbeing 
over the Life-Course.14 It will also require many 
more properly controlled experiments.
At the moment much policy is based on little 
more than a hunch. We firmly believe that a 
more scientific element can be introduced into 
the process. It will never be decisive, and  
ultimately decisions have to be made by elected 
politicians accountable to the electorate. But 
their decisions can be based on much better 
information. So from this chapter emerge four 
key recommendations:
•  The goal of governments should be to 
increase the happiness of the people and, 
especially, to reduce misery.
•  Where willingness to pay is not a feasible 
measure of benefit, governments should 
develop new methods of policy analysis 
based on happiness as the measure of 
benefit.
•  All policy change should be evaluated 
through controlled experiments in which the 
impact on happiness is routinely measured.
•  A major objective of social science (and of  
its funders) should be to throw light on the 
causes of happiness, how it can be enhanced, 
and at what cost.
This would mean that the price of future public 
expenditure in units of today’s happiness should 
fall at the same discount rate as is used for 
future happiness.
The length of life and number of births
Finally, how should we value changes in the 
length of life? Most people would agree that a 
longer life is better, but so is a happier one. So 
how could we combine these two desirable 
things into a single objective measure of what 
we are aiming at for an individual? The most 
common approach is to multiply the person’s 
length of life by her average happiness – so that 
the result equals the total happiness the person 
experiences – or in medical parlance the number 
of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs). 
However for this to make sense we need to assume 
that there is such a thing as zero happiness – in 
other words happiness is measured on a ratio 
scale rather than a cardinal scale. The typical scale 
which measures life satisfaction runs from 0 
(“not at all satisfied”) to 10 (“extremely satisfied”), 
and at a stretch one could interpret 0 as equivalent 
to zero happiness.
But are all years of life after birth equally important? 
For example if life expectancy is 80, is it twice as 
valuable if we save the life of a newborn infant 
as if we save the life of a 40-year-old? Any other 
assumption is bound to be controversial. 
Finally there is the issue of the numbers born.  
Is the world better if more people are born, 
provided the quality of life is constant? For most 
practical purposes we can take the number of 
births as exogenous. 
But some policies clearly do affect the number 
of births, and some countries like France, India, 
China and Japan have all tried to influence the 
fertility of their populations. How do we evaluate 
such policies? We can imagine two extreme  
positions. One position says the only thing that 
counts is the proportional distribution of QALYs 
among all those who are born and that the 
number of people born is immaterial. Thus a 
world of 1 million people is as good as one of  
7 billion who are equally happy. The opposite 
position says that what matters are total QALYs, 
added up over all the people born.12 According to 
that position we should prefer a trebling of 
births even if it halved the QALYs per person 
born. Probably most people would hold some 
intermediate position, but no one of a liberal 
disposition would want government regulation 
of births – at most, perhaps, incentives one way 
or the other.
Acceptability
This completes our outline of an approach to 
policy analysis based on happiness as the measure 
of benefit. We think it should be generally 
applied throughout the public services and by 
NGOs. As it took hold, people would become 
familiar with which ratios of happiness per unit 
of expenditure were typically acceptable and 
which were not.
Or is this quite impracticable? In fact, it has 
already been practiced, with little dissent, for  
10 years in the British National Health Service. 
There is a public agency called NICE (National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence) which 
evaluates all new treatments for all conditions 
and recommends which should be publicly- 
funded and which should not. Its criterion is the 
number of QALYs per dollar of NHS expenditure, 
and at present it recommends all treatments 
which cost less than $45,000 for each additional 
quality-adjusted life year.
Relation to traditional cost-benefit analysis
One final question. Could we not do all of this 
equally well using money as the measure of 
benefit? After all, money has a specific impact 
on every person’s happiness (its “marginal 
utility”), so we could always measure a person’s 
change in happiness by the change in money that 
would produce the same change in happiness. 
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configuration of policy and ask whether the 
change will be for the better. The answer is Yes if
 !"Hi  – #("E – "T)  > 0 (4)
By trial and error we should soon find a value for 
# which allowed the right number of expenditure 
programs to pass the test. Equation (4) provides 
the basic rule for all cost-benefit analysis where 
happiness is the criterion. 
(i)  For public expenditure programs it says 
that the net gain in human happiness must 
exceed the net cost to the government 
times the shadow price of government 
funds. Perhaps more intuitively, it can also 
be written
   !"Hi      (5) 
 "E – "T
In other words the welfare gain per dollar of  
net public expenditure cost must exceed some 
crucial value #. In some parlance this approach 
is called “cost-effectiveness analysis,” since the 
calculations of costs and effects are in different 
units (in this case costs being measured in 
money and effects in units of happiness). 
(ii)  For taxation, the following is perhaps the 
most intuitive formulation:
   !"Hi  (6) 
      "T
The loss of welfare per dollar of taxes raised 
must be below some critical level.
(iii)  For regulation there are often few  
expenditure or tax implications and the 
rule reduces to: Do if
   !"Hi  > 0     (7)
In measuring the changes in happiness  
it is important to include not only the  
benefits (like food safety) but also the  
disbenefits like reduced liberty or increased 
enforcement costs.
Distribution of happiness
Many people argue that is more important to 
raise the life satisfaction of people for whom it  
is low than of those for whom it is already high. 
One approach here uses the veil of ignorance as 
the basis for ethical theory. The person making 
the ethical judgment is asked to rank states of 
the world without knowing what his place in the 
world will be. In such a situation he would 
probably prefer a state of the world with less 
inequality of happiness, even if this involved 
some fall in average happiness.16 This has led 
economists such as Atkinson and Stiglitz to 
propose a social welfare function where social 
welfare (W ) is represented by17
 W  =     !
i    
(Hi
$– 1)    ($%1) (8)
(This involves abandoning cardinality in favor  
of a ratio scale: the origin of Hi can no longer be 
varied at will.) 
Now the change in social welfare resulting from 
a policy change becomes not !"Hi but 
 "W  = !
i    
Hi
$– 1 ."Hi (9)
This adds no real difficulty to the approach 
except for the choice of $, which is essentially a 
matter of ethical judgement or political preference. 
An alternative approach is simply to break down 
net benefits according to the levels of happiness 
(or income) of those affected – leaving the overall 
evaluation to the readers.
TECHNICAL ANNEX:  
POLICY ANALYSIS IN TERMS  
OF HAPPINESS
This Annex spells out more formally and in 
more detail the argument in Chapter 4, as it 
applies to governments.
The conceptual objective
The government’s aim is, we assume, to maxi-
mize the happiness of the population (initially 
considered as the sum of each individual’s 
happiness, Hi). This has to be done subject to 
the usual constraints of endowments, technology 
and tastes, working their way through the market 
mechanism. To affect things, the government 
has three main types of policy instrument.
(i)  The first is programs involving public 
expenditure. We include in these not only 
public services but also transfer payments, 
in order to highlight the choice between 
giving people money and giving services 
which help people to help themselves. 
There is thus an array of possible  
programs(P
~
). Each programme Pj involves 
an expenditure Ej. Not all possible programs 






   Ej   ≤  E
–
 (1)
(ii)  The second type of policy is tax policy, 
which determines the way in which public 
expenditure is financed. Again there is an 
array of different possible taxes (S
~
). Each 
tax Sk will yield its own tax-take Tk and 
altogether these tax receipts must finance 
the total of public expenditure:
 !
k
   Tk   ≥  E
–
 (2)
(iii)  Finally there are regulations, where public 
revenue and expenditure are not the main 
issue. There is an array of possible regula-
tions (R
~
) from which the government has 
to choose which ones to switch on. 
(Clearly many actual policies are mixtures of 
these three forms, but this poses no substantive 
problem.)
So we can think of the happiness (Hi) of individual 
i as being determined by which expenditure 
programs, taxes and regulations are switched on:





)    (i=1,…,n) (3)







 to maximize !Hi subject to constraints (1), (2) 
and (3).
This task, if correctly undertaken, would throw 
up a shadow price of public expenditure (in 
units of happiness) corresponding to constraint 
(1). This price (call it #E) would measure the gain 
in happiness per dollar of expenditure resulting 
from the marginal public expenditure program. 
It would also throw up a shadow price of tax 
receipts (in units of happiness) corresponding  
to constraint (2). This price (call it #T) would 
measure the loss of happiness per dollar of tax 
receipts resulting from the most damaging tax 
that squeezed through. One would hope that 
these two shadow prices were the same. If the 
shadow price of expenditure were higher than 
that of taxes, it would suggest that E
–
 should be 
higher. But issues of this kind must be left to the 
politicians. So we shall assume that #E = #T = #.
Decentralization
Maximizing !Hi subject to (1) – (3) describes the 
outcome we would like to achieve. But the same 
result can be achieved not through one single 
massive optimization, but through a decentralized 
process whereby each possible program, tax or 
regulation is looked at on its own.15 For each 
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(2)  If some policies are evaluated in units of 
happiness and others in money, how do 
we compare policies in those two different 
categories? The problem here is that there 
is a wide range of estimates of the marginal 
utility of money at any particular income 
level (though not of the ratios between the 
marginal utility at different income levels). 
So in practice it may be necessary to have 
two separate pots of money – one for 
policies evaluated in money units and one 
for policies evaluated in units of happiness.
Conclusion
Present methods of cost-benefit analysis give 
little guide to the cost-effectiveness of much of 
public policy. The only way forward is through 
direct measurement of happiness using causal 
models of how it is determined. This is still  
in its infancy. But, even existing knowledge 
indicates the need for major new priorities. And 
as knowledge accumulates, the evaluation of 
specific projects in terms of happiness outcomes 
will become increasingly feasible. We urge 
Finance Ministries to take a lead in making this 
happen, as they have done with traditional 
cost-benefit analysis.
Discount rates
We have so far considered only one period. But 
almost all policies have multi-period effects. The 
government’s objective is then to maximize the 
discounted sum of happiness, subject to expen-
diture and tax constraints in each period. In the 
absence of distributional weights this would lead 
to a multi-period decision criterion, analogous  
to (4) but expanded to
!
t    
!
i    
"Hit (1–&)t
 –!
t   
#t ("Et– "Tt ) ' 0 (10)
For & it seems reasonable to use a pure time 
preference rate of 1.5%, or possibly less. For #t , 
which is the price of government funds in units 
of happiness, it also seems reasonable to assume 
that #t = #o (1–&)
t.
Length of life
The analysis so far takes person-years as given. 
If we follow standard practice and take births  
as exogenous, we shall simply add an extra, 
discounted, "Hi for each additional year which 
comes about through increased life expectancy.
Measuring "Hi
So much for the framework. The much greater 
problem is the measuring of "Hi. There are 
important problems in measuring Hi. But, even 
if these are (roughly) overcome, there are major 
difficulties in measuring the "Hi resulting from 
a policy change. The ideal approach would be a 
randomized controlled trial (RCT) but this is 
often not feasible. And it only gives data for as 
many years as the trial is continued.
This is where life-course models can help. But 
this depends on the model being truly causal.  
To derive more causal models will require a lot 
more work, and must be one of the main tasks 
of social science in the years to come.
Measuring ("E – "T)
An equally important task is to get better  
measurements of the net change in public 
expenditure as a result of a policy. The immediate 
cost is usually fairly clear, but the subsequent 
impact through additional costs and cost savings 
is much less so. There have been many notable 
cases of over-claiming in this field. For example, 
early work on the Perry Pre-School Program 
showed that program participants later received 
both more education and higher earnings than 
the control group. The higher earnings were 
credited to the program without deducting the 
costs of the extra education.
To trace the year-by-year impact of a policy  
on the individual’s use of public services is an 
absolutely critical need now. Life-course models 
will help in this, as will experimental designs  
(as for example where a new mental health 
program is introduced for some groups and the 
subsequent savings on physical healthcare are 
evaluated against control groups).
Relation to traditional cost-benefit analysis
Traditional cost-benefit should of course continue 
to be used in some areas. But this raises two 
questions.
(1)  How can non-pecuniary factors (such as X) 
be valued in money units? The best available 
approach is as follows. If we have a happiness 
equation in which both X and log income 
(log Y) appear, such as
 Hi = a Xi + b l ogYi  + etc (11)
it follows that the equivalent variation for a 
change in Xi is
  "Yi = a b Yi ("Xi ) (12)
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1  O’Donnell et al. (2014). There is also evidence that the life 
satisfaction of the population has a key influence on voting 
behavior, see Ward (2015).
2  For example those embodied in the UK Treasury’s Green 
Book.
3  For evidence on comparability across people, see Layard 
(2010). On cardinality, if a variable is cardinal, this means 
that the difference between a score of x and (x+1) is the 
same as the difference between a score of y and (y+1), 
whatever the values of x and y. The evidence on whether 
happiness measures are truly cardinal is limited, but 
Krueger & Schkade (2008) found that test-retest differences 
were independent of the level of reported happiness, 
which if generally true would support cardinality. 
4  We return later to the issue of whether more weight 
should be given to reducing misery than to increasing 
existing happiness.
5  If there are two mutually exclusive policies of different 
cost, this approach has to be modified.
6 Kahneman et al. (1999).
7  According to Rawls (1971) we should simply focus on the 
very bottom.
8  For data on replies to these questions see Helliwell et al. 
(2012), Chapters 2 and 3.
9  Krueger et al. (2009). See also Layard (2009).
10 These are real amounts (inflation adjusted).
11 Stern (2007) argues that 1.5% is too high.
12 See Broome (2004).
13 Layard & Clark (2014).
14 See also Layard et al. (2014).
15  This needs modifying if there are some very large projects, 
or projects that are mutually exclusive but differ in public 
expenditure cost.
16  This does not contradict “expected utility theory.”  
See Layard (2011), pp 312-3. 
17 Atkinson & Stiglitz (1980).
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Introduction
The past decade has seen robust scientific 
attention to the neural bases of human emotion. 
While this research area lay dormant for many 
earlier decades,1 the global scientific community 
has taken up questions related to both normal or 
typical emotion as well as pathological changes 
in emotion associated with psychopathology.  
For many years, emotion and reason were thought 
to be associated with separate brain systems – 
with emotion associated with subcortical  
structures and reason associated with the  
cerebral cortex. However, extensive developments 
in neuroimaging techniques over the past two 
decades have given us a much more nuanced 
understanding of the interactive interplay 
between cortical and subcortical zones in the 
circuitry of emotion and emotion regulation. 
Progress in understanding the neural bases of 
emotion, and happiness more specifically, has 
been tremendously helped by the availability  
of imaging methods to interrogate both the 
function and structure of the human brain. 
These methods have contributed importantly to 
our understanding of the different constituents 
of happiness and well-being. 
This review will emphasize recent developments 
in affective and social neuroscience that showcase 
four constituents of well-being: sustained positive 
emotion; recovery from negative emotion; 
pro-social behavior and generosity; and mind- 
wandering, mindfulness and “affective stickiness” 
or emotion-captured attention. The first two 
constituents have been studied within the frame-
work of affective chronometry,2 the time course 
of emotional responding. In several early  
publications we argued that the ability to recover 
quickly from adversity was a key constituent  
of well-being and can be measured objectively.3 
More recently, we have extended these studies  
by directly measuring the time course of brain 
activity in specific circuits underlying both 
negative4 and positive5 emotion. Moreover, some 
of these new findings suggest that these patterns 
of brain function are related not just to reports 
of emotion and life satisfaction, but also to 
systemic biological measures that are associated 
with physical health. These studies help to 
provide an understanding of the mechanisms 
connecting psychological well-being and  
physical health. The third constituent—pro-social 
behavior and generosity—has recently been 
shown to play a very important role in promoting 
well-being, and the neural bases of these social 
behaviors are now the subject of more intensive 
study. The fourth and final constituent we 
consider—mind wandering, mindfulness  
and affective stickiness—is also receiving  
more serious research attention, though it still 
remains understudied. 
Nevertheless, this last constituent is particularly 
important since it underscores the difference 
between well-being, as measured by life evaluation, 
and happiness, as measured by emotional reports. 
An individual can potentially have high levels of 
subjective well-being and yet not be happy at 
every moment. For example, such a person 
might respond with intense sadness, upon 
learning of a tragic event involving loss. An 
individual with high levels of well-being could 
conceivably also feel and express anger in 
response to a moral transgression or in response 
to an individual who is perceived to be thwarting 
an important goal. If the individual recovers 
quickly and there is no lingering resentment—
affective stickiness—then it is likely that high 
levels of well-being can persist even in the face 
of these seemingly inconsistent emotions. These 
considerations lead to two important conjectures. 
One is that from a neuroscientific perspective, 
there must be something different in the baseline 
patterns of brain function that distinguish those 
with high versus low levels of well-being, since 
well-being does not depend upon momentary or 
short-lived emotional states. And second, there 
is an important distinction between happiness 
(which can be momentary and short-lived) and 
well-being (most likely more enduring and 
related to life satisfaction). Whether happiness 
or well-being in the senses that are being used 
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the intensity of positive mood ratings. Using 
positron emission tomography at rest to index 
baseline patterns of glucose metabolism (a 
measure of brain activation), Volkow found  
that individuals with increased activation in the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex reported increased 
baseline levels of positive emotionality.15
The studies reviewed above all examined the 
regions of the brain activated by short-lived 
emotional stimuli. While some of the findings 
indicate that these short-term neural responses 
correlate with present moment measures of 
happiness, it is not clear if such short-term 
neural responses correlate with more enduring 
forms of well-being and life satisfaction or 
whether other patterns of neural activity better 
predict these more trait-like measures. Moreover, 
the studies reviewed above all focus on positive 
affect, yet some have suggested that enduring 
well-being is also associated with a more resilient 
response to adversity, operationalized by some 
as faster recovery following negative events.16  
In the sections that follow, we take up these 
different issues. 
Savoring: The Neural Bases of  
Sustaining Positive Emotion
The first clue that the neural bases of sustaining 
happiness might be different from the short-term 
elicitation of positive emotion came from studies 
with depressed patients. We investigated whether 
depressed patients showed the typical pattern of 
activation in response to positive stimuli compared 
with controls. Using conventional analysis  
methods, we were unable to detect robust 
differences in activation in reward-related brain 
regions between clinically depressed patients 
and non-depressed controls.17 However, when 
we examined the capacity to sustain activation in 
here differentially contribute to other aspects of 
mental and physical health will be considered in 
the following sections.
In the concluding section of this chapter, we 
consider the implications of the fact that the 
circuits that have been implicated in well-being 
all exhibit plasticity, the ability to grow and 
change.6 Such plasticity occurs wittingly or 
unwittingly and most of the influences on our 
well-being that shape these circuits are unwitting. 
We are exposed to adversity and stressful life 
events that are often beyond our control. These 
contextual influences induce plastic changes in 
brain function and structure that clearly impact 
our well-being. However, plasticity in these 
circuits could also be harnessed for intentional 
cultivation and shaping. Engaging in specific 
forms of training to cultivate well-being through 
psychotherapy, meditation and other forms of 
mental training have been found to induce 
functional and structural changes in the brain 
and have also been found to benefit well-being.7 
Some of the most promising evidence of this 
sort will be reviewed in the concluding section 
of the chapter. 
Positive Emotion
Often, well-being is defined in two different but 
related ways—hedonia (pleasure or momentary 
well-being) and eudaimonia (flourishing, living 
a meaningful life) first described by Aristotle.8 
There has been much work done exploring  
the neural correlates of hedonic well-being in 
animals by studying the brain response to 
reward.9 These mechanisms are very similar 
across species and research across human and 
animal populations have informed each other. 
Further, hedonic and eudaimonic well-being are 
highly correlated in humans10 and many of the 
brain mechanisms involved in the hedonic 
experience of sensory pleasure are also active in 
the more eudaimonic experience of altruistic 
and higher order pleasurable experiences.11
By combining state-of-the-art cellular recording, 
microinjection and nuanced behavioral measure-
ments, Berridge and his colleagues12 were able to 
isolate separate neural representations within 
ventral striatal circuitry—specifically within the 
nucleus accumbens and ventral pallidum—for 
wanting, liking and prediction components of 
the same reward. The ventral striatum is a region 
deep in the center of the brain that is associated 
with wanting, liking, and reward in a large 
number of species. We refer to it as subcortical, 
which means the structure is located below the 
cortex (which covers the surface of the brain).  
In humans, the region most activated by hedonic 
pleasure is the ventral prefrontal cortex (a region 
in the front of the brain directly above the eyeballs), 
but there is also activity in ventral striatum (the 
same region identified in rodents).
In a typical experiment designed to investigate 
circuitry activated during hedonic pleasure,13 
participants were presented with text that had 
been rated as highly positive (e.g., winning the 
lottery) and then asked to generate imagery related 
to this text for 12 seconds during which brain 
function was monitored with fMRI. When the 
positive imagery condition was contrasted with 
an unpleasant condition, greater activation for 
the former was found in the nucleus accumbens 
(within the ventral striatum) and a region of the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Functional 
connectivity between the nucleus accumbens 
and amygdala (a brain region commonly activated 
by positive and negative emotional stimuli) and 
between the ventral prefrontal cortex and amygdala 
was significantly increased during the positive 
compared to negative imagery conditions. A 
similar pattern of prefrontal activation was 
observed in a study conducted in our laboratory14 
with mothers soon after the birth of their first 
child. While in the scanner, mothers were 
presented with pictures of their own infants, a 
stranger infant or an adult. We found greater 
ventrolateral prefrontal activation in response to 
pictures of their own infants. These pictures also 
elicited significantly greater positive affect and 































Figure 5.1: Psychological well-being is predicted by sustained activation of the ventral striatum across trials 
in response to positive pictures, p<.005, corrected for multiple comparisons. Modified from Heller et al. (2013).
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Our laboratory has developed methods to probe 
the duration of positive and negative affect using 
peripheral physiological measures.23 Using 
measures of facial electromyography (fEMG), 
facial expression behavior that follows the offset 
of emotional stimuli can be used to probe the 
extent to which positive and negative affect 
persist beyond the eliciting stimulus. We would 
predict that short-lived responses to positive 
stimuli should be associated with lower levels of 
well-being and should be impacted by stressful 
life experiences. In a sample of 116 participants 
who were part of the MIDUS study,24 we25 found 
that individuals exposed to prolonged marital 
stress exhibited short-lived responses to positive 
stimuli. And the findings above indicate that 
individuals with short-lived responses to positive 
stimuli show lower levels of well-being compared 
with those who show more prolonged reactivity 
to such stimuli. These findings suggest that 
some of the key chronic obstacles to well-being 
such as marital stress may undermine well- 
being by specifically diminishing the capacity  
to sustain positive affect. 
In a novel recent report, Telzer and colleagues26 
studied adolescents longitudinally over a two 
year age span. They assessed brain activity with 
fMRI in response to two separate tasks that 
putatively engaged hedonic and eudaimonic 
happiness respectively. They found that ventral 
striatal activation in response to the task that 
engaged eudaimonic happiness (a family donation 
task that involved personal loss in the service of 
overall family gain) predicted longitudinal 
the nucleus accumbens over time (across trials 
in the experiment), robust differences between 
patients and controls became apparent. The 
depressed patients and the controls showed a 
very similar response during the early trials in 
the experiment, but as the experiment progressed, 
across trials of positive stimulus presentations, 
the controls sustained activation in the nucleus 
accumbens, while the depressed patients did 
not. The nucleus accumbens is a cluster of 
neurons in the ventral striatum that is commonly 
associated with positive affect and reward. More-
over, when connectivity between the accumbens 
and other brain regions was examined, it was 
connectivity between the accumbens and the 
middle frontal gyrus (a region that has been 
associated with regulation and goal-directed 
behavior) that showed sustained activation among 
the controls but dropped off with increased  
trials in the depressed patients. Finally we also 
demonstrated18 that patients’ reports of positive 
emotion were most strongly predicted by the 
metric that captured their sustained activation 
across trials over time, rather than the conven-
tional measure of mean activation. This study 
provided the first strong experimental evidence 
that the neural correlates of savoring, the ability 
to maintain positive emotion over time, are 
associated with sustained activation in the 
ventral striatum and with sustained connectivity 
between regions of prefrontal cortex and the 
ventral striatum. Moreover, depressed patients 
differ from controls on these metrics. 
In a direct follow-up to this initial study,19 we 
examined whether sustained activation in the 
ventral striatum would change over the course  
of antidepressant treatment and whether an 
increase in the ability to sustain activity would 
specifically predict increases in reported positive 
affect. We found that when medication is taken, 
the greater the increase of sustained ventral 
striatum activation, the greater the rise in  
reports of positive affect among clinically  
depressed patients. These findings indicate that 
metrics of sustained activation in the ventral 
striatum can be used to index sustained  
happiness and are an important outcome  
measure for studies of antidepressant impact. 
In a recent study involving a large community 
sample derived from the MIDUS study,20 we 
experimentally examined relations between 
individual differences in sustained activation  
in the ventral striatum and psychological 
well-being.21 We found that individuals with 
higher levels of sustained activation across trials 
in the ventral striatum in response to positive 
pictures reported higher levels of psychological 
well-being on Ryff’s22 composite measure of 
well-being (see Figure 5.1). In addition, we found 
a similar pattern in the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, a region often involved in working 
memory and attention, but also active when a 
person is regulating his or her emotion (Figure 5.2). 
We also looked at the relationship between 
activity in these brain regions and an individual’s 
cortisol output over the course of the day. Cortisol 
can be understood as a measure of a body’s 
response to stress, with higher amounts over the 
course of the day indicating more stress signals 
being communicated in the body. We found that 
participants with greater sustained activation in 
both the ventral striatum and the dorsolateral 
prefrontal region had lower levels of cortisol 
output, which suggests less activation of the 
body’s stress response (see Figure 5.3). These 
findings indicate that the initial clues we gleaned 
from studies with depressed patients generalize 
to healthy individuals, and indicate that sustained 
activation across time in response to positive 
incentives in the ventral striatum and dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex predicts psychological well- 
being, a form of sustained happiness that may 
not depend directly upon external circumstances. 
Moreover, our findings indicate that these neural 
patterns predict not only reports of well-being 
but also peripheral biological measures (such as 
cortisol output) that may reflect both psychological 
and physical well-being. 
Figure 5.2: Psychological well-being is predicted by sustained activation of the right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex  (RDLPFC) across trials in response to positive pictures, p<.005, corrected for multiple comparisons. 
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events can be obtained using peripheral psycho-
physiological measures29 or can be assessed with 
direct measures of brain function30 where the 
actual time course of responding in specific 
neural circuits can be assessed. In both cases, 
the key time window for measuring recovery is 
the period after a negative emotional stimulus 
ceases to be present. Prolonged or slow recovery 
would be reflected in greater signal in the period 
that follows the end of a negative emotional 
stimulus, reflecting a continuation of the  
emotional response when it ceases to be relevant. 
We suggest that a key constituent of well-being 
is fast recovery following a negative stimulus. 
Moreover, we have proposed that the time 
course of responding in the amygdala represents 
a central node through which peripheral signs  
of recovery are modulated. The rationale for 
considering the amygdala a central node for 
resilience is the extensive literature implicating 
this structure in fear and anxiety.31 Faster recovery 
of the amygdala would therefore imply more 
adaptive coping with adversity, since the central 
and peripheral changes associated with fear and 
anxiety would be diminished more quickly if  
the amygdala exhibited a faster time course of 
decreased activation following exposure to a 
negative event. 
To test these ideas, we recruited 120 middle-aged 
adults (mean age=48 years) and brought them 
into the laboratory for an imaging session 
during which an automatic emotion regulation 
paradigm was presented.32 In this paradigm, 
positive, negative or neutral pictures were 
presented for four seconds, after which a neutral 
face was presented one or three seconds after 
the image, or not at all. Three days after the 
scanning session, participants rated the likeability 
of the faces they had seen, along with novel 
unfamiliar faces that acted as foils.
In response to the emotional pictures, the time 
course was divided into separate reactivity and 
recovery periods. We measured amygdala activity 
in the four seconds while the image was on the 
screen (reactivity) and in the four seconds after 
the image disappeared (recovery). We found that 
individual differences in neuroticism, one of  
the key attributes of trait negative affect and a 
personality variable that is inversely related to 
well-being,33 was predicted by greater amygdala 
signal during the recovery period, but not during 
the reactivity period. This implies that a person’s 
initial reaction to a negative event (either large 
or small) has little effect on that person’s trait 
levels of neuroticism. The process that results in 
less neuroticism is how well the person recovers 
once the negative stimulus is no longer relevant. 
We also found that ratings of less likeability of 
the neutral faces were associated with greater 
amygdala signal during both the reactivity and 
recovery periods. These findings suggest that 
individual differences in amygdala recovery may 
play an important role in resilience and well- 
being, and argue for increased attention to this 
construct in future studies of well-being. 
Is there more direct evidence that recovery 
following negative events is connected with 
well-being, and is there a particular component 
of well-being that may be more strongly associated 
with recovery than others? We studied these 
questions in a sample of 331 participants from 
the MIDUS study between the ages of 34-84 
years.34 Using an automatic emotion regulation 
task very similar to that described above for the 
imaging study, we examined emotion-modulated 
startle at different latencies during and following 
emotional picture presentation. After viewing 
emotional images, participants were sometimes 
subjected to a loud burst of sound, and the 
amount of startle in response to the sound was 
used as a measure of sustained emotional 
arousal. Evidence for better recovery following 
negative events would be reflected in greater 
startle diminution after negative pictures were 
removed from the participants’ view. We used 
startle magnitude during the picture presentation 
as a measure of recovery that was unconfounded 
by reactivity. We found that participants with 
higher scores on the Purpose in Life subscale  
of well-being exhibited the most robust recovery 
following negative events. This finding holds 
decrease in depressive symptoms while activation 
in this same region in response to a hedonic 
reward task did not. This suggests that the 
context in which ventral striatal activation is 
observed is significant and determines the 
network with which it associates. What is not 
known from this study is whether a more 
sensitive analytic method might have revealed 
differences in the pattern of activation (within 
the ventral striatum and related regions) between 
these conditions. 
Both brain function and concepts of positive 
affect are complex and so it should not be 
surprising that there are interesting relation-
ships between positive affect and other regions 
of the brain as well. Though they are not as 
straightforward as the findings within the 
ventral striatum, we discuss some of these 
thought-provoking findings in Annex 1.
Resilience and the Recovery  
from Adversity
The study of resilience is receiving increased 
neuroscientific attention.27 Much of this work is 
being conducted at the rodent level and entails 
the study of experimental manipulations that 
have resilience-promoting effects, including 
variations of maternal care, early handling, and 
partially restricted foraging schedules. While 
there are many definitions of resilience, the 
maintenance of high levels of well-being in the 
face of adversity seems to be a common theme 
among the differing definitions. One key way in 
which high levels of well-being can be sustained 
in the face of adversity is through effective 
recovery from negative events. We have concep-
tualized recovery as a form of automatic emotion 
regulation.28 It is automatic in the sense that it 
does not require explicit effortful control; rather, 
there are large individual differences in the 
naturally occurring rate at which we recover 
from negative events. Just as we described above 
in the case of savoring, the time course of 
recovery from negative events is the flip side of 
savoring. Measures of recovery from negative 
Figure 5.3: Sustained activation in the ventral striatal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex regions in  
response to positive pictures is associated with lower levels of overall total daily cortisol output. Modified  
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cingulate cortex (an area of cortex just above the 
corpus callosum in the medial part of the brain). 
This overlaps with the activity shown when those 
individuals are exposed to pain themselves.48 The 
anterior insula is not only active when witnessing 
the pain of another – it activates in response to a 
person’s own positive and negative experiences. 
Similarly, increases activity when witnessing both 
positive and negative emotions of another, thus 
suggesting that it does not code valence but rather 
something that is common across different 
types of emotion. For example, Jabbi et al. found 
activation of the anterior insula when individuals 
witnessed others drinking both pleasant and 
unpleasant drinks.49
with measures of reactivity statistically removed. 
The other subscales of the Ryff well-being 
measure to reach statistical significance were the 
Personal Growth and Self-Acceptance subscales. 
These findings suggest that better recovery from 
negative events may be an important constituent 
of well-being. They further raise the possibility 
that strategies that might promote the learning 
of more effective recovery might serve to  
increase well-being. 
Russo et al.35 review the growing literature in 
non-human animals (mostly rodents) that is 
focused on the mechanisms underlying resilience. 
For the purposes of these studies, resilience is 
operationalized as not succumbing to the delete-
rious effects of stress-inducing manipulations. 
In mice exposed to predators or chronic defeat 
stressors, those exhibiting a resilient behavioral 
profile showed higher levels of early gene  
expression in glutamatergic neurons in the 
medial prefrontal cortex (a region commonly 
involved in the regulation of emotion in humans). 
Activation in this brain region has been interpreted 
as a pro-resilience adaptation. Consistent with 
this interpretation, Covington et al.36 showed 
that direct stimulation of neurons in this region 
promotes resilience to social defeat stress, 
underscoring the causal role of this brain region 
in the expression of resilience. In squirrel 
monkeys, Katz et al.37 found that exposure to 
intermittent maternal separation (which has 
been found to promote resilience) increases 
cortical volume in the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex, a pattern that is opposite to what is 
observed in depression. These and other related 
findings are consistent with human data in 
suggesting an important role for prefrontal  
regulatory regions in the promotion of resilience, 
and they further underscore the role of these 
circuits in well-being. These findings are also 
consistent with the evidence introduced in an 
earlier section of this chapter showing that 
individuals with sustained dorsolateral prefrontal 
activation in response to positive stimuli report 
higher levels of well-being.38 The general view 
suggested here is that opportunities with moderate 
levels of adversity may facilitate the learning  
of emotional regulatory strategies that help 
promote better recovery and result in changes  
in prefrontal engagement. 
Empathy, Altruism, and Well-Being
One of the strongest predictors of well-being is 
the quality of an individual’s social relationships.39 
In fact, when individuals are made to experience 
social isolation many of the same brain regions 
become active that are active in the experience of 
physical pain.40 Behavior that increases social 
bonds (altruism and pro-social behavior) reliably 
increases well-being in children41 and adults42 
and appears to be consistent across cultures.43  
In fact, individuals asked to recall a purchase 
they made for another person were happier 
immediately following the memory, and were 
subsequently more likely to spend money on 
another person. This type of behavior could 
result in a feedback loop, where pro-social  
behavior increases well-being, which then 
results in more pro-social behavior.44 Pro-social 
behavior is even associated with better health45 
and longer life expectancy46 and these improved 
health outcomes in turn can also contribute to 
greater well-being.
Neural Correlates of  
Empathy and Altruism
A vital precursor to the development of pro-social 
behavior is the activation of empathy, or the 
ability of an individual to recognize and share 
the emotions of others. The neuroscience of 
empathy is in its nascent stages, but one thing 
that is clear is that many of the brain regions 
involved in empathy are the same as those 
involved in experiencing our own emotions.47 
For example, when individuals watch other 
people being exposed to a painful stimulus, they 
show activation in the anterior insula (a region 
just behind the temples) and anterior medial 
Figure 5.4: The anterior insula (AI) and anterior/
medial cingulate cortex (aMCC) are activated 
during the experience of pain and also to witnessing 
pain in another. The inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) is 
also identified.  From top left to bottom right are 
slices from the center of the brain outward showing 
regions that respond to witnessing another in pain. 
(From Lamm et al. [2011]).
Activity in empathy-related regions is also 
affected by the degree of social connectedness 
between the observer and the individual  
experiencing pain. Hein et al. studied fans of 
two different sports teams and found that 
anterior insula activation was decreased in 
individuals observing the pain of a rival versus  
a fan of the same team.50 The anterior insula is  
a region that is involved in the feeling of bodily 
sensation, so this suggests that individuals 
observing others in pain “feel” some level of that 
pain themselves, and the feeling is stronger if 
the individual receiving the pain is someone that 
the person feels more socially connected to. In 
Hein’s study of sports fans, they further found 
that the more anterior insula activity an individual 
showed, the more likely they were to help the 
individuals in pain when given the opportunity.51 
In a study of African Americans and Caucasian 
Americans, Mathur et al.52 found that both 
groups showed anterior insula and anterior 
cingulate cortex activity in response to witnessing 
both African Americans and Caucasian Americans 
in pain. However, African Americans additionally 
recruited the medial prefrontal cortex (a region 
generally implicated in self-related processing) 
when witnessing the suffering of other African 
Americans as opposed to Caucasian Americans. 
Further, the magnitude of medial prefrontal 
activity positively predicted the amount of 
money participants indicated later that that they 
would be willing to donate to help members of 
their in-group.53
One step beyond the experience of empathy (and 
more directly related to well-being) is the ability 
of an individual to engage in pro-social behavior. 
In a study of individuals deciding whether to 
donate money to charity, it was found that 
people showed activity in the same brain regions 
(ventral tegmental area and dorsal and ventral 
striatum) both when they donated money and 
when they received it.54 In fact, in that study the 
ventral striatum was even more active when 
participants donated money than when they 
received it. Given the role of the ventral striatum 
in the experience of positive affect (discussed in 
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accumbens predicted greater helping behavior 
in the compassion group, but less helping 
behavior in the reappraisal group (see Figure 5.5). 
These data suggest that the regulation of emotion 
by the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex serves 
different purposes in the two different groups. 
In the reappraisal group it might allow the 
individual to more effectively disengage from 
another’s suffering, while in the compassion 
group it might allow the individual to manage 
their own emotional response in order to have 
more resources to direct towards helping.60
In another study of the effects of compassion 
training on an individual’s response to suffering, 
Klimecki et al. studied the effects of a one-day 
compassion training versus a one-day memory 
training on participants’ response to short clips 
of strangers in distress. Before training, both 
groups showed increases in negative affect, 
accompanied by increases in anterior insula and 
anterior cingulate cortex, in response to the 
video clips. After the compassion training, 
participants watched another set of video clips  
of people in distress but this time reported a 
very different emotional response and exhibited 
a different neural signature. They reported greater 
positive affect (with respect to the memory 
training group) and showed activation in brain 
regions commonly associated with positive 
affect, namely the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, 
putamen, pallidum, ventral tegmental area.61 
These findings suggest that after compassion 
training, an individual witnessing another’s 
suffering might buffer the debilitating effects of 
a negative empathic response with the generation 
of positive emotion to better allow the individual 
to respond with helping behavior. 
A follow up on the previously mentioned study 
of a day of compassion training looked at the 
specific effects of empathy training versus 
compassion. Participants first watched videos  
of people suffering before any training, then 
after a day-long empathy training, and finally a 
third time after a day of compassion training. 
They found that the empathy training alone led 
a previous section), these data corroborate the 
adage that “it is better to give than to receive.” 
Additionally, participants with greater magnitude 
of striatal activity also made a greater number of 
charitable donations than individuals with less 
striatal activity. This suggests that participants are 
more likely to engage in charitable donations if 
they find the activity more intrinsically rewarding.
Another interesting avenue of research in this 
area is the study of the brains of extraordinarily 
altruistic individuals. Marsh et al. found just 
such a population when they recruited voluntary 
organ donors, specifically individuals who 
donated a kidney to a stranger. They deemed 
these individuals “extraordinary altruists,” as 
kidney donation is a significant cost to the donor 
to benefit an anonymous stranger. They found 
that extraordinary altruists showed increased 
amygdala response to faces of people in fear, and 
greater amygdala volume on average than a 
group of control participants. Further, greater 
amygdala response in the whole sample predicted 
better recognition of fearful faces one to two hours 
later.55 Given the role of the amygdala in emotional 
arousal, these results suggest a heightened 
sensitivity to the suffering of others in this 
group of extraordinary altruists, specifically 
others that are experiencing fear.
Neural Changes in Response  
to Compassion Training
The expression of empathy and compassion has 
been a mainstay of many contemplative traditions 
for millennia, and some traditions have even 
evolved extensive methods to train these qualities. 
We define empathy here as sharing the feelings 
of others, whereas compassion is a feeling of 
concern for another, along with a desire to 
improve his or her well-being. Recent years have 
seen a gain in momentum towards the study of 
mindfulness and concentration trainings. 
However, it is only recently that scientists have 
begun to study the efficacy of methods that 
specifically train compassion on an individual’s 
well-being, and the well-being of those around 
them. Kemeny and colleagues enrolled female 
school teachers in a secular eight-week training 
with a focus on mindfulness, empathy, compassion, 
and recognition of emotions in oneself and 
others. They found that after the training, the 
women reported higher levels of positive emotion 
and lower levels of negative emotion compared 
to a wait-list control group. In addition to changes 
in their own emotions, they had an increased 
ability to recognize the emotions of others, a 
precursor for empathy and compassion.56 In a 
study of a much shorter training, Leiberg et al.57 
studied the effects of just one day of compassion 
training compared to a day of memory training. 
They found that people trained in compassion 
reported increases in positive emotions,  
accompanied by greater helping behavior in  
a pro-social game.
Several studies provide insight into the brain 
mechanisms underlying these increases in the 
ability to recognize emotion and engage in 
helping behavior. Mascaro et al. investigated  
the effects of an eight-week cognitive-based 
compassion training versus a health discussion 
control group, and found that the compassion 
group was better able to recognize emotions 
after training. Further, the increases in recognition 
were predicted by activity in the ventral and 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex.58 Since these 
regions are involved in the regulation of emotion 
and goal-directed behavior, this activity might 
indicate the compassion training led to the 
development of greater motivation to recognize 
the emotions of others, and thus a more  
compassionate response. In our laboratory, 
Weng et al.59 studied individuals who completed 
a two-week training in either compassion or 
cognitive reappraisal, and found that people 
engaged in more helping behavior after  
compassion training (versus reappraisal). We 
also studied the brain response to images of 
people suffering, before and after the trainings. 
We found that a greater increase in the connection 
between dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and nucleus 
Figure 5.5: Stronger increases in connectivity 
between right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex  
(R DLPFC, shown in red) and nucleus accumbens 
(NAcc, shown in green) predicts more helping 
behavior in people trained in compassion, but less 
helping behavior in people trained in reappraisal 
(from Weng et al. [2013]).  Participants were ranked 
by how much they chose to distribute.
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capture, a proxy for emotional distraction. We 
used a task based upon Anderson et al.72 that 
assesses how much individuals are slowed by 
attending to a distractor formerly paired with 
reward, despite their cognitive goal of completing 
a visual search as quickly as possible. We found 
that participants with greater breath counting 
accuracy (i.e., higher levels of mindfulness) 
showed less attention capture by a previously 
rewarded stimulus, indicating decreased  
attachment to affect-relevant stimuli and less 
“stickiness”—involuntarily being attentionally 
pulled by irrelevant emotional distractors. 
Strengthening attentional skills through mind-
fulness or similar types of training may decrease 
stickiness and mind wandering and increase 
well-being by transforming default mode activity. 
Summary
This review emphasizes four novel constituents 
of well-being and their underlying neural bases: 
1. Sustained positive emotion; 2. Recovery from 
negative emotion; 3. Empathy, altruism and 
pro-social behavior; and 4. Mind-wandering, 
mindfulness and “affective stickiness” or emotion- 
captured attention. Well-being has been found  
to be elevated when individuals are better able to 
sustain positive emotion; recover more quickly 
from negative experiences; engage in empathic 
and altruistic acts; and express high levels of 
mindfulness. In each case, a growing body of 
evidence is pointing towards the importance of 
these four constituents to well-being. In some 
cases, effects are stronger for certain components 
of well-being, such as purpose in life, or positive 
relations with others. In other cases, the findings 
hold for measures of overall well-being. The 
neural circuits that underlie each of these four 
constituents are partially separable, though there 
is some overlap. The prefrontal cortex and 
ventral striatum are especially important in 
sustained positive emotion. Connectivity between 
the prefrontal cortex and amygdala is a key node 
through which effective recovery following 
negative events is mediated. The anterior insula 
and regions of the anterior cingulate cortex  
are implicated in empathic responding and  
the prefrontal cortex-ventral striatum are  
critical here in subserving altruistic behavior.  
Mind-wandering and mindfulness engage the 
default networks that can be detected at rest. 
Two key nodes of the default mode—the medial 
prefrontal cortex and the precuneus/posterior 
cingulate cortex—have both been implicated  
in mind-wandering. These regions exhibit 
decreased activation during the explicit voluntary 
cultivation of mindfulness, and increased levels 
of mindfulness are associated with decreased 
behavioral signs of stickiness. 
Just how these four constituents may  
synergistically work together has not been 
studied, nor has their relative contributions  
to well-being been rigorously dissected. There 
are two overall lessons that can be taken from 
the neuroscientific evidence. The first is the 
identification of the four constituents we high-
light, which are not commonly emphasized in 
well-being research. The second concerns  
the profound implications of the fact that the 
circuits we identify as underlying these four 
constituents of well-being all exhibit plasticity, 
and thus can be transformed through experience 
and training. Training programs are now being 
developed to cultivate mindfulness, kindness, 
generosity etc. As we reviewed above, data are 
available that indicate that some of these training 
regimes, even those as short as two weeks, can 
induce measurable changes in the brain. These 
findings highlight the view that happiness and 
well-being are best regarded as skills that can  
be enhanced through training.
to increases in insula and anterior middle 
cingulate cortex activity as well as to an increase 
in negative affect in response to viewing people 
in distress. However, after the completion of 
both empathy and compassion trainings the 
participants again showed increases in positive 
affect, decreases in negative affect, and increases 
in regions more commonly associated with 
positive emotion, including the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum.62
Mind Wandering, Mindfulness  
and Affective Stickiness
In a well-known study, Killingsworth & Gilbert63 
developed a smartphone app to sample the 
experience of more than 2,000 individuals 
(mean age=34 years) while they went about their 
daily activities in the world. They were interested 
in the frequency with which people reported 
their minds to be wandering (i.e., not focused on 
the activity in which they were predominantly 
engaged). At the same time, they also asked 
participants to rate the degree to which they 
were happy or unhappy at that moment. They 
found that on average, these participants reported 
their minds to be wandering 47% of the time. 
Moreover, when they reported their minds to be 
wandering, they also reported significantly more 
unhappiness than when they were focused on 
the activity at hand. In a very recent report, 
Wilson and colleagues64 found that across 11 
different studies, college student participants 
typically did not enjoy spending 6-15 minutes in 
a room by themselves with nothing to do. They 
preferred to engage in external activities much 
more, even ones that were mundane, and some 
even preferred to receive electric shocks than to 
sit alone. In light of the high prevalence of mind 
wandering and negative affect during “resting” 
conditions, the findings from Wilson et al.65 
clearly indicate that the typical college student 
finds his/her thoughts during an uninstructed 
condition to be unpleasant. 
Neuroscientists have begun to discover specific 
characteristics of the brain’s function at rest, 
when no formal task or instruction is given and 
the mind is allowed to wander. When functional 
MRI data is collected from participants at rest 
(not completing any task), a very reliable network 
of brain regions becomes active. Because these 
regions are active specifically in the absence of  
a task, we refer to them as the default mode 
network. Connectivity between regions in this 
network, in the absence of explicit instruction or 
a task, has been found to be related to various 
aspects of mind wandering.66 For example, 
Mason et al.67 found increased activity in several 
areas of the default mode (including the medial 
prefrontal cortex and the posterior cingulate) 
related to an increased frequency of mind 
wandering reports.
Mindfulness is a construct that is receiving 
serious attention in the scientific literature for 
the first time.68 Mindfulness is often defined as 
paying attention, on purpose, non-judgmentally, 
and, when cultivated through training, is said to 
promote increased well-being.69 Recent evidence 
suggests that mindfulness meditation training 
results in a decrease in the same regions of the 
default mode that are increased in activation 
during mind wandering.70 These authors suggest 
that their findings “demonstrate differences in 
the default-mode network that are consistent 
with decreased mind-wandering.”
Mindfulness is also said to be associated with 
decreased attachment, reflected in part by a 
decreased influence of wanting, which may at 
least in part underlie the association between 
mindfulness and well-being. Wanting, defined 
as an incentive to approach, can be irrationally 
inconsistent with cognitive goals and lead to 
decreases in well-being. This occurs in a striking 
way in addiction. Using a newly developed 
behavioral measure of mindfulness based on 
breath counting accuracy,71 we recently examined 
the relation between individual differences in 
this behavioral measure of mindfulness and a 
behavioral measure of reward-related attention 
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Executive Summary
Children matter vitally–both as people and as 
tomorrow’s adults. Altogether, 31% of the world’s 
population is aged under 18,1 representing 
one-third of all human experience. This is  
the group we focus on in this report, and for 
convenience we shall refer to them as “children.”
What matters most about children is their 
subjective well-being – how they feel about  
their lives. This reflects a new shift of emphasis 
among policy makers worldwide. Increasingly 
people feel that the success of a society cannot 
be judged mainly by its level of wealth but rather 
by how satisfied people are with their lives.2 Nearly 
all Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries now measure 
adult life satisfaction as a routine statistic,3 and 
many are considering new forms of policy 
analysis with this as the objective.
Children differ hugely in their subjective 
well-being (or “well-being” for short). There is  
a very wide spectrum. For much of our report  
we focus on those with mental disorders, who lie 
at the bottom end of the spectrum. But we also 
look at the whole spectrum because a general 
upward shift in well-being can be an excellent 
way to reduce the numbers at the lowest levels. 
More fundamentally, there is increasing evidence 
that nurturing the positive aspects of all young 
lives is the most effective way of preventing 
mental disorders. 
Children’s mental well-being is affected by every 
aspect of their lives – by their physical health 
and quality of nutrition, by their wealth and 
poverty, by discrimination, by war and conflict 
– and a whole range of other social and economic 
factors. But it is also affected by more personal 
factors. First is the family – the stability it offers, 
the stimulus it provides and the values it nurtures. 
Then there is the psychological support of the 
wider community, including the healthcare 
system, but also a whole range of local social 
organizations. And finally there is the school, 
which leaves its mark on the character of every 
child. In this report we cannot discuss all the 
factors that affect children. Instead we concentrate 
on the role of these more personal factors, and 
above all on how they can be improved.
Our central focus is on how to reduce mental 
illness by directly addressing the personal 
factors that have caused or are sustaining it.  
This means ensuring that mental disorders are 
treated when they arise, but also doing our best 
to prevent them in the first place. Prevention 
requires a wide approach because there is no 
reliable way of predicting which children will 
develop mental health problems. So, when 
thinking about prevention, we have to think 
about how to improve the well-being of all 
children – a task for everyone in our society.
We need a completely new priority to be given  
to the well-being of children and we make  
major recommendations about what this would 
imply – suggestions affecting communities, 
healthcare systems and schools. We start with 
three main points.
1. First, the scale of the issue. This is a massive 
problem. Around 10% of the world’s children 
today are suffering from diagnosable mental 
health problems.4 Roughly half of these are 
suffering from anxiety disorders (or, less  
commonly, depression) and a half from conduct 
disorder or attention deficit and hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD). Approximately 1% of all 
children suffer from developmental disorders 
such as autism. Where evidence exists over time, 
it shows that these problems have increased over 
the last half century.5 These children are unhappy 
and disturbed – the quality of their experience  
is very poor. And the majority of them will also 
become unhappy adults. The best predictor of 
whether a child will become a satisfied adult is not 
their academic achievement but their emotional 
health in childhood.6 The cost of child mental 
illness is borne by all of us. Crime is increased, 
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mothers. They should be trained to provide 
general mental health education to parents and, 
unless more professional services are available, 
they should also be trained to treat these problems.
4. Professionals: Every country should train 
more professionals in evidence-based treat-
ments, especially psychological therapy. To 
develop quality, there should be at least one 
center of excellence for every region.
5. Schools for well-being: The well-being of 
pupils should be an explicit objective of every 
school. Schools should have a well-being code 
(including mutual respect, kindness and play) to 
which all teachers, parents and pupils subscribe. 
This should stress the importance of praise 
rather than criticism.
6. Measurement: Schools should measure  
pupil well-being regularly.
7. A life-skills curriculum: Schools should use 
evidence-based methods to provide explicit 
teaching in life skills for at least an hour a week 
throughout school life, and more in the early 
years. This should mainly emphasize dos rather 
than don’ts.
8. Teacher training: All teachers should be 
trained in ways to notice and promote child 
well-being and mental health, and to maintain  
a civilized learning environment.
9. Use of mobiles: There should be a  
major international program to develop free 
smartphone-based approaches to all our  
recommendations. A major international  
charity should be asked to support this.
10. The Sustainable Development Goals: The 
Sustainable Development Goals should include 
explicit reference to physical and mental health.
To summarize
There is a massive problem: 10% of our children 
are suffering from a mental disorder, and under 
a quarter of these are receiving specialist help 
for their problem.
We know what to do: For children with mental 
health problems, there are effective evidence- 
based psychological treatments that the healthcare 
system should provide. Every school should 
promote the well-being of its children, using 
evidence-based approaches.
The net cost need not be high: Mental illness 
already imposes high costs on the economy. 
Above all, hundreds of high-quality online 
programs should be developed and offered  
free to children and their caretakers throughout 
the world.
Why Does Child Well-being Matter?
A central aim of any society should be that its 
children enjoy their lives and acquire the skills 
necessary to become happy, functioning adults. 
For this, they need to develop emotional buoyancy, 
coping skills, resilience and the ability to form 
constructive social relationships. Social and 
emotional capacity is a built-in response to 
experience. The main drivers of children’s 
experiences are parents, teachers, health workers 
and the community in general. These relation-
ships form the focus of this report. How can 
these relationships be supported and improved 
to maximize good outcomes for children? And 
how can this be achieved given the different 
challenges posed in low-, middle- and high- 
income countries?
Some 31% of the world’s population is aged under 
18.11 Of them, around 10% have a diagnosable 
mental disorder (mainly anxiety, depression or 
conduct disorder).12, 13 That means some 220 
million children and young people. As Figure 1 
educational achievement is thwarted and  
productivity is diminished. Improving children’s 
mental health is a critical issue across the globe, 
and the messages of this report are as relevant  
to high-income countries as to low- or middle- 
income countries.
2. Second, treatment and prevention. In the 
richest countries only a quarter of disturbed 
children get specialist help,7 and in the poorest 
countries it is much less. In every country in the 
world, far fewer children are in treatment if they 
have mental health problems than if the problem 
is one of physical illness. This is shocking, because 
today there are really effective treatments available 
for children in distress, as well as the opportunity 
to make major changes in schools and commu-
nities that can make the problem less likely in 
the first place. In treatment there has been a real 
revolution in the last 30 years. We now have 
well-researched treatments for child anxiety and 
depression and for conduct problems, with 
recovery rates of over 50%, and with effects that 
are observed to persist.8 We can also treat maternal 
depression, which blights the lives of many 
young children. On prevention, we can use 
community structures and healthcare systems  
to promote good parenting, as well as openness 
and honesty about mental illness. And our 
schools should become as concerned with the 
well-being of children as they are with their 
academic performance. Because any child can 
develop mental health problems, we need a 
universal approach to mental health and well- 
being that involves the whole of society.
3. Third, economics. For the sake of our common 
humanity we should use all the tools that are 
available. But it is also good economics; in most 
countries, mental illness is reducing gross 
domestic product (GDP) by over 5%.9 And the 
net cost of the changes we propose is mostly 
small. Reorienting schools involves training 
teachers differently but not training more of 
them. The main cost is improved healthcare and 
support for parents. Intensive early intervention 
with at-risk families is expensive, but has been 
shown to save as much as it costs.10 The same 
can be true of better treatment facilities. There 
should be parity of esteem between mental and 
physical health – children should be as likely to 
receive help if their problem is mental or physical. 
This will involve substantial gross cost. In poorer 
countries it will have to be done through people 
with less professional training than in richer 
countries, and with fewer of them. But the 
savings will be great and will often exceed the 
costs. We cannot afford not to do it.
In all these endeavors we have the enormous 
advantage of new technology – above all, the 
smartphone with internet access. Online programs 
can contribute hugely to staff training, to the 
mental health treatment of adolescents, and to 
life-skills curriculums in schools. Our single 
most important recommendation is that one or 
more major charities establish a substantial 
fund to design such programs that can be 
available for free worldwide.
Action Points
This is a short report, which cannot possibly 
cover the whole field. So we focus on 10 specific 
things that can be done in every country and that 
would bring great benefit. These action points are:
1. Community action: Every local community 
should have a local child well-being strategy, 
including an assessment of the needs of children 
and families, and of the role that can be played 
by healthcare organizations, schools, community 
groups, non-government organizations (NGOs), 
youth and faith organizations.
2. Parity of esteem: Evidence-based healthcare 
for children and their parents should be equally 
available whether their disorder is mental  
or physical.
3. Universality: All health professionals should 
be trained to identify mental health problems  
in children, as well as perinatal depression in 
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taxpayer in criminal justice costs an amount 
equal to three years’ average wages.23
•  Action to reduce mental illness among children 
would produce major savings to society, which 
should be offset against the costs. For example 
the Incredible Years training program for 
parents, teachers and children, described in 
Box 2, produces enough healthcare savings to 
offset the cost of training.25 If we add in savings 
to the criminal justice system, the amount 
saved is three times the cost.
•  When parents are mentally ill, children suffer. 
Depression attacks one-fifth of all mothers, 
either during pregnancy or the following year.26 
This takes a heavy toll on mother and child. The 
children are more likely to develop mental health 
problems and to require special educational 
support and, as adults, they are likely to  
experience reduced earnings. The mother also 
needs more care. The average cost to society  
of one case of perinatal depression has been 
estimated in Britain to equal the average 
annual wage.27  
By contrast, the cost of successful psychological 
treatment (assuming a 50% success rate28) is 
only 5% of that:29 the savings exceed the cost by 
a factor of 20 to 1. Therefore community health 
workers need to screen all mothers for depres-
sion, and as Box 3 shows, they can also be 
trained to deliver effective treatment in those 
countries where more expert specialists are not 
available.
These simple facts have fundamental policy 
implications. First, if we care about well-being, 
then the well-being of children must be a top 
policy priority for communities and families, 
healthcare systems and schools.30 This is a 
matter of basic human rights, as set out in the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. And we must talk about mental health 
issues much more openly and destigmatize the 
issue. Second, if we do all of this, we shall 
certainly incur costs but we will also save huge 
expenses in the future. So who can do what?
shows, the problem affects every country. Of 
total child morbidity, the World Health Organi-
zation estimates that 23% results from mental 
rather than physical ill-health.14
This is serious enough in itself. But, on top  
of that, over half the children who experience 
mental illness in childhood will suffer from 
mental illness again as adults.15 Their lives are 
more likely to be impoverished and unhappy – 
90% of people who commit suicide are mentally 
ill.16 Moreover, mental health affects physical 
health. Depression reduces life expectancy as 
much as smoking does.17 It has a more disabling 
effect than arthritis, diabetes, angina or asthma.18 
Mental health is also crucial for a satisfied life, 
and research on the British Cohort Study reveals 
a striking finding. If you wish to predict whether 
a child will grow into a satisfied adult, the best 
predictor is not the academic achievement of the 
child but their emotional health.19
The suffering produced by mental illness is the 
main reason to care. But on top of that there is 
the economic cost – the sheer waste. So here are 
some remarkable facts.
•  Adult mental illness reduces GDP by at least 
5% through reduced productivity or inability  
to work, and through increased crime and 
healthcare costs.20
•  If we follow children with mental health 
problems into adult life, we can estimate the 
cost that they impose on the economy and 
society at large. For example, in Britain the 
least-happy tenth of children are 7% poorer as 
adults than they would otherwise be. This is 
partly because emotional problems interfere  
so much with their education and physical 
health.21
•  Equally, children with conduct disorder become 
four times more likely to commit crime, take 
drugs, become teenage parents, depend on 
welfare, and attempt suicide – as Table 1 
dramatically demonstrates. It has been estimated 
that, in Britain, such children may cost the 
Figure 1: Prevalence of mental disorders among 
children under 1922
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ACTION POINT 1. COMMUNITY ACTION: 
Every local community should have a local 
child well-being strategy, including an 
assessment of the needs of children and 
families, and of the role that can be played by 
healthcare organizations, schools, community 
groups, NGOs, youth and faith organizations.
A good child well-being strategy will set out a 
vision for what we want, and clear actions on 
how we will get there. Components are likely  
to include:
•  A forum for bringing together leaders of the 
key agencies dealing with families and children 
to ensure that everyone is aiming for the same 
outcomes.
•  Ways of regularly assessing the need for 
services.
• Investment in child protection services.
•  Good universal services for families, combined 
with specialist and targeted services for children 
with identified problems.
• High-quality education.
• Opportunities for positive youth experiences.
• Investment in workforce development.
It is especially challenging to cater for children 
who are victims of violence, yet experience of 
trauma is clearly related to child mental health 
outcomes.36 Building resilience and countering 
the effects of living in conflict zones are critically 
important for the protection of children’s mental 
health in some areas of the world.37 In Box 1 we 
highlight one community-based approach to 
these problems.
Who Can Do What?
A fundamental principle is that it is better to 
intervene earlier. This applies especially if the 
child or its parents already have mental health 
problems. If problems do not resolve themselves 
quickly, evidence-based support should be 
provided to the parent, child, or both. But the 
principle of early intervention applies even more 
fundamentally to prevention. Supporting families 
is crucial. Communities need to promote good 
parenting practices from birth onwards. In most 
countries this is most easily led by the healthcare 
system, which is in touch with most families 
around the time of childbirth. That system is 
also best placed to detect problems of maternal 
depression. But education in life skills is needed 
throughout childhood, when schools become an 
increasingly important part of a child’s life.
Early relationships are critical because the 
brain’s plasticity is highest in young children 
and they are the most reactive to new influences, 
whether good or bad. There are marked brain 
differences between groups of people who have 
and have not been maltreated as children.31 
Attachment is a key capacity for a healthy  
emotional life. It develops early but it also 
continues to develop well or badly throughout 
childhood and adolescence.32 Indeed, the  
growth spurt in the teenage years is another  
key period of change and development. So we 
need institutions that concern themselves with 
child happiness and well-being from conception 
to early adulthood.
The exact institutions for delivering support will 
vary between countries, but there are general 
principles that apply everywhere. First, there 
needs to be an integrated approach at the local 
level, so that no child in need slips through the 
cracks. This will involve community groups, 
NGOs, faith organizations and many others.33 
But two systems are uniquely well-placed to 
reach every family: the healthcare system, which 
is involved even before the child is born, and the 
school system, which every child should attend. 
In the sections that follow, we first review  
the role of the overarching community, before 
looking at healthcare and schools.
Communities
Children grow up in families that are based in 
communities, and each community needs a 
framework for promoting the well-being of its 
children and families. This needs to include at 
least the following elements:
•  Understanding the extent of the opportunities 
and problems – what are the particular mental 
health needs of children in the community?
•  Advice for parents on how to bring up children.
•  Help for parents with mental health problems, 
especially perinatal depression.
•  Help for parents to develop their children’s 
well-being, and share solutions when things go 
badly for them or their children.
• Help for children who are in distress.
•  Schools that promote good values, encourage 
happiness and support the suffering.
•  Organizations that facilitate the transition to 
adulthood.
These functions can be performed by many types 
of service, but what matters is if the overall pattern 
is adequate to the task.34 Coordination can be 
provided through local government, community 
leaders, or ad hoc community groups, but it must 
happen. This can be adapted to different local 
contexts, as experiments with the Communities 
That Care intervention in the United States have 
illustrated. Communities That Care is a process 
rather than a program, providing a framework for 
bringing together key players in the local commu-
nity to design an action plan specific to the needs 
of that community. Once needs are clear, a plan is 
drawn up that uses evidence-based programs to 
enhance existing services.35 What is implemented 
will vary from one area to another, but local leader-
ship is central to success.
Box 1: A psychosocial care system for children in areas of violence38
This multi-tiered psychosocial care system com-
bines mental health promotion, prevention and 
treatment to address the needs of at-risk children 
and adolescents in areas of armed conflict. Based 
in Indonesia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Burundi 
and Nepal, the community-based system of care 
is intended to:
•  Increase community awareness about children’s 
psychosocial problems (for example, a local radio 
program in South Sudan).
•  Mobilize community resources for healing (for 
example, establishing child-to-child peer support 
networks in Burundi).
•  Increase social support systems (developing 
so-called Child Resilience Groups – semi-struc-
tured group activities once a week for five weeks).
•  Identify children in need of focused psychosocial 
support (using a screening instrument developed 
for the purpose).
•  Reduce psychosocial distress (through a 15-session 
classroom- or community-based intervention 
involving structured behavioral activities to 
increase children’s capacity to deal with problems 
posed by being exposed to conflict).
•  Support parents of children with problems 
(through family-oriented psychoeducation).
•  Provide individual counseling (or other treat-
ment) to children with severe mental health 
problems.
All services are provided by trained teams, 
including community volunteers, teachers, 
community counselors and mental health 
professionals. The system is set up to ensure 
that children can move between the levels and 
components of the system, depending on need. 
Supervision is an integral part of the service 
delivery framework. The system has been 
successfully evaluated.
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Healthcare systems
In the provision of family support, the strongest 
organization in most countries is the healthcare 
system. It provides the main treatment for 
disorders when they arise, but it also has a key 
role in detecting disorders and in advising parents 
so that disorders are avoided in the first place.
In a typical country, rich or poor, roughly 10%  
of children are suffering from a diagnosable 
mental disorder (see Figure 1). Some 5% have 
behavioral disorders, sometimes accompanied 
by ADHD. Some 5% have mood disorders, 
mainly anxiety disorders, like social anxiety 
disorder, panic attacks, obsessive compulsive 
disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder, 
which is especially common in conflict zones 
(depression becomes common only in the 
teens). And around 1% of children have neuro- 
developmental disorders, like autism. As  
Figure 1 shows, there is no systematic pattern  
of difference between countries or continents.  
At the same time, 20% of mothers experience 
depression in pregnancy or in the year after 
childbirth.39
For all of these conditions there are evidence- 
based methods of treatment with good rates of 
effectiveness – many of them based on the ideas 
of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT). For mild 
to moderate conduct disorders, the Incredible 
Years weekly parent training in groups for up to 
24 weeks has good results, even seven years later 
(see Box 2).40 The training has been effective in  
a whole range of cultures.41 Fidelity to the basic 
ideas is crucial, but the detailed content has to be 
modified according to the culture and experience 
of the parents in the group. For severe conduct 
disorder, one-on-one treatments work best, but 
they are expensive.42 And for ADHD, medication 
helps 75% of those treated to become symptom- 
free, but should only be used in serious cases.43
For anxiety problems, CBT yields 50–60% 
success rates in children over eight.44 Depression 
can be treated by CBT, interpersonal therapy or, 
in carefully selected cases, medication – with 
good success rates.45 This applies also to perinatal 
mothers suffering from depression.46
The shocking thing is that, even in rich countries, 
most children with mental health problems get 
no treatment at all. In rich countries the figure 
is around a quarter and in poorer countries it is 
much lower.50 The same is true of mothers with 
perinatal depression.51
This is totally in conflict with the principle of 
parity of esteem for mental and physical health, 
which means that a person has equal access to 
evidence-based treatment whether their disorder 
is physical or mental. This principle of parity of 
esteem is now enshrined in law in the UK and 
the US but there, as elsewhere, more honored  
in the breach than the observance. This  
must change.
ACTION POINT 2. PARITY OF ESTEEM: 
Evidence-based healthcare for children and 
their parents should be equally available 
whether their disorder is mental or physical.
But this is only a principle. To make it operational, 
we need enough suitably trained people to 
deliver the care. We need a framework in which 
children, parents and carers in need of help are 
identified. We also need a system that educates 
and supports parents to bring up children with 
good mental health.
The healthcare system is best placed to perform 
all these roles. Nearly all families interact with 
the system around the time of childbirth. That is 
the time primary care health workers identify 
perinatal maternal depression, and it is the time 
to offer parents lessons in how to bring up 
children who will be emotionally stable and well 
behaved.52 Equally, as the children grow, the 
healthcare system is well-placed to identify if the 
child is developing the symptoms of mental 
disorders. So all healthcare workers need some 
basic training in identifying mental ill-health in 
families and in arranging suitable treatment.
But who should actually provide the treatment? 
The issue here is similar to that in respect of 
physical illness. In rich countries, we should 
insist on fully professional care. For example,  
the recovery rates with treatment by well-trained 
practitioners are often double or triple those from 
personnel who are not as well-trained.53 In poorer 
countries, we have to use the available talent 
wherever we can find it. So ordinary community 
health workers should all be trained to deliver 
psychological therapy and, in many cases, it will 
be necessary to use non-health community 
workers as well.54 As Box 3 shows, it can become 
a routine function of primary health workers to 
identify and treat maternal depression.
Box 2: The Incredible Years – training for  
parents of children with conduct disorder47
Box 3: Treating maternal depression in rural Pakistan55
This is a well-known group training program 
for parents of children with conduct disor-
der, meeting weekly over 16 to 24 weeks. 
The emphasis is on promoting sociable, 
self-reliant child behavior and calm.
The relevant messages are introduced in a 
specific set of structured steps (described in 
a manual):
1.  Playing with the child, non-judgmentally, 
with the child leading.
2. Praise.
3.  Authoritative rules and instructions, using 
eye contact.
4. Rewards and (small) punishments.
Methods include sharing filmed vignettes 
of parents in common parenting situations. 
These trigger discussions leading to inter-
active learning and improvements in self- 
management of similar situations. The 
emphasis given to different elements can 
change, depending on the parents’ cultural 
background experiences, education, 
knowledge or values.48
The program has been evaluated in random-
ized control group trials in the US, Canada, 
United Kingdom, Wales, Norway, the 
Netherlands and Portugal. Ongoing research 
is being done in New Zealand, Denmark, 
Spain, Hong Kong and Sweden. In the UK, 
children were followed up seven years later 
and found to be 80% less likely to have 
oppositional defiant disorder than those in 
the control group.49
Community health workers were trained to identify 
and treat maternal depression, using a CBT-based 
intervention (the Thinking Healthy Program). 
The initiative used 16 home-based individual 
sessions and included active listening, collabo-
ration with the family, guided discovery and 
homework (that is, trying things out between 
sessions, practicing what was learned).
Forty local areas were assigned to either interven-
tion or routine care, with about 450 mothers in 
each group. At follow-up sessions (after six 
months) the experimental group included 23% 
still depressed, compared with 53% in the control 
group. In another study, psychoeducation is 
being offered to all mothers.56
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In every country there should also be a major 
expansion in higher-level mental health specialists, 
especially psychological therapists. England’s 
Improving Access to Psychological Therapies 
(IAPT) program shows how child mental health 
services can be quite quickly transformed to 
deliver evidence-based therapies with measurable 
outcomes.60 To promote change, there has to  
be a center of excellence in every region, which 
acts as a hub of training and researches and 
demonstrates good practice. This is as true for 
poorer countries as it is for richer countries. The 
quality in such centers can set the tone for the 
whole system. And they must do research that is 
relevant to their local problems. Mental health 
research is grossly underfunded and, within 
that, child mental health is especially under-
funded. That should change.
In all countries, if possible, more intensive help 
should be offered to the most deprived young 
families. In the US, Nurse–Family Partnerships 
provided monthly visits to poor, teenage mothers 
for three years. Consequently their children 
behaved better, did better in school and earned 
more as adults.57 A similar program in Jamaica  
is described in Box 4.
Box 4: Psychosocial stimulation to growth-stunted 
toddlers in Jamaica58
Box 5: An illustrative school well-being code
In weekly visits over a two-year period, com-
munity health workers taught parenting 
skills and encouraged mothers and children 
to interact in ways that develop cognitive 
and socio-emotional skills. Children were 
randomized into the trial and 20 years later 
were found to be earning 25% more than 
those from the control group. Children in 
the program were also found to score more 
highly on cognition, psycho-social skills and 
schooling attainment as well as showing 
reduced participation in violent crime.59
our aims
•  Our aim is to promote the happiness of 
every child, and equip each child to become 
a happy adult who contributes to the happi-
ness of others.
•  We also aim to develop academic compe-
tence and above all a love of learning. But 
this is easier to achieve if a child is happy.
The two aims are thus complementary and 
not in competition.
to achieve our aims, we will ensure that:
•  All members of the school (teachers, 
parents and children) treat each other 
with respect, using encouragement and 
praise rather than shame or criticism as 
the chief form of incentive.
•  Bullying of one child by another is unac-
ceptable and we have clear procedures for 
identifying it and dealing with it.
•  We have explicit systems for developing 
values in our children, such as adopting 
one value as the “value of the month,” for 
example caring, trust, honesty, courage.
•  Our aims are fully reflected in all school 
activities, including assemblies.
•  All teachers are comfortable talking about 
values and the necessity of developing 
good values and good habits throughout a 
child’s life at school.
•  We draw strongly on the evidence of what 
programs work best for developing specific 
life skills and devote at least one hour a 
week to evidence-based teaching of life 
skills throughout the school life.
•  All our teachers are able to talk openly 
and positively about problems of mental 
health, and identify and get support for 
those needing help.
performance at school. For example, children 
with emotional or behavioral difficulties are 
more likely to be excluded from school and to 
leave school without qualifications.62
So schools should make the well-being of their 
children a major objective, and this should 
include the children’s sense of social obligation 
and also how they feel inside: are they fulfilled 
or are they anxious or depressed? Every school 
should have a well-being policy, affecting the 
whole life of the school. There is good evidence 
that schools with such a policy improve their 
outcomes on all fronts.63 A well-being policy 
should include at least three elements:
•  A code of behavior (including an anti-bullying 
procedure).64
• A system of measuring well-being.
• Explicit teaching of life skills.
ACTION POINT 5. SCHOOLS FOR WELL-
BEING: The well-being of pupils should be 
an explicit objective of every school. Schools 
should have a well-being code (including 
mutual respect and support) to which all 
teachers, parents and pupils subscribe. This 
should stress the importance of praise rather 
than criticism.
The well-being code should be designed in 
consultation with teachers, parents and children, 
all of whom should explicitly subscribe to it (in 
some ceremony and/or in writing). As Box 5 
suggests, it should cover the basic values (for 
example, mutual respect) to be applied to all 
relationships. It should also cover the procedures 
to be applied when the code is infringed. But the 
fundamental aim in teacher–pupil relationships 
(as in parent–child relationships) should be to 
use praise and positive incentives rather than 
violence or harshness.65 Children should be 
encouraged always to live up to the standards  
of their better selves.66
We need more research on treatments but also 
much more research on prevention.
So from this discussion emerge two main action 
points:
ACTION POINT 3. UNIVERSALITY: All 
health professionals should be trained to 
identify mental health problems in children, 
as well as perinatal depression in mothers. 
They should be trained to provide general 
mental health education to parents and, 
unless more professional services are available, 
they should also be trained to treat these 
problems.
ACTION POINT 4. PROFESSIONALS: 
Every country should train more professionals 
in evidence-based treatments, especially 
psychological therapy. To develop quality, there 
should be at least one center of excellence 
for every region.
Schools
Every parent wants their child to be happy at 
school and to learn how to become a happy 
adult. Yet many schools do not see this as a 
primary objective of their institution. Increasingly 
in many countries, schools are becoming exam 
factories. To improve child well-being, this  
must be reversed, and schools must address  
the emotional and spiritual education and 
opportunities for their children in addition to 
their intellectual development.
There is no conflict between these objectives.  
In fact, the evidence is clear – if children are 
happier, that is also good for their intellectual 
development. For example, a survey of 200 
school-based programs to promote the social 
and emotional skills of children found that 
children taking these programs gained about  
10 percentile points in emotional well-being and 
behavior as well as in academic achievement.61 
Conversely, low well-being is linked with worse 
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If you treasure it, measure it. If schools do not 
measure the well-being of their children but do 
measure their intellectual development, the 
latter will always take precedence. We therefore 
suggest that schools use standard questionnaires 
to measure the well-being of their children, 
preferably each year and certainly when they 
enter and leave the school. If the resulting scores 
are properly standardized, the change in well- 
being will be a good measure of the well-being 
value added during school life.
The questionnaires used will also help schools to 
recognize the children who are experiencing 
difficulties that might not otherwise be identified.
While children’s behavior is easy to see, their 
inner world is much less visible. If we assess 
children’s physical health when they go to 
school, it is surely wrong to not also assess  
their mental health. If a child is in distress,  
they should be offered help from a person with 
special competence in mental health. One 
possible questionnaire is illustrated in Table 2.
ACTION POINT 6. MEASUREMENT: 
Schools should measure pupil well-being 
regularly.
Schools need an ethos that promotes children’s 
well-being and identifies children who are 
languishing; but they should also devote at least 
an hour a week to education in life skills. Children 
and young people need to learn how to understand 
and manage their own emotions, understand 
others and care for them, manage their sexual 
relationships responsibly, eat and drink sensibly 
and avoid drugs, understand mental disorders 
and what can be done about them, understand 
parenting, manage their responses to modern 
media and choose positive life goals.
There are now hundreds of programs that have 
been developed worldwide to address one or 
more of these issues. Many of these programs 
have been rigorously evaluated on the whole age 
cohort in a school and been found to produce 
good results, at least in the short run. This was 
the finding of Durlak et al. that we quoted earlier,67 
and it related to impacts in the first six months 
after the programs ended. But, in the few cases 
where children have been followed up over a 
longer period, the effects have often been found to 
fade over time and, in many cases, to disappear.68 
This is not surprising given that the programs 
typically average 20 hours. We should also note 
that many quite famous programs have had at 
least one trial that found no effects.69
This leads to two important conclusions. First,  
if children are to develop good life skills, they 
need more than one or two 20-hour programs: 
they need a whole curriculum of life skills, at 
least once a week throughout the school life.  
As Aristotle observed, good habits are learned 
through interesting repetition in varying  
contexts. Second, this curriculum should be 
evidence- based and depend as little as possible 
on inspired improvisation by the teacher. It is 
universally found that the best results follow 
from using detailed materials accompanied by  
a good manual on how to use them and some 
explicit training of the teachers. (this is not so 
different from what is needed for a good surgical 
operation).70 And the best results always come 
from offering a positive vision rather than 
warnings about what not to do.
The obvious way forward is to draw on the most 
successful programs worldwide and to combine 
them into a single curriculum. For 11- to 14-year-
olds, Table 3 illustrates such a curriculum that is 
being trialed in the Healthy Minds experiment 
in 34 English schools.72 Mindfulness training 
will be used as a standard practice in every 
session, since it has already established itself as 
a reliable way in which children can calm them-
selves and improve their well-being.73
Table 2: An illustrative way of measuring well-being in children aged 13 and over  
(the Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Wellbeing Scale)71
Below are some statements about feelings and thoughts. Please tick the box that best describes  
your experience of each over the last 2 weeks.
*Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Well-Being Scale (WEMWBS) © NHS Health Scotland, Univeristy of Warwick and University of Edinburgh, 2006, 
all rights reserved. www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/med/research/platform/wemwbs/
Statements
I’ve been feeling  


















close to other people
I’ve been feeling  
confident
I’ve been able to








1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
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who start off with the greatest problems. But  
this is not an argument for targeted intervention. 
That would involve an unacceptable degree of 
stigma and exclude many others who stand to 
gain. Also, the programs are not expensive. 
Once teachers have been trained, they involve 
little extra expense – they become part of the 
school curriculum.
ACTION POINT 7. A LIFE-SKILLS  
CURRICULUM: Schools should use  
evidence-based methods to provide explicit 
teaching in life skills for at least an hour a 
week throughout school life, and more in the 
early years. This should mainly emphasize 
dos rather than don’ts.
Whether they teach life skills or not, all teachers 
should have basic training in how to promote 
child well-being and identify mental health 
problems in children. As suggested in Table 2, 
there are already easy-to-complete short  
questionnaires that teachers can use to identify 
young people who are struggling with high 
levels of psychological difficulties. In teacher–
child relationships, the same principles apply as 
in parent training: the importance of praise and 
of calm. These things can be learned by teachers 
in well-designed programs lasting five to eight 
days (see Box 6). This results in better-behaved 
children and a better learning environment.84
ACTION POINT 8. TEACHER TRAINING: 
All teachers should be trained in ways to 
notice and promote child well-being and 
mental health, and to maintain a civilized 
learning environment.
For primary age children, the most respected 
curriculum of social and emotional learning is 
that provided by the Promoting Alternative 
Thinking Strategies (PATHS) program, which 
includes 130 lessons over a one-year period.81 
Another admirable program which aims to 
develop moral sense and pro-social behavior is 
the Good Behavior Game, where children in a 
primary school class are divided into teams and 
each team is scored according to the number of 
times a member of the team breaks one of the 
behavior rules. If there are fewer than five 
infringements, all members of the team get a 
reward. Children in the treatment and control 
groups were followed up to age 19–21, and  
those in the treatment group had significantly 
lower use of drugs, alcohol and tobacco, and 
significantly lower frequency of anti-social 
personality disorders.82
Incredible Years also has a child-training program 
for primary age young children, called the 
Incredible Years Dinosaur Social and Emotional 
Curriculum. It has been successfully evaluated 
both as a small group treatment program for 
young children with conduct problems and 
ADHD, as well as an indicated prevention 
program for high-risk children in schools that 
address high levels of families living in poverty.83
One finding from all these programs is that the 
children who benefit most are, on average, those 
Table 3: A weekly life-skills curriculum for 11- to 14-year-olds (Healthy Minds)74
Box 6: Training teachers to improve children’s conduct in Jamaica85
Teachers in 12 community preschools were given 
eight days training in an adapted version of the 
Incredible Years teacher training program, using 
the principles of praise and calm. The participating 
schools were randomly selected from 24 schools, 
with another 12 acting as control groups. In all 24 
schools, three children were followed in each 
class (those with the worst pre-trial conduct). 
Following the trial, children’s observed classroom 
behavior, teacher-reported and parent-reported 
behavior all improved significantly in schools 
using the program, relative to the control 

























To implement all our recommendations, one  
of the most effective ways will be to harness the 
power of cheap, ubiquitous mobile telephone 
technology. In many low- and middle-income 
countries there may still be limited access to 
personal computers or landline telephones, but 
the majority of the world’s young people have 
access to mobile telephones.86 And they love 
them. As the power of each generation of tele-
phones increases exponentially, these phones 
are evolving into personal hand-held computers.
Year-on-year, access to information and commu-
nication technologies (ICTs) continues to grow. 
In 2013, nearly all of the world’s population had 
access to a mobile cellular signal, and around 
40%  had access to mobile broadband.87 The 
number of mobile subscriptions used worldwide 
grew from fewer than 1 billion in 2000 to over  
6 billion in 2011, of which nearly 5 billion were 
in low- and middle-income countries.88 The UN 
estimates that more people have access to a cell 
phone than a toilet (6 billion compared with 4.5 
billion respectively).89 Mobile telephone apps are 
becoming widespread; 30 billion were downloaded 
in 2011—and this figure will continue to rise.
There are well-known dangers associated with the 
internet – online bullying, premature exposure to 
adult sexuality and so on. But the internet also 
offers a huge opportunity to bring to billions of 
children, parents and teachers tools that can 
transform their mental health. There are already 
exciting examples of well-being interventions that 
can be delivered online or through mobile tele-
phone apps (see Boxes 7 and 8).90 Not all programs 
work, and most work best when there is some 
human contact as well. But we firmly believe that 
this is an important part of the way forward, and 
that a concerted effort to develop new approaches 
using this technology is needed.
To make this happen rapidly requires a major 
coordinated effort. This could usefully be led by 
one or more major international charities. It is 
highly desirable that the resulting products 
become available worldwide free of charge – the 
intellectual property of the world. To develop such 
free products would require significant charitable 
money. It is hard to think of a more deserving 
cause than the well-being of children worldwide.91
ACTION POINT 9. USE OF MOBILES: 
There should be a major international 
program to develop free smartphone-based 
approaches to all our recommendations. A 
major international charity should be asked 
to support this.
Conclusion
We hope to have shown that:
•  Children’s well-being and mental health is 
vitally important, and there are high levels  
of untreated problems.
•  We have good evidence-based ways to  
improve this.
•  The cost of doing so is manageable, since so 
many other costs are saved.
The key principles are early intervention to 
support families, parity of treatment within the 
healthcare system, and children’s well-being 
included as a major objective for schools.
These issues are moving up the political agenda, 
but far too slowly. Two things could make a real 
difference:
•  Mental health should appear explicitly in the 
post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals.
•  Countries could have a Cabinet Minister for 
Mental Health.
If something is really important, it should be 
reflected in policymaking structures. We cannot 
continue as if academic success is almost all that 
matters for a child.
ACTION POINT 10. THE SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT GOALS: The Sustainable 
Development Goals should include explicit 
reference to physical and mental health.
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Box 7: A computerized CBT game to treat  
depression (SPARX)92
Box 8: A computerized CBT program for anxiety 
(Cool Teens)93
In the online game SPARX, the young 
person chooses an avatar and, facing a 
series of challenges, learns how to restore 
balance in a fantasy world dominated by 
GNATS (Gloomy Negative Automatic 
Thoughts). The computerized program has 
seven modules and involves no significant 
contact with clinicians. It has been trialed 
on 94 New Zealand adolescents seeking 
help for depression, with an equal number 
randomized to face-to-face counseling. 
Remission rates were 44% in the CBT group 
and 28% for the control group.
Cool Teens is a game on CD-ROM that 
consists of eight, half-hour modules that 
young people undertake, together with 
a weekly 15-minute call to a therapist. 
Compared with a randomized control group 
on a waiting list, the average participant 
shed at least one anxiety disorder.
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1. The underpinnings of Civil Economy: human 
values, relational goods, subjective well-being 
and “public happiness”
Economics today looks like physics before the 
discovery of electrons. Economists “discovered,” 
classified and studied in detail characteristics of 
private goods, public goods and even common 
goods, but they have only recently come to study 
more intensively the role and relevance of 
relational goods.1 The importance of human 
values and relational life for economic health 
and subjective well-being is still largely under- 
estimated, and is a fascinating field for future 
research.
At the root of the current problem lies three forms 
of reductionism: i) anthropological reductionism 
by which human beings are conceived as homines 
economici2 (100% self-interested individuals) and 
not as personae, that is, human beings whose 
subjective well-being largely depends on the 
quality of their social life; ii) corporate reductionism 
by which all productive organizations need to be 
unfettered profit maximizers that prioritize the 
expectations of one category of stakeholders 
(shareholders) over all the others (customers, 
workers, suppliers, local communities); iii) value 
reductionism by which value is narrowly identi-
fied with GDP and not as the stock of economic, 
environmental, cultural, spiritual and relational 
goods that a community should enjoy.
The Civil Economy research program endeavors 
to show theoretically and empirically that economic 
productivity and subjective well-being may be 
significantly enhanced when one goes beyond 
these three forms of reductionism.
Within a general equilibrium perspective, the 
reductionist approach assumes that the aggregation 
of the actions of homines economici and of profit 
maximizing firms may be heroically transformed 
into a social optimum and common good by  
the forceful action of two (invisible and visible) 
hands: the invisible hand of market competition 
which reconciles a multiplicity of self-regarding 
actions, and the visible hand of benevolent, 
perfectly informed institutions and regulators. 
The latter are assumed to be strong enough not 
to be captured by those who are being regulated. 
The visible and invisible hands reconcile private 
and social optimum by addressing market 
failures due to asymmetric information, public 
goods and externalities.
As widely demonstrated by the recent global 
financial crisis, the two (invisible and visible) 
hands tend too often to be affected by cramps 
and so, when left alone, they generate an outcome 
that is largely suboptimal in terms of both 
economic performance and subjective well-being.3 
On the contrary, the Civil Economy perspective 
states that societal well-being is the fruit of a 
four-handed endeavor: the role of the two hands, 
to be effective, needs to be reinforced by the two 
additional hands of both responsible citizens 
and corporations. In essence it proposes to 
overcome the three-sided reductionist approach 
and introduce into the system; i) a share of 
non-reductionist (not purely self-interested) 
human beings who get happier with socially and 
environmentally responsible (consumption, 
saving, work) actions; and ii) a share of non-profit 
maximizing multi-stakeholder productive 
organizations. When doing so, the socioeconomic 
system has the potential to create economic value 
in a socially and environmentally responsible 
way, thereby producing authentic economic 
health. While emphasizing the bottom-up action 
of non-purely-self-interested individuals and 
organizations, the Civil Economy does not 
neglect the traditional role of institutions, since 
such bottom-up action is a forceful complement 
to and not a substitute for these institutions. 
In what follows we explain theoretically and 
empirically why the Civil Economy paradigm 
(where human values play a fundamental role) 
may work and is already at work to transform 
the current socioeconomic environment for the 
better. More specifically, in the second section 
we illustrate the rich historical and philosophical 
roots of Civil Economy. In the third section we 
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law of society, i.e. reciprocity. This is both clear, 
and important, especially in his analysis of trust, 
or “public faith,” which lies at the heart of his 
Lezioni di economia civile.
For the civil humanists the market is a matter  
of fides, i.e. trust. One of the key elements in 
Genovesi’s theory of Civil Economy is “public 
faith,” something he considers as the true 
precondition for economic development:  
“confidence is the soul of commerce, and  
without confidence all the component parts of 
this mighty structure would crumble under it.”9 
In his thought there is a substantial difference 
between private and public trust: while the first 
can be associated with reputation, i.e. a private 
good which can be “spent” on the market, the 
latter is not the sum of private “reputations;” 
rather, it entails genuine love for the Common 
Good (as intended in the classical philosophical 
tradition, i.e. Aristotle or Aquinas). This concept 
is similar to what modern theorists have called 
“social capital,” that is, the fabric of faith and 
civil virtues that allows human and economic 
development to get into motion and preserve 
itself over time. 
According to Genovesi, the lack of “public faith” 
is what caused the lack of civil and economic 
development in the Kingdom of Naples—an 
argument that more than two and a half centuries 
later has lost none of its currency. In this Kingdom, 
as denounced by the tradition of Civil Economy, 
“private trust” (intended in particular as blood ties 
or bonds based on feudal pacts of vassalage), or 
honor, was abundant, but public and generalized 
trust, the kind that originates from the cultivation 
of civil virtues, was scant. Some decades later 
Gaetano Filangieri similarly maintained that no 
civil and economic development can be achieved 
without man having “confidence in the govern-
ment, the magistrates, and his fellow citizens,”10 
who are the first and most important resources for 
any kind of collective and individual development.
If on one side market development brings civil 
and economic development, for the Neapolitan 
school it is even more important to stress that 
cultivating public faith is the precondition for any 
possible discourse concerning civil and economic 
development: “nothing is more necessary than 
public trust in a wise and easy circulation.”11 
Very significant is also this footnote by Genovesi: 
“This word fides means rope that ties and unites. 
Public faith is therefore the bond of families 
united in companionship.” 
The civil economist then takes one further step. 
In the Lezioni, Genovesi explains to his students 
and fellow-citizens that public faith is above all a 
matter of authentic reciprocity, and not merely a 
matter of contracts.12 According to the Neapolitan 
economist, public faith is not the kind of capital 
that can be built outside the market and later be 
used on the market. On the contrary, the market 
is conceived as part of civil society, which produces 
what today we would call social capital and 
relational goods. For this reason his discourse 
on public faith is directly economic: “Where no 
trust exists—not in the part that constitutes the 
reciprocal confidence of citizens in each other, 
nor in the certainty of contracts, or in the vigour 
of laws, or in the science and integrity of judges 
... there is no certainty of contracts, no power of 
laws, no trust of man towards man. Because 
contracts are bonds and civil laws are also 
themselves public pacts and contracts.”13
The reference to Genovesi makes the case for 
further integrating social relations in happiness 
studies alongside the other standard determinants 
of happiness (income, unemployment, inflation, 
personality traits, socio-demographic and political 
and institutional factors). In this respect the Civil 
Economy paradigm encompasses eudaimonic 
analyses of happiness based on a particular 
version of the capabilities approach (CA) of 
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. The 
eudaimonic approach heavily relies upon the 
Aristotelian concept of the good life and appeals 
to the common shared intuition that there is 
more to life than a mere balance of pleasure and 
discuss from a theoretical point of view why the 
current reductionist perspective may be harmful 
both in terms of economic and human health. In 
the fourth section we introduce the fundamental 
concept of relational goods. In the fifth section 
we provide ample empirical evidence from 
experimental behavioral economics challenging 
the reductionist paradigm and documenting that 
the two additional hands of responsible citizens 
and corporations are already at work. In the sixth 
section we provide evidence on the nexus between 
human and civic values and economic prosperity. 
The seventh section concludes the paper with 
some policy suggestions.
2. Historical roots of Civil Economy 
The Civil Economy paradigm has its roots in  
the “classic” tradition of moral philosophy, the 
so-called Aristotelian-Thomistic approach, which 
found a significant expression in social sciences 
within the Italian tradition of Civil Economy.4 
This tradition represents an important attempt 
to keep alive within modernity the tradition of 
civil life based on friendship (Aristotle’s notion 
of philia) and a more socialized idea of person and 
community. Central to this tradition is the role 
of Antonio Genovesi, a Neapolitan philosopher 
and economist, who lived around the same time 
as Smith. In many key aspects of their thought 
Genovesi and Smith are surprisingly similar, but 
there are also important differences. 
The Civil Economy tradition of the eighteenth 
century may be seen as the modern expression of 
the civil tradition that originated in Aristotelian 
Greece and was rediscovered in the Middle Ages. 
Like the first civil humanists, Genovesi sees civil 
life as the place where happiness may be fully 
realized thanks to good and just laws, to trading, and 
to the civil bodies where men are free to practice 
their natural sociability: “Even if companionship can 
bring evils, on the other hand it also assures life and 
its goods; it is the source of the greatest pleasures, 
unknown to the men of nature.”5
On the natural (and non-artificial) character  
of sociality and on its essential role for a fully 
humane and happy life, Genovesi is also aligned 
with the ancient Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition: 
“Every person has a natural and inherent obligation 
to study how to procure her happiness; but the 
political body is made of persons; therefore, the 
entire political body and each of its members 
has an obligation to do what is on their part,  
i.e. all that they know and can for the sake of 
common prosperity, as long as that which is 
done does not offend the rights of the other  
civil bodies.”6
At the heart of the view of a social life in common, 
held by the authors of the Neapolitan school of 
Civil Economy (not only Genovesi), is the idea 
that “mere” sociability, man’s character as a 
“political animal,” cannot suffice to distinguish 
the human from other animals. The kind of 
sociality that is typical of human beings is a 
qualified type of sociality—which we must call 
reciprocity, friendship, mutual assistance, or 
fraternity, all basically synonyms in the vocabulary 
of Genovesi and of the other authors belonging 
to this tradition: “Man is a naturally sociable 
animal: goes the common saying. But not every 
man will believe there is no other animal on 
earth that is not sociable... In what way then is 
man more sociable than the others? … [in] the 
reciprocal right to be assisted and consequently 
his reciprocal obligation to assist us in our 
needs.”7 This passage contains something that 
we do not find in Aristotle or in Smith: for 
Genovesi, reciprocity (not only a general relation-
ality, nor simple sociability) is the typical element 
of human sociality. For Smith, by contrast, what 
constitutes the typical character of human 
sociality is the “propensity in human nature ... to 
truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another,”8 
founded, as we have seen, on the power of 
persuasion.
Genovesi portrays market relationships as 
relations of mutual assistance, hence neither 
impersonal nor anonymous. In fact, the market 
itself is conceived as an expression of the general 
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shown in the more recent literature surveyed in 
section 5), since purely self-regarding attitudes 
produce suboptimal individual and social outcomes 
that are inferior to those generated by other- 
regarding (i.e. team or we-thinking) attitudes.18
4. Relational goods
One of the main reasons for the incapacity to 
broaden our view beyond the simplistic approach 
to the utility function and to go beyond anthro-
pological reductionism is the missing concept of 
relational goods. Mainstream economists view 
relationships as a kind of background for market 
activity, or as useful and functional elements in 
the exchange or production of goods and services 
that are fully independent and distinct from the 
individual characteristics of agents and that are 
the typical objects of economic study.19
In recent decades, however, attention has been 
given to relational themes such as trust, social 
capital, networking, and reciprocity. Words that 
were rarely used in the tradition of economics, 
such as brotherhood, spiritual capital, and 
intrinsic motivations, are beginning to enter the 
lexicon. In the light of this development, and 
also thanks to the space created within the 
discipline of economics for such categories,20 
relational goods today represent a rising field  
of theoretical and empirical research. 
The basic idea of the concept of relational goods  
– which may vary in terms of technical detail, 
and in part in content – is to assign the status  
of economic good (or evil) to relationships in 
themselves since each human relationship is  
an infinitely “greater” fact than the economic 
dimension alone. But, nevertheless, relational 
goods can be understood and described also as 
economic goods; that is, as realities to which 
people attribute economic value alongside other 
non-economic values, and from which they 
obtain well-being. With relational goods, the 
relationships among people (doing things 
together) are what increases utility and not  
the goods in themselves.
It is possible to identify the following as the 
basic characteristics of relational goods:21
1. Identity: The identity of the individuals involved 
is a fundamental ingredient since “goods which 
arise in exchanges where anyone could anony-
mously supply one or both sides of the bargain 
are not relational.”22
2. Reciprocity: Inasmuch as they are goods made 
of relationships, they can only be enjoyed recip-
rocally. “Mutual activity, feeling, and awareness 
are such a deep part of what love and friendship 
are that Aristotle is unwilling to say that there is 
anything worthy of the name of love or friendship 
left, when the shared activities and the forms of 
communication that express it are taken away.”23
3. Simultaneity: In contrast with normal market 
goods, whether private or public, where production 
is technically and logically separate from  
consumption, relational goods (such as many 
personal services) are simultaneously produced 
and consumed—the good is co-produced and 
co-consumed at the same time by those involved. 
Although the contribution to the production of 
the meeting may be asymmetric (consider the 
organization of a party among friends or the 
management of a social cooperative), in the act 
of consuming a relational good a pure free rider 
is not possible, since, to be enjoyed, the relation-
al good requires that one become involved in  
a relationship with the characteristics that we  
are listing.24
4. Motivations: In genuinely reciprocal relationships 
the motivation behind the behavior is an essential 
component. The same encounter—for example, 
a dinner—may create only standard goods or 
relational goods as well, based on the motivations 
of those involved. If the relationship is not an 
end, but only a means to something else (e.g. 
doing business), we cannot talk about relational 
goods.25
pain along Benthaminian lines. Authenticity, 
self-actualization, participation, and purpose in 
life are elements to the lay concept of well-being. 
As it is well known, the core of the CA is its 
focus on what people are effectively capable of 
doing and being. The basic idea advanced by this 
approach is that people should have more 
freedom to live the kind of life they have reason 
to value. It follows that the CA is not insensitive 
at all to mental states such as desire–fulfillment 
or happiness. Rather, what the CA claims is that 
people’s capabilities to function come “before,” 
in a logical sense, what one can reasonably  
ask people in questions of the type: “how subjec-
tively happy do you feel” or “how happy are you 
these days.” This is tantamount to saying that 
capabilities “precede,” ontologically, subjective 
well-being declarations. Thus it is shown in 
Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2 of this Report that 
freedom to live the type of life people choose is 
one of the six key factors underpinning higher 
life evaluations.
3. The reductionist view as a constraint to social 
and economic progress 
The crucial role of reciprocity and civic virtues 
for economic prosperity emphasized in the 
historical roots of Civil Economy challenges the 
“anthropological and social reductionism” we 
generally observe today. The problem of anthro-
pological reductionism does not question the 
premise of individual rationality (that is, the 
consistent pursuit of a goal given constraints), 
but what we usually assume as arguments in the 
utility function. Binmore and Shaked implicitly 
support this point of view when they say we do 
not need to abandon the standard approach to 
accommodate other-regarding arguments in utility 
functions, since there is no “selfishness axiom” 
necessarily attached to it and no commitment to a 
particular fixed preference structure.14 Their 
thought is effectively explained when saying that 
the standard (utility maximizing) rationality 
paradigm may accommodate preferences of both 
Attila the Hun or St. Francis of Assisi.15
The issue of anthropological reductionism 
therefore concerns the fact that, even though 
much progress has been made recently in this 
field (see sections 5 and 6), the benchmark still 
considered in many economic models is the old 
narrow view of human preferences. This hinges 
primarily on self-interest and largely ignores 
preferences such as altruism, strategic altruism, 
inequity aversion or reciprocity. In the section 
that follows we refer to the ample empirical 
evidence in support of the fact that deviations 
from the reductionist view on human preferences 
are huge, and that relational activities and 
community involvement are important drivers of 
life satisfaction. The anthropological reductionism, 
however, is not just a problem because the homo 
economicus is a behavior followed by a minority 
of individuals and producing suboptimal results 
in terms of life satisfaction (see Engel 2010 and 
section 5 below). It is also a problem because its 
behavior is suboptimal from the individual and 
social points of view. This last point is well 
addressed by “social dilemmas” that include, 
among others, trust games, Prisoner’s Dilemmas, 
weakest link games and stag hunt games. 
The main characteristics of social dilemmas are 
intuitively described by the well known Hume’s 
Apologue where two neighboring farmers fail to 
cooperate in a “sequential harvest game” due to 
their lack of empathy and lack of trust, thereby 
producing the undesirable result of the loss of 
their crops.16 The main message that will be later 
formalized in trust games by Berg et al. is that in 
social dilemmas with asymmetric information 
and incomplete contracts, such as that narratively 
described by Hume, the homo economicus form 
of rationality produces suboptimal individual 
and social outcomes by depriving individuals  
of enhanced gains from cooperation.17 Since 
most social and economic interactions have  
the characteristics of social dilemmas, the  
“reductionist” approach on human preferences 
turns out to be socially harmful (as widely 
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Statistical evidence on donations documents that 
in the US around 90% of the population donated 
money in 2009 (for a total amount of $303.75 
billion, around 2% of GDP),28 while around 26% 
“worked for nothing,”29 becoming volunteer 
workers in a not-for-profit organization.30 Both 
experiental studies and survey evidence (Table 
2.1 in Chapter 2 of this Report) show that people 
are happier in just these circumstances.
A non-negligible share of individuals in most 
countries volunteer: the highest shares of  
population vounteering in registered organizations 
are in Canada (38.1%) and Australia (37.9%) and 
it is reasonable to assume that the real numbers 
are larger if we include those volunteering 
outside established organizations. The ILO 
acknowledges that “Volunteer work provides a 
sense of personal satisfaction, fulfillment, well-being 
and belonging to persons who volunteer.” It has 
recently created a common accounting standard 
to measure volunteer work (in hours or in 
value), and reports that volunteers are around 
12% of the adult population in 37 countries  
(140 million people), with activity equivalent  
to that of 20.8 million full-time equivalent  
paid workers that generates a $400 billion 
contribution to the global economy.31
Even though not all donating and volunteering 
choices may be explained by other-regarding 
preferences and may also depend on strategic 
reasons,32 they expose individuals to the social 
risk of not being reciprocated, and are largely 
pursued to satisfy intrinsic motivations and 
other-regarding preferences. 
Further empirical evidence in support of the 
relevance of human values in economic choices 
comes from revealed other-regarding preferences 
of the growing number of individuals “voting 
with the wallet” for products of companies that 
create economic value in socially and environ-
mentally responsible ways. The Nielsen Globally 
Conscious Consumer survey finds that 46% of 
respondents in a sample of 28,000 consumers 
in 56 countries are willing to pay a premium 
price for goods and services from companies 
adopting corporate social responsibility strategies.33 
Even though the contingent evaluation literature34 
tells us that these figures are likely to be biased 
upwards, the actual market shares of individuals 
voting with their wallets for ethical or green 
products show that consumption and savings 
are sophisticated acts, where material goals are 
just one driver of choices together with status, 
cultural and social motivations.35
The evidence provided below documents that a 
significant share of individuals follow what are 
apparently a non-purely-self-regarding behaviors 
by donating time, money and paying a premium 
for ethical features of consumption goods and 
financial investment. The interpretation of these 
facts is not unambiguous since strategic reasons 
may mix up with purely altruistic motivations. 
Results from lab experiments are therefore 
particularly important since they may test and 
reject specific assumptions on individual prefer-
ences with ad hoc treatments that control for all 
other potential confounding factors, and may be 
replicated by other researchers for different groups 
of individuals and time periods. The typical 
experiments used to investigate characteristics 
of human preferences are Dictator Games,36 
Ultimatum Games,37 Gift Exchange Games,38 
Trust Games39 and Public Good Games.40 
The main finding of these experiments is that 
departures from purely self-regarding behavior 
are massive. A related fundamental result (in 
Prisoner’s Dilemmas, Public Good Games and 
Trust Games) is that individuals facing social 
dilemmas depart from purely self-regarding 
behavior (and expect that other participants would 
do the same) since such departures produce  
superior outcomes from both an individual and  
a social point of view. The dilemma is that the  
superior outcome is produced only if the counter-
part will also follow the same (cooperative) route 
of action. Many individuals, however, accept such 
social risk and their confidence, if reciprocated, is 
productive from an economic point of view.
5. Emergent Fact: Relational goods emerge within 
a relationship. Perhaps the category of “emergent 
fact” captures the nature of a relational good 
more than the economic category of “production.” 
That is, the relational good is a “third” that 
exceeds the contributions of those involved, 
which in many cases was not among the initial 
intentions. This is why a relational good can 
emerge within a normal market transaction, 
when at a certain point, right in the middle of  
an ordinary instrumental market relationship, 
something happens that leads those involved to 
transcend the reasons for which they had met.26
6. Gratuitousness: An essential characteristic of 
relational goods is gratuitousness, in the sense 
that a relational good is such if the relationship 
is not “used” for anything else, if it is lived out 
as a good in itself, and arises from intrinsic 
motivations.27 This is why, as Martha Nussbaum 
claims, a relational good is a good in which the 
relationship is the good—a relationship that is 
not an encounter based on self-interest, but a 
gratuitous encounter. A relational good requires 
the presence of intrinsic motivations toward that 
particular relationship. 
7. Good: Finally, another essential way of defining 
a relational good is focusing on the noun: it is  
a good but it is not a commodity (in Marx’s 
terminology). That is, it has a value (because it 
satisfies a need) but it does not have a market 
price (precisely because of gratuitousness), 
though it always has an “opportunity cost.”
These points, taken together, imply that relational 
goods present characteristics that are combinations 
of what economics call private and public goods. 
To understand the peculiar nature of relational 
goods, it is necessary to free oneself from the 
dichotomy of “public good” and “private good,” 
and from the idea of a good as a means or 
instrument for reaching something (utility) that 
is external to the relationship. In fact, as long  
as we try to situate relational goods among 
private goods (such as a pair of shoes or a 
sandwich, which are “rival” and exclusive goods 
in consumption) or, alternatively, among public 
goods (that is, non-rival goods, which tend to  
be non-exclusive), we remain within the non- 
relational paradigm. Neither of the definitions of 
“private good” or “public good” imply in fact any 
relationship among those people involved; the 
only difference between the two types of goods 
is the presence or absence of “interference” in 
consumption. The consumption of a public good 
is simply consumption by isolated individuals 
independently of each other. Consider the use  
of an uncongested road, or two or more people 
admiring the same painting in a museum: the 
good is public as long as the consumption by 
one does not interfere with that of the other. 
This is what is implied by the hypothesis of 
non-rivalry in public goods, but it can be enjoyed 
without any relationship or production of  
relational goods. It is therefore misleading to 
attempt to locate relational goods among public 
goods, because, we claim, it is more scientifically 
fertile to consider relational goods as a third 
genus of goods.
5. Empirical evidence on the relevance of  
human values and Civil Economy
The above is important not only from a  
theoretical point of view. Empirical evidence 
from lab experiments and revealed preferences 
demonstrates that subjective well-being is 
heavily influenced by relational goods and that 
social and economic behavior is far from being 
identifiable with the homo economicus paradigm: 
individuals significantly deviate in their choices 
from the homo economicus model and their 
subjective well-being is enhanced by not purely 
self-interested choices.
Straightforward evidence of other-regarding 
attitudes in individual choices comes, among 
others, from i) donations, ii) voluntary activities, 
iii) consumers and investors paying ethical 
premia, iv) lab experiments on Dictator Games, 
and v) life satisfaction studies. 
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to the well-being of others significantly and 
positively affects one’s own well-being. Individuals 
feel a disutility for inequality, an obligation to 
reciprocate for the kindness received and may 
have the well-being of others in their utility  
functions. Technically speaking the implied 
broadened preference pattern has been shown  
to include elements of (positive and negative) 
reciprocity,46 other-regarding preferences,47 
inequity aversion,48 social-welfare preferences,49 
and various forms of pure and impure (warm 
glow) altruism.50 One of the most fascinating 
directions of research in this field is to investigate 
drivers and laws of motion of non-other-regarding 
preferences. Studies such as the Henrich et al. 
experiment on primitive ethnic groups51 and 
Becchetti et al. experiment comparing trusting 
attitudes of bridge and poker players52 document 
that everyday activities contribute to shape 
individual preferences. In this respect whale 
hunters and bridge players reveal superior social 
capital than, respectively, farmers and poker 
players, since their commonly practiced activity 
requires and rewards team thinking.
6. Empirical evidence on human values, rela-
tional goods and subjective well-being
More than two centuries later, the fundamental 
aspects of the discourse on Genovesi and Civil 
Economy remain absolutely topical and relevant; 
they eloquently explain the absence of joy in  
any people who exclude the sometimes risky  
but deeply rewarding giving relationships  
with others.
Contemporary social sciences now widely 
recognize the decisive role of interpersonal 
relations, particularly those that are genuine, in the 
development of a good life. Research concerning 
the so-called paradox of happiness53 shows that  
it is the quality of genuine relational life (in a 
non-instrumental sense) that carries most of the 
weight, even compared to income, in people’s 
estimation of subjective well-being.
A first robust bulk of empirical evidence on the 
relationship between human values, relational 
goods and subjective well-being may be found in 
psychological studies. In Kahneman et al.,54 900 
Texas women were asked to assess how they 
spent their time, using his Day Reconstruction 
Method (DRM). The results showed that in 14  
of 15 activities carried out during a day (in all 
except prayer), the women interviewed reported 
a greater self-evaluation of their own well-being 
when their activities were carried out in the 
company of other people. Furthermore, when 
psychologists analyze the characteristics of those 
who consider themselves more satisfied (and who 
are considered so by others), it emerges without 
exception that these people have meaningful and 
positive interpersonal relationships.55
Psychological studies thus offer much data that 
confirm the importance of relational life for 
people’s happiness and satisfaction. Some 
scholars have defined relatedness as a primary 
need essential to well-being.56 In particular, 
scientists who consider themselves part of the 
eudaimonistic school of thought, inspired by 
Aristotle, hold that there is a universal nexus 
between the quality of human relationships and 
subjective well-being: “The evidence supports 
that the bond between relatedness and subjective 
well-being is complex. The studies suggest that, 
of all the factors that influence happiness, 
relatedness is very near the top of the list... 
Furthermore, loneliness is consistently negatively 
related to positive affect and life satisfaction.”57
Evidence on the positive impact of relational 
goods on life satisfaction is also becoming 
widespread in economic studies. An important 
reference in the empirical literature is Helliwell 
documenting the presence of this nexus in two 
of the largest international databases containing 
information on life satisfaction, the World Values 
Survey and the Gallup World Poll.58 This empirical 
research documents that relational ties (marriage 
or living as married), voluntary activity and the 
number of people whom respondents can rely 
on are significantly and positively related to life 
The most important results confirming what has 
been written above, however, come from Dictator 
Games where departures from the self-regarding 
paradigm cannot be explained by strategic 
reasons. In the Dictator Game a player is given 
an amount of money and can decide whatever 
part of it to donate to a second player. After this 
move there is no reply and the game ends. 
Under the reductionist anthropological paradigm 
of the homo economicus the dictator gives 
nothing since a donation would reduce her own 
monetary payoff. Note that, since the game ends 
with her move, the dictator has no strategic 
reasons to donate. In order to avoid the possibility 
that generosity would be driven by friendship or 
sympathy for a counterpart, standard Dictator 
Games are generally played under the maximum 
social distance since the giver plays with a 
computer and cannot see who is on the other side. 
A meta-study by Engel examines results  
from around 328 different Dictator Game 
experiments for a total of 20,813 observations.41 
The result is that only around 36% of individuals 
follow Nash rationality and give zero (based on 
these numbers the author can reject the null 
hypothesis that the dictator amount of giving is 
0 with z = 35.44, p <.0001) and more than half 
give no less than 20%.
When analyzing factors affecting departures 
from the homo economicus behavior we find 
that the share of dictators giving zero falls to 
28% if the money property rights are of the 
recipient and the dictator may take from him, 
25% if players handle real money in the game, 
and 19% if the recipient is deserving (i.e. is 
identified as poor).42 A further interesting result 
is that student experiments (which are the vast 
majority of treatments) underestimate deviations 
from the self-regarding paradigm. Students are 
slightly closer to the homo economicus behavior 
(40%) while only 20% of children, 10% of 
middle age players and almost none of the 
elders behave in this way.43 
Engel concludes his meta-analysis by saying that 
“While normally a sizeable fraction of participants 
does indeed give nothing, as predicted by the payoff 
maximisation hypothesis, only very rarely this has 
been the majority choice. It by now is undisputed 
that human populations are systematically more 
benevolent than homo economicus.”44
Another impressive set of results comes  
rom the meta-analysis of Johnson and Mislin  
on 162 trust games with more than 23,000  
observations.45 As is well known, the trust game 
is a sequential game in which the trustor has the 
first move and may give part of her endowment 
to a second player (the trustee). The amount  
of money sent by the trustor is tripled when 
transmitted to the trustee, who may in turn 
decide how much of what she received to send 
back to the trustor. After the trustee moves  
the game ends. As is well known, the Nash 
equilibrium of the game is the one in which 
both trustor and trustee send zero under the 
assumption that there is common knowledge 
that both players behave as homines economici. 
Deviations from the Nash equilibrium for the 
trustor may be generally due to strategic reasons, 
inequity aversion and pure altruism. Trustees 
have no strategic reasons to give back money 
and may deviate from the Nash solution due to 
inequity aversion, pure altruism and reciprocity 
or kindness.
The meta-analysis reports average amounts sent 
by trustors and trustees in 35 different countries 
(equally weighting each experiment). The highest 
average amount is sent by trustees in Asia (.46) 
and the lowest in Africa (.32). All average contri-
butions are significantly different from zero 
even though, differently from what occurs in the 
Dictator Game meta-experiment of Engel, we do 
not have information about the share of individuals 
following Nash rationality.
The above mentioned lab experiments have 
helped researchers to identify specific forms of 
other-regarding preferences in which contributing 
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satisfaction. The most impressive characteristic 
of this nexus is that it appears in almost all 
empirical analyses of life satisfaction data 
irrespective of geographical and time differences, 
and in studies where such variables are just used 
as socio-demographic controls. Along this line, 
Bruni and Stanca on the basis of the data of the 
World Values Survey (264,000 observations 
originating from 80 countries, between 1980 
and 2003) find a strong correlation between the 
time that a person spends in activity with a 
relational component (with friends, family, or  
in volunteer work) and self-reported subjective 
well-being (or happiness). This correlation 
remains robust even when controlling many 
other variables (age, geographic region, education, 
culture, and so forth).59
The research of Bartolini et al. looks at short and 
long-term effects of changes in sociability, showing 
that the fall in US social capital (Putnam’s 
“bowling alone” effect) predicts a significant part 
of the Easterlin paradox in the 1975-2004 period.60
More specifically, data from Bartolini et al. 
document a positive cross-country correlation 
between yearly changes in in-group membership 
(a proxy of social ties) and yearly changes in life 
satisfaction (Figure 7.1), compared to a negative 
cross-country correlation between average rates 
of growth of per capita GDP and yearly changes 
in life satisfaction (Figure 7.2).
The main problem is to understand whether 
correlation reflects true causality or is at least 
partially spurious since it conceals inverse 
causality (from subjective well-being to relational 
goods) or endogeneity (unobservable third 
drivers causing both of the two variables that 
produce the observed correlation between the 
latter). The direct causality hypothesis postulates 
that, if the relational nature of human beings 
supported by many cultures and philosophies is 
true, higher quality of relationships should bring 
higher subjective well-being. The reverse causality 
rationale, however, argues that it is also the case 
that happier and more extroverted types have 
better relational lives; while one of the many 
endogenous explanations is that a background 
fostering human and social capital may be 
conducive to both better relational goods and life 
satisfaction. The problem of endogeneity and of 
the direction of causality in the relationship 
between human values, relational goods and life 
satisfaction has been more thoroughly explored 
by some papers that tried to outline sound 
identification strategies. Meier and Stutzer find 
in German reunification an exogenous shock 
that terminated many social activities and  
organizations in East Germany, and use this 
event to demonstrate a robust causality from 
social activities to life satisfaction.61
Becchetti et al. demonstrate that the average 
retirement probability for a given age class in 
the neighboring region is a relevant and valid 
instrument for relational goods (retirement  
has a strong impact on leisure and enjoyment  
of relational life), and document how the latter 
significantly affects life satisfaction.62 Becchetti 
et al. provide non-experimental evidence of the 
relevance of sociability on subjective well-being 
by investigating the determinants of life  
satisfaction on a sample of Europeans aged above 
50.63 Using an instrumental variable approach, they 
show that voluntary work, religious attendance, 
helping friends/neighbors, and participation  
in community-related organizations affect life 
satisfaction positively and significantly. More-
over, different combinations between actions 
and motivations have different impacts on life 
satisfaction, thereby providing support for the 
relevance of these specific “contingent goods” 
and to the literature of procedural utility.64
These findings should not lead us to a naïve and 
simplistic vision of relationships in social and 
economic life, while shedding light on their often 
unexplored dimension. Others may also be our 
rivals and competitors for the enjoyment of 
private goods. And they are our term of reference 
since well-being does not depend only on absolute 
but also on relative performance.65 But they are 
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Joseph Schumpeter. We believe that today this 
model of democracy is not capable of producing 
expressive laws in the above-mentioned sense – 
that is, laws capable of generating self-enforcing 
mechanisms that favor compliance even in the 
absence of specific forms of coercive punishment. 
In the language of the capabilities approach,  
this means that the elitist-competitive model fails 
to fully exploit the potential of the democratic 
principle in order to promote those policies 
designed to improve public well-being. We argue 
that the participative/deliberative model of 
democracy is the most adequate and effective 
model to that end.
Of course, there are several theoretical and 
practical problems that have to be resolved if the 
participative/deliberative model of democracy is 
to constitute a fully acceptable alternative to the 
existing model. However, there can be no doubt 
that the participative/deliberative idea of democracy 
is, today, the one that more than any other – and 
certainly more than the neo-communitarian 
model that supporters of private politics are 
advocating in the USA and in Europe – manages 
to deal with the many problems posed by the 
paradoxes of happiness, the most serious of 
which is the decline in the social and moral 
legitimacy of the present model of development. 
Happiness of course requires participation, but 
not just the formal variety as expressed at the 
polling station. Full participation is achieved 
when citizens are given the opportunity to take 
part in the deliberative process which then leads 
to a certain decision being made. As we are all 
aware, happiness lies more in the process than 
in the final outcome. This is why giving citizens 
a real chance to participate in the deliberative 
process increases their happiness regardless of 
the level of GDP.67
Empirical confirmation of the importance of 
deliberative democracy, in relation to the dual 
aim of improving government action and  
increasing public happiness, is provided by  
the vast survey conducted by the World Bank  
in 37 different countries.68 Constitutional  
arrangements and economic conditions being 
basically equal, the greater the participation  
of citizens in deliberative forums, deliberative 
surveys, popular juries, etc., the higher the quality 
of welfare services, the greater the credibility of 
government, and the higher the index of public 
happiness.
The move from an elitist to a deliberative approach 
is urgent, since the traditional paradigm based 
on anthropological and corporate reductionism 
places an impossible task on the shoulders of 
the institutional elites. If all individuals are 
homines economici and all corporations are profit 
maximizing, there is a logical contradiction in 
believing that members of the institution are 
inherently benevolent. And it is hard to conceive 
that optimal legal rules can be something more 
than “inexpressive laws” that are ineffective due 
to their lack of relation to the social and moral 
norms of a given political community.
This is why the paradigm of Civil Economy 
suggests the creation of participatory rules that 
move from elitist to deliberative democracy, 
stimulating bottom-up (political and economic) 
participation and providing incentives for the 
non-purely-self-regarding behavior of citizens 
and corporations described in previous sections. 
In the era of globalization – with still weak 
supranational institutions – we are also aware 
that an important part of deliberative democracy 
passes through economic life and relates to 
consumption, saving and corporate practices 
that incorporate issues of environmental and 
social responsibility. The role of policy is crucial 
from this point of view as well. An economic 
system is like a natural environment. It requires 
diversity to strengthen its resilience. The devel-
opment of many different corporate forms of 
social economy (cooperatives, productive not- 
for-profit entities, ethical or sustainable banks 
and businesses, social businesses, etc.) together 
with traditional for-profit companies is funda-
mental to the creation of economic value in an 
also those without which we cannot enjoy 
relational goods, which are fundamental for  
our life satisfaction. 
A second obvious caveat is that, even though 
relational life is fundamental for individual 
well-being, it does not automatically have positive 
effects for the society as a whole.66 Phenomena 
such as amoral familism, corporatism or even 
mafia connections tell us that the interest of a 
group of individuals linked by close ties can be 
pursued at the expense of the interests of third 
parties. Nonetheless – and this is what matters 
for our purpose – the reductionist individualist 
approach to the definition of individual utility, 
which neglects the role of relational life, is 
strongly rejected by empirical evidence. 
To sum up, individuals donate time and money, 
and find a large part of their enjoyment and 
sense of purpose in cultivating relationships. 
Neglecting these will be economically counter-
productive since economic vitality crucially 
depends on the quality of interpersonal relation-
ships in social dilemmas such as those represented 
in Trust Investment games or Prisoner’s  
Dilemmas, which are part of everyday economic 
interactions. Such dilemmas tell us that – in the 
presence of three factors such as asymmetric 
information, incomplete contracts and limits of 
civil justice – absence of trust, trustworthiness, 
or cooperative attitudes make economic outcomes 
suboptimal from both an individual and an 
aggregate point of view.
7. Policy suggestions
The Civil Economy paradigm challenges the 
three reductionist views on human beings, 
corporations and “value indicators” that we 
documented as being contradicted by empirical 
evidence in this paper. These three reductionist 
views inevitably produce, in terms of policy 
measures, “inexpressive laws” – that is, laws that 
have reduced effectiveness since they are in 
sharp contrast with social and moral norms. 
Consistency among the three types of norms is 
essential for sustainability and effectiveness of 
the legal framework. Legal rules, as an expression 
of the coercive power of the state – the enforce-
ability of which is dependent upon penalties 
imposed by the same state – need to be in 
accordance with social rules. And social rules, 
which are the result of ancient and modern 
conventions and traditions – the enforceability 
of which depends on the shame that always 
accompanies the stigmatization of deviant forms of 
behavior (loss of status and social discrimination) – 
need to be in accordance with moral rules. 
These are associated with the prevalence of 
clearly-defined cultural matrices (religious and 
non-religious), the breach of which triggers a 
feeling of guilt in the individuals concerned. 
If the legal rules that are promulgated “run 
counter” to the social rules and, more importantly, 
to the moral rules prevailing within that society, 
then the former will fail to produce the desired 
results, in that they will not be observed for the 
simple reason that that not all infringers of such 
rules can be punished. Even worse, they will 
undermine the credibility and/or the acceptability 
of the other two categories of rules, thus threat-
ening the stability of the social order. This is 
precisely what happens with what are currently 
termed “inexpressive laws,” that is, laws that fail 
to express those values constituting the pillars of 
a given society. Unfortunately, current economic 
theory continues to remain silent on the question 
of the relationship between the three types of 
rules. With few rare exceptions, jurists deal 
exclusively with laws, sociologists with social 
rules, and ethicists with moral rules. Thus it is 
not difficult to understand why it is that the 
majority of legal rules are of the “inexpressive” 
variety.
What should be done to cope with such a serious 
shortcoming? Our suggestion is to move beyond 
the still prevalent model of democracy, i.e. the 
elitist-competitive model of Max Weber and 
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environmentally sustainable way. Regulation 
must not harm this biodiversity by attempting  
to apply a “one-size-fits-all” approach. 
The implicit idea behind the Civil Economy is 
that solutions to the current problems cannot 
come just from institutions left to themselves in 
the face of passive and myopic citizens and 
corporations. There is nothing such as a neutral 
playing field. Active participation of the citizens 
in their economic actions and of corporations 
along the lines of social and environmental 
responsibility is crucial to tilt the balance. It is in 
the foremost interest of institutional actors to 
devise proper rules to stimulate the development 
of civic and corporate virtues.
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A considerable amount of research in recent 
years has established four related propositions:
(1)  Social capital is a meaningful albeit broad 
concept that describes the extent of trust, 
social support networks, and pro-sociality in  
a society;
(2)  Societies differ systematically in the various 
dimensions of social capital;
(3)  The various dimensions of social capital tend 
to be correlated across countries, including 
interpersonal trust, social support systems, 
individual generosity, honesty in governance; 
and
(4)  Societies with high social capital outperform 
those with low social capital in terms of 
subjective well-being (SWB) and economic 
development.
In the World Happiness Report, we see various 
dimensions of social capital directly at work in at 
least three of the six main determinants of SWB 
(Helliwell, Huang, and Wang, this volume):
•  Social support: “If you were in trouble, do 
you have relatives or friends you can count 
on to help you whenever you need them,  
or not?”
•  Generosity: “Have you donated money to  
a charity in the past month?”
•  Honesty: “Is corruption widespread in 
business or not?” and “Is corruption wide-
spread in government or not?”
Social capital probably raises well-being in two 
ways, one that might be considered intrinsic and 
the other instrumental. The intrinsic benefit of 
social capital is the human yearning for love, 
friendship, and community. Man, as Aristotle 
famously said, is a social animal.1 Social capital 
is a measure of the quality of interpersonal 
relations, involving trust, honesty, and mutual 
support, and these in turn increase mental and 
physical well-being.
The instrumental benefit of social capital arises 
because of the contributions of social capital to 
improved economic performance and social 
insurance.2 Social capital facilitates economic 
cooperation, efficient contracting, the division  
of labor, and the provision of social insurance 
against shocks. The key point is the existence  
of “social dilemmas” in countless aspects of 
economic and social life. A social dilemma 
occurs when an individual faces the choice of 
incurring a personal cost for a greater benefit for 
others. When social capital is high, individuals 
are more prepared to incur such individual costs 
for the greater good; and when most people in 
society behave in that manner, society as a  
whole benefits in higher economic productivity, 
stronger social insurance, greater societal  
resilience to natural hazards, and greater mutual 
care (such as Good Samaritans coming to the 
emergency aid of others, and the well-known 
case of Nordic citizens being especially likely to 
return a wallet full of money, as reported in the 
Economist, 1996).
Many social dilemmas occur in countless face-
to-face encounters in daily life and business 
dealings. When two individuals engage in a 
business encounter, there are the possibilities 
that they may engage in deceitful behavior such 
as theft, fraud, or even violence. Some of these 
threats can be controlled by legal contracts, but 
writing and enforcing contracts can be costly or 
even impossible in some circumstances. Thus, 
trust is critical: the confidence that the counterparty 
will behave honestly or morally and transparently. 
Without social trust, a wide range of mutually 
beneficial economic and social arrangements 
may be impossible to negotiate, much less  
to sustain.
Other social dilemmas occur at the societal 
scale. When social capital is high, individual 
citizens are more prepared to pay their taxes 
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individuals (e.g. in the polity debating a rise in 
taxes to finance a public good). In the latter case, 
we sometime use the concepts of market failures 
(e.g. free riding and externalities) to describe the 
social dilemmas – that is, decentralized market 
decisions lead to the under-provision of public 
goods such as infrastructure, or the over-provision 
of public bads such as pollution. In all cases, the 
social dilemmas pit individual egoistic actions 
against the broader social good.
The most famous case of a social dilemma is  
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, of which the simplest 
form is the so-called Donation Game. In the 
2-person Donation Game, each individual can 
expend a cost C in order to benefit the other 
person in the amount B > C. If both individuals 
expend C, both individuals have a net benefit in 
the amount B-C > 0. However, if one individual 
forgoes the cost C, while the other expends  
C, the first individual reaps a net benefit  
B > B-C > 0, while the second individual ends 
up with –C. The traditional game-theory  
language describes the shirker as “defecting” 
while the other individual “cooperates.”
If the two individuals play this one-shot game, 
and consider only their own net payoffs, the 
dominant strategy for each individual is to 
defect. The outcome is that neither individual 
expends C, and neither party receives the benefit 
B. The net payoff for both is therefore zero, less 
than the mutual gain B-C if both individuals 
cooperate.
In the jargon of social dilemmas, the “pro-social” 
behavior is for each individual to expend C so 
that the other individual receives benefit B > C. 
When both individuals act pro-socially, they gain 
from mutual cooperation. When both individuals 
behave anti-socially, or egoistically, they end up 
with zero.
The standard game-theoretic treatment of the 
Donation Game assumes that the individuals act 
egoistically; that they adopt dominant strategies 
(in this case, each party defects); and that the 
predicted outcome is therefore the absence of 
cooperation. Yet in experimental settings over 
the past three decades, researchers have found  
a much higher tendency to cooperate than is 
predicted by egoistic strategies. Depending on 
the context of the game (e.g. whether the parties 
discuss their moves beforehand, whether the 
parties play repeated games or a one-shot game, 
whether the parties are primed in some way, 
whether they have had face-to-face contact, and 
so forth), the extent of cooperation varies from 
mostly defections to nearly full cooperation. Yet 
robustly, the extent of cooperation is greater than 
pure egoistic logic suggests.
Social dilemmas occur not only in small-group 
interactions such as bilateral dealings, but also 
in society-wide interactions. Consider, for example, 
the question of pro-sociality regarding the 
payment of taxes. In the classic public goods 
setting, a useful public investment (e.g. a highly 
beneficial road or bridge) is to be funded with 
tax collections. The government’s ability to 
undertake the investment depends on the total 
tax revenues. Each individual taxpayer receives a 
benefit from the project based on the total taxes 
rather than the individual’s own payment.
The situation poses the well-known free-rider 
problem, a social dilemma at the scale of the 
political community of taxpayers rather than of 
two individuals. If tax evasion is easy and largely 
undetectable, each individual may have the 
incentive to shirk on his own tax payments. The 
best outcome for each person is that all the other 
taxpayers honestly pay their taxes, yet the egoistic 
outcome is that each taxpayer shirks (defects), 
thereby preventing the public investment from 
being undertaken.
In experimental settings and real-life situations, 
groups tend to be more cooperative than pure 
egoistic game theory predicts. In the laboratory 
setting, researchers have extensively tested the 
Public Goods Game, akin to an N-person Donation 
honestly, more prepared to support investments 
in public goods, and more likely to support 
social insurance policies. The Scandinavian 
countries, with perhaps the highest social capital 
in the world, also have the most extensive social 
welfare systems (broadly classified as social 
democracy). High social capital is conducive to 
electoral support for a strong social safety net 
and extensive social services. It is also likely that 
the emergence of social democratic systems in 
Scandinavia in the 1930s and onward helped to 
foster more social capital in those countries.3
Yet if social capital is so important to well-being, 
both directly and indirectly, how is high social 
capital achieved?4 Can societies invest in social 
capital in the same way that they invest in 
human and physical capital? Can we measure 
the rate of return to investments in social  
capital, in terms of benefits to SWB and  
economic performance?5
The answer to these questions is that we don’t 
really know. What we know is that some societies 
display attributes of high social capital – trust, 
low corruption, strong social support networks 
– while others do not. Yet why one society has 
strong social capital while another does not is a 
bit of a mystery. It is my purpose here to survey 
the main ideas about social capital and use them 
to help explain the huge disparities worldwide in 
social capital, and what might be done to build 
social capital in societies stuck in a “social trap” 
of very low social capital.
A Quick Look at the  
Cross-Country Evidence
Countries vary widely in their social capital, as 
measured along several dimensions: (1) generalized 
trust (“Can most people be trusted?”), (2) social 
support networks, (3) generosity and voluntarism, 
and (4) perceptions of corruption in business 
and government. Generalized trust may be the 
variable that comes closest to a single measure 
of social capital, since it directly measures 
whether individuals in society trust each other. 
According to the results of the World Values 
Survey for the 2010-14 wave, 66% of respondents 
in the Netherlands and 61% in Sweden answered 
that most people can be trusted, compared with 
just 35% in the US and 28% in Russia. More-
over, comparing the extent of trust in the 1981-84 
sampling period with the recent period, trust 
rose in Sweden (from 57 to 61%), while it declined 
in the United States (from 45 to 35%).
Notably, generalized trust is strongly negatively 
correlated with perceptions of corruption  
(r = -0.40 for 59 countries with data on both 
variables) and with income inequality as measured 
by the most recent Gini coefficient as reported 
by the World Bank (r = -0.45 for 44 countries). 
High-trust countries like Denmark, Norway, and 
Sweden are also low-corruption and low-inequality 
countries, compared with countries like the 
United States where generalized trust is much 
lower. The linkages of trust with economic 
inequality and with the perceptions of corruption 
in government are in line with theories of social 
capital described below.
Generalized trust is also positively related to the 
quality of social support networks (r = 0.28 for 
59 countries) and the indicator of generosity  
(r = 0.36 for 59 countries). Overall, we see that 
the various dimensions of social capital are all 
correlated as one might expect, suggesting the 
various causal interconnections as discussed below.
The Challenge of Social Dilemmas
Social dilemmas arise when individual strategic 
behavior may result in the failure to garner the 
benefits of cooperation. In some cases the social 
dilemmas arise in the face-to-face interactions  
of just two individuals or a small number of 
people, such as in bargaining over a contract or 
an exchange of goods and services. In other 
cases, the dilemmas involve large numbers of 
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Fischbacher explore the complex implications  
of altruism, especially involving the complex 
interactions of altruists and non-altruists.12 
Capraro et al. show that benevolent characteristics 
of individuals are predictive of cooperation in 
social dilemmas.13
Second, individuals may be primed to cooperate 
through verbal and visual priming, suggesting 
that cooperation taps into unconscious emotional 
and cognitive pathways.14
Third, individuals may be guided by personality 
traits and/or cultural norms of cooperation, causing 
an individual the emotions of compunction, 
remorse, guilt, or embarrassment in the event  
of an individual defection. These traits may be 
“hard-wired” as the result of long evolutionary 
processes, such as group-level selection leading 
to the evolution of pro-social behaviors.15
Fourth, individuals may be guided by ethical 
commandments, such as the Golden Rule  
(behave in the manner each would want the other 
to behave), the Kantian Categorical Imperative 
(behave according to that maxim that could be  
a universal law), or God’s rule (“Justice, justice 
shall you pursue,” in Deuteronomy in the Bible).
Fifth, individuals may expect future rounds of 
strategic interaction with the same individual 
counterpart, so that cooperating now can foster 
future bilateral cooperation (direct reciprocal 
altruism).
Sixth, individuals may seek to build a public 
reputation for cooperation rather than defection, 
in order to garner respect and esteem and 
thereby to elicit cooperation from others in  
the future (indirect reciprocal altruism). 
Seventh, individuals may seek to protect themselves 
from punishment and ostracism16 imposed  
by third parties following a bilateral defection 
(protection from “altruistic punishment”).
Eighth, individuals may cooperate to the extent 
that they believe that others will cooperate as 
well (reciprocal or conditional cooperation). 
Face-to-face communication can also raise the 
confidence in the cooperation of the other party.
This final factor, reciprocal cooperation, perhaps 
bolstered in small-group cases by face-to-face 
communication, may seem obvious: individuals 
will be more cooperative if others are also 
expected to be more cooperative. Yet it is important 
to recognize that cooperation is not necessarily 
the dominant strategy of an egoistic player even 
when the other party is expected to cooperate. In the 
Donation Game, for example, the egoist does 
not determine his own play according to whether 
he expects the counterpart to cooperate. Defection 
is the dominant strategy, irrespective of the play 
of the other. That is why Defection-Defection is 
the (Nash) equilibrium of the 2-Person Donation 
Game, and tax evasion is the dominant strategy 
of the Public Goods Game.
In other games, however, such as the Stag  
Hunt Game, reciprocal cooperation may be 
more directly justified. The Stag Hunt Game 
works as follows. Two hunters can either hunt  
a stag, which requires their mutual cooperation 
for success, or each can hunt a hare, which is 
successful with a single hunter alone and no 
cooperation. Deciding to hunt a stag therefore 
requires that each hunter have the confidence 
(trust) that the other hunter will also join in the 
stag hunt. Hunting a hare is much safer, since 
success doesn’t depend on the cooperation with 
the other hunter, yet the returns to the hunt are 
also much lower. In such a situation, reciprocal 
cooperation makes perfect sense: if one is 
confident (trusting) that one’s counterpart will 
cooperate, it is egoistically rational to choose the 
stag hunt (cooperation) over the hare hunt 
(non-cooperation).
Why does reciprocal or conditional cooperation 
show up so frequently as an empirical explanation 
of observed behavior, even when it cannot be 
Game. In this game, each of N players receives 
an income Y at the beginning of the game. They 
are told that they may contribute some part of 
their income (from zero up to Y) into a common 
pot (equivalent to total tax revenues). Thus, with 
player i making contribution Ci the total collection 
is T = ! Ci. The total collection is then multiplied 
by a factor " greater than 1 and less than N, and 
then divided equally among all of the players in 
the amount B = (1/N) " T. We may think of " >1 
as the rate of return on public investment.
Note that if player i makes contribution Ci the 
player’s net income NYi at the end of the game 
is given by:
NYi = Y – Ci + (1/N) " ! Ci
It is immediately clear that for each player, the 
egoistic solution is to set Ci equal to zero, free 
riding on the contributions of the others. Each 
dollar of contribution gives a return to the 
individual contributor of "/N <1, but a society- 
wide benefit of " >1. The final outcome is no 
investment, so that each player ends up with net 
income Y. On the other hand, the social optimum 
is for each player to contribute to the maximum 
Ci = Y, leading all players to receive net income 
NYi = "Y > Y.
The situation in this game is somewhat akin  
to real-world tax collections. Tax evasion may  
be the egoistic optimum, assuming of course  
no detection or penalties for non-payment,  
while paying taxes may be the social optimum, 
assuming that the government can make good 
use of the funds. The point is that social dilemmas 
occur both in bilateral relations and in society- 
wide interactions, and the reasons for defection  
or cooperation may be similar in the two  
circumstances.
The essential finding of more than 30 years of 
experimental research is that in both 2-person 
and N-person games, cooperation occurs far 
more often than egoistic game theory implies, 
yet that cooperation is fragile and variable across 
contexts. Groups can be primed to move towards 
cooperation or towards defection, for example by 
subliminal images of happy faces that promote 
cooperation.6 Social groups display varying 
tendencies towards defection or cooperation, 
and honesty versus cheating, depending on 
socioeconomic status,7 culture,8 field of academic 
study,9 and sector of employment.10 Piff finds a 
systematically lower display of honesty among 
high socioeconomic status individuals in the US, 
a finding in line with Adam Smith’s (1759) 
surmise that individuals of average rank in 
society are more likely to display moral behavior 
than the privileged classes, mainly in Smith’s 
view because the poor and middling ranks must 
depend on their good reputations, while the rich 
can surround themselves with flatterers.11
Countries seem to differ markedly and persistently 
in the average prevalence of pro-social behavior. 
Such persistent differences are observed both in 
the replies of individuals in surveys and in the 
observed practices of voluntarism, tax evasion, 
public-sector corruption, and other contexts of 
social dilemmas. These persistent differences 
matter enormously, since countries with high 
social capital – meaning the observed tendencies 
towards pro-sociality – tend to have greater 
happiness and development performance 
through the channels we have already described.
There are several theories as to why cooperation 
occurs with much greater frequency than is 
predicted by egoistic game theory and as to why 
it differs across various social groups and contexts. 
These alternative theories are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive: more than one factor may 
explain pro-social cooperation in any particular 
setting.
First, individuals may be guided by true altruism 
and compassion, meaning that they intrinsically 
value the benefit B received by the counterpart 
in the 2-person Donation Game (or the equivalent 
in the N-person Public Goods Game). Fehr and 
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towards family, friends, and generic others. The 
result is a high degree of individualism that is 
then “moralized” into a moral code that puts 
personal liberty ahead of other moral standards 
such as compassion for others.
Second, general education, ethical instruction, 
and specialized compassion training make a 
difference in pro-sociality. Most tellingly, students 
trained in egoistic game theory, notably in 
university courses in neoclassical economics,  
are less likely to cooperate in laboratory settings. 
There is now a large literature on the lower 
levels of pro-sociality of economics students 
compared with non-economics students. The 
findings have been recently well summarized by 
Etzioni.21 The findings of low pro-sociality among 
economics students are robust; the interpretation, 
however, has differed between those who have 
identified self-selection as the cause and those 
who have identified the content of neoclassical 
economics training as the cause. In short, does 
economics attract students with low tendencies 
towards pro-sociality, or does it make them? The 
answer, after three decades of research, seems to 
be both. There is an element of self-selection, 
but there is also a clear “treatment effect,” 
according to which pro-sociality declines as the 
result of instruction in mainstream, egoistic 
game theory and neoclassical economics more 
generally. Davidson and Schuyler (2015, this 
volume) discuss the efficacy of specialized 
compassion training to promote “increases in 
positive emotions, accompanied by greater 
helping behavior in a pro-social game.”
Third, certain professions seem to display 
in-group cultures that may be inimical to social 
capital. The finance industry has been identified 
as a profession that seems to display especially 
egoistic behavioral patterns and cultural norms. 
A compelling recent study by Cohn et al.22 gives 
credence to the role of professional cultures.  
In this experiment, 128 employees of a large, 
international bank were divided randomly into 
two groups. In the “treatment” group, the subjects 
were given a questionnaire to prime them with 
regard to the banking industry. The questions 
asked the subjects about their role in the bank 
and their professional background. In the control 
group, the questions were generic, not about 
banking but about daily life (such as the hours 
of television the subject watched per week).
The two groups were then subjected to a test 
environment examining their honesty. In  
particular, the subjects were asked to report the 
outcome of unsupervised coin flipping, having 
been told that flipping more “heads” would lead 
to a higher financial rewards for the subject.  
The actual coin flips were not observed, but the 
treatment group reported a rate of heads flips 
that was statistically far above the 50% fair mark, 
suggesting considerable lying in their self- 
reports. The control group reported near 50% 
heads flips. The essence of the experiment 
showed that priming subjects with their personal 
role in the bank decreased their honesty. According 
to further questions administered to the control 
and treatment groups, subjects primed with the 
banking questions led those subjects to report a 
greater materialistic orientation (specifically the 
belief that “social status is primarily determined 
by financial success.”23). That higher materialism, 
in turn, seems to have led to dishonest behavior.
Fourth, social scientists in many disciplines have 
long argued that particular social conditions 
cause individuals to adopt pro-social or anti- 
social behaviors. Five particularly important 
social conditions have been hypothesized. Putnam 
famously argued that voluntary participation in 
civic groups creates social capital.24 Rothstein 
has argued powerfully that honesty in public 
administration (low corruption and the rule of law 
in the public administration) causes individuals 
in the society to believe that their pro-social 
behavior will translate into beneficent outcomes 
for society.25 Uslaner,26 Uslaner and Rothstein,27 
and Bj∂rnskov28 have argued that the equality of 
income and socioeconomic status is critical for 
pro-social behavior in the population. Many 
political scientists and social theorists have long 
argued that political democracy is conducive to 
explained by egoistic self-interest in many cases 
(e.g. the Donation Game)? Individuals (and even 
lesser primates) seem to display a strong sense 
of “fairness,” sometimes also called “inequality 
aversion.” Individuals are ready to make sacrifices, 
e.g. to pay taxes, but only if they believe that 
others are doing the same. They pay taxes not 
out of a commitment to altruism (in which case 
they would pay taxes whether or not the others 
evade taxes), and not even necessarily out of 
concerns of reputation and punishment, but 
because they recognize that it is fair to do so if 
the result of fairness is mutual benefit.
Social Capital and Social Dilemmas
Social capital may be defined as social conditions 
that cause pro-sociality. This is admittedly a 
vague definition: it defines social capital in 
terms of the outcome (pro-sociality) that it 
promotes. Yet such vagueness is a reflection 
both of the social capital literature as it now 
stands, and of the real challenge of explaining 
pro-sociality. Since pro-sociality arises from 
several factors – altruism, culture, ethics,  
reputation, fear of ostracism, sense of fairness, 
emotional priming – social capital comes in 
many forms.
For example, social capital might reflect a high 
level of belief that others in the community are 
trustworthy (likely to cooperate), thereby triggering 
conditional cooperation. Social capital might 
work through shared religious beliefs and the 
fear of divine retribution following a defection. 
Social capital might work through society-wide 
standards for a positive reputation through 
demonstrated acts of pro-sociality. Each of these 
various motives for pro-sociality will imply a 
different content of social capital – trust, religious 
beliefs, community norms – and different ways 
that societies might promote social capital.
Unfortunately there is much more literature  
on the role of social capital in producing good 
societal outcomes (in GDP, well-being, health, 
and other outcomes) than on determining why 
social capital differs across societies and changes 
over time. The eventual power of social capital as 
an intellectual construct will depend in large 
part on a better understanding not only of why 
social capital is important but of how to achieve 
it through various kinds of societal investments. 
Here are some of the things that researchers 
have reported in recent years.
First, pro-sociality differs across individuals, 
probably as a condition of deep personality traits.17 
A leading modern expositor of this approach is 
Jonathan Haidt,18 who has persuasively argued 
that morality entails several distinctive founda-
tions, including concerns regarding: Care 
(harm), Fairness, Liberty, Loyalty, Authority,  
and Purity (taboo). Haidt argues that American 
left-of-center liberals interpret morality mainly 
in terms of care for others and distributive 
fairness, while American right-of-center  
conservatives put more weight on individual 
liberty, within-group loyalty (and less salience  
of the well-being of those outside of the group), 
authority (and hierarchy), and purity (disgust 
vis-a-vis sexual and other taboos). More generally, 
psychologists have explored personality traits 
that lead to Social Value Orientation (SVO),  
such as agreeableness, consideration of future 
consequences, low in narcissism, and need  
to belong.19
The powerful study by Iyer et al.20 of American 
libertarians, within Haidt’s analytical framework, 
exemplifies this line of research. Using online 
survey data, Iyer, Haidt and associates describe 
the distinctive moral and affective beliefs of 
American libertarians. The argument, at the 
core, is that libertarians (who generally oppose 
government redistribution of income and public 
investments) have distinctive personality traits 
including low levels of empathetic concern; low 
extraversion and agreeableness; low emotional 
reactance to others; and weaker feelings of love 
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which people defect because they expect  
others to defect, an expectation that is generally 
confirmed. As in all self-fulfilling traps, the 
question becomes how to shift a social equilibrium 
from the bad equilibrium to the good one.
There are probably four underlying motivations 
for conditional cooperation: benevolence,  
reputation, fairness, and conformity. At least 
since Adam Smith’s (1759) magisterial The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, social thinkers have 
recognized that moral behavior arises in part 
from benevolence and also from the quest of 
each individual to win a favorable reputation 
among one’s peers. But what kind of behavior 
elicits a favorable reputation? If most individuals 
adopt a norm of pro-sociality, then acting pro- 
socially will boost one’s reputation. But what if 
most individuals adopt the view that pro-sociality 
is naïve “do-gooder” behavior? Then one’s 
reputation will be enhanced not by pro-sociality 
but by the opposite, the demonstration of tough-
ness and self-serving behavior.  Thus, there may 
be two reputational equilibria, one in which 
pro-social behavior is the dominant norm, and 
each individual behaves pro-socially to garner 
the favorable view of others in society; and the 
other in which cynical toughness is the dominant 
norm, and individuals shun pro-sociality in 
order to win the admiration of others.
The sense of fairness may similarly lead to two 
equilibria. If everybody else is cheating, fair 
behavior is to cheat as well. If everybody else is 
behaving cooperatively, then fair behavior is to 
behave cooperatively.
Both of these cases are examples of the power of 
conformity more generally: behave like others to 
be accepted within the society. The tendency 
towards conformity gives rise to the remarkable 
variation in cultures, taboos, social norms, and 
most likely, varying tendencies towards pro- 
sociality. Just as many aspects of culture are 
clearly functional adaptations to history and  
the environmental context, while others are 
self-reinforcing tendencies without any evident 
functionality, so too the quest for conformity 
likely gives rise to a range of moral codes and 
behaviors, some of which are pro-social and 
others not. Of course, societies that do not 
cooperate well internally may eventually succumb 
to competition from other societies with more 
effective social norms, but that kind of between- 
group selection pressure may be weak and 
inconsistent over time.
Towards a New Era of Investment  
in Social Capital
Aristotle gave birth to comparative political 
science by asking what kind of constitution is 
conducive to a good society, one that produces 
eudaimonia (thriving) among its citizens. Among 
Aristotle’s many insights was that forging a 
good society involves not only selecting the right 
constitution (socio-political institutions) but also 
fostering the right kind of citizenry. Specifically, 
the polis should strive to develop the virtues of its 
citizens, and citizens have the purpose (telos)  
of pursuing life plans to develop their virtues. 
Political institutions and individual virtues are 
two sides of the same coin of the realm.
Modern political and economic science in the 
Anglo-Saxon tradition beginning with John 
Locke gave primacy to individual rights and 
consumer preferences, and downplayed the 
forging of virtuous citizens. In a tradition 
stretching from Locke to Mill to modern  
neoclassical economics, the state exists mainly 
to foster the maximum freedom of the individual, 
not to forge individuals to be responsible citizens. 
We might summarize the distinction of  
Aristotelian and Anglo-Saxon political economy 
by saying that Aristotle views the purpose of the 
good state as to forge the virtues of the citizenry, 
while Anglo-Saxon liberalism views the purpose 
of the good state as to protect the liberty of the 
citizens, including their rights to property.
social trust and the formation of high social 
capital.29 Finally, Putnam,30 Bj∂rnskov, and 
others have argued that ethnic homogeneity is 
conducive to pro-sociality, while ethnic, racial, 
religious, and linguistic diversity is problematic.
One of the most interesting debates has followed 
Putnam’s famous hypothesis that voluntary 
association is the key to social capital. Subsequent 
studies have found that voluntarism per se is not 
strongly correlated with generalized trust, meaning 
trust across the extent of the society. Voluntarism 
can lead to strong within-group trust but at the 
same time may actually exacerbate the divide 
between groups according to ethnic, racial, 
ideological, or other identities. The same is true 
with generosity, which may extend only to the 
in-group, rather than across the boundaries of 
society. As a result, some sociologists, such as 
Rothstein and Uslaner, have put their emphasis 
on society-wide variables such as the quality of 
political institutions and the extent of income 
inequality as more important than voluntarism 
at the individual level as determining overall 
social capital.
These debates continue to rage among the social 
scientists, with no consensus yet in sight. Part  
of the problem is that the high-trust, high- 
social-capital societies tend to have certain key 
features in common, and causality is thereby 
very difficult to determine. The highest social 
capital region of the world, the three Scandinavian 
countries (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden)  
and other Nordic countries (Finland, Iceland), 
have all of the attributes that researchers have 
suggested: high civic participation, high ethnic 
homogeneity, high social and economic equality, 
and low public corruption. The result is a very 
high level of social trust not matched almost 
anywhere else in the world.
Deeper comparative studies and close observations 
of changes over time within societies will help to 
identify causation. For example, Rothstein has 
persuasively argued that Scandinavia’s high 
social trust had to be created through political 
agreements (e.g. Sweden’s famous 1938  
Saltsjöbaden accord between employers and  
the trade unions) and through the universalistic 
social welfare state.31 Sweden went from a 
high-conflict society to a high-trust society in  
the course of the 20th century. By contrast, the 
US has experienced a sharp decline in measures 
of social capital since 1980, even as other societies 
have held their own in social capital and trust. 
Why has the US deteriorated? The answers seem 
to be related to a rapidly widening inequality of 
income, a shift of politics towards free-market 
libertarian approaches, and perhaps also the shift 
of underlying demography with the surge of 
Hispanic immigration and consequent decreased 
homogeneity in the past half century.
Social Capital Traps
Even if societies evince deep reasons for the rise, 
fall, and variation of social capital, there are also 
likely to be “social capital traps” that lock some 
societies into prolonged crises of distrust. The 
basic idea is that social capital is low because 
society lacks interpersonal trust and norms of 
pro-sociality, but the lack of social capital in turn 
causes individuals to behave egoistically and 
anti-socially, and those anti-social actions in turn 
continue to perpetuate the low social trust. The 
result is a persistent “trap,” in which individuals 
are distrustful because social capital is low 
because individuals are distrustful and so on, in 
a self-reinforcing cycle. Rothstein hints at this 
with his title Social Traps and the Problem of Trust, 
though his book is actually the story of how 
Scandinavia escaped from such a trap.32
The importance of conditional cooperation is 
probably the main reason for self-fulfilling traps. 
Individuals cooperate when they believe that 
others will cooperate as well. This tendency 
leads to a circularity and to two equilibria, a 
good one in which people cooperate because 
they expect others to cooperate, an expectation 
that is generally confirmed; and a bad one in 
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detriment to interpersonal trust, as argued  
by Knack and Zak,39 Rothstein and Uslaner,40 
and others.
Eighth, the adoption of universal social benefits 
and strong social safety nets (as in Scandinavia) 
rather than means testing, according to Rothstein41 
can have the effect of raising social trust. Means 
testing, according to Rothstein and Uslaner,42 
foments distrust by making the recipients of 
such aid a suspect class, tending “to stigmatize 
recipients as ‘welfare clients.’” Strong social 
insurance protects individuals from the heavy 
psychological and economic burdens of adverse 
shocks. (See De Neve et al. for evidence on the 
asymmetric effects of negative and positive 
economic shocks on happiness, with negative 
shocks having twice the absolute impact.)43
Ninth, the recovery of moral discourse in society 
more generally – calling out illegal and immoral 
behavior by powerful companies and individuals 
– can increase the reputational benefits of 
pro-social behavior. Leading stakeholders in 
societies that suffer from pervasive corruption 
and lack of generalized trust should recognize 
that their societies are likely caught in a self- 
reinforcing social trap. Ethical leaders should 
help their societies to shift the ethical equilibrium 
by raising the social opprobrium to corruption, 
and by celebrating local leaders who defend 
pro-social values and behaviors.
Tenth, the strengthening of deliberative  
democracy, in which individuals meet face to 
face or in virtual online groups to discuss and 
debate public policy issues in detail, may well 
foster generalized trust, reputational benefits of 
pro-sociality, and more ethical framing of policy 
issues. The consistent evidence that effective 
democracy fosters generalized trust is a power-
ful indication that good governance not only 
reduces transaction costs in the economic 
sphere (i.e. lowers the costs of doing business), 
but also produces social capital with myriad 
direct and indirect benefits. In a fascinating new 
study, Hauser et al. also suggest that democracy can 
restrain egoistic behavior by enforcing majority 
rule to curb the behavior of non-cooperators in 
the minority of the voting population.44
Eleventh, the accurate reporting of pro-social 
behavior may build social trust. For example,  
the actual rate of return of cash-bearing wallets 
found by strangers in downtown Toronto has 
been found to be three times as great as people 
believe.45 Return of a lost wallet is a genuinely 
benevolent act, and people are far happier to live 
in a community where they think such a return 
is likely. Correcting falsely pessimistic views  
of social mores, through better communication 
based on more extensive evidence, would  
provide a powerful step to build, or to rebuild, 
social capital.
We are at an early stage of testing effective 
approaches to building social trust and pro- 
social behavior, especially in societies riven by 
distrust, corruption, and anti-social behavior.  
As this challenge is of paramount importance 
for achieving sustainable development and a 
high level of well-being, we intend to pursue  
this challenge of building social capital in  
future editions of the World Happiness Report.
The growing body of evidence on the importance 
of social capital to well-being and economic 
success is leading again to the question of how 
best to forge the virtues of the citizenry to 
achieve desirable society-wide outcomes. We  
are returning full circle to the question asked  
by Aristotle (as well as by Buddha, Confucius, 
Jesus, and other ancient sages): how best to 
achieve pro-sociality, through interpersonal 
trust, moral codes, education and compassion 
training,33 and effective public institutions.
I believe that we can expect many different 
approaches to this challenge in the years ahead, 
each of which provides a different way of  
investing in social capital.
First, as per Aristotle, society should pay attention 
to moral training in the schools. The discovery 
of the anti-social effect of neoclassical economics 
training is in a way grounds for optimism: 
education matters. Educational programs that 
teach about social dilemmas and the potential 
gains of cooperation could create an improved 
environment for cooperation. The chapter by 
Layard and Hagell in this report recommends 
that schools implement a life-skills curriculum, 
including this type of training.
Second, universal access to education more 
generally is likely to promote social capital in 
many additional ways, by raising awareness of 
social dilemmas, reducing social and economic 
inequalities, fostering a better understanding  
of public policy debates, raising individual skill 
levels, and creating an educated citizenry that 
can keep government in check.34
Third, specialized training in compassion, and 
in traditional techniques such as meditation to 
develop mindfulness, may be effective pathways 
at the individual level to greater compassion and 
thereby to social capital.35
Fourth, the professions should establish codes  
of ethics that emphasize pro-sociality. We have 
seen that the modern banking sector currently 
lacks such a code of conduct. This was made 
vivid by the claim by Goldman Sachs after the 
2008 financial crisis that it was justified in 
selling toxic securities to clients because those 
clients were “sophisticated” and therefore 
should have protected themselves against bad 
investment decisions. In other words, said 
Goldman, its counterparties are on their own, 
without any obligation by Goldman to disclose 
the truth about the securities it marketed. The 
assumption is pure egoism in the pursuit of 
profits. Ironically, the credit markets are named 
after the Latin root “credere,” to trust.
Fifth, more effective regulation by the state 
against dangerous anti-social behavior  
(e.g. financial fraud, pollution, etc.) could help  
to give confidence in interpersonal trust, the 
point emphasized by Rothstein.36 Governments 
should disqualify bankers and others who have 
played by dirty rules, as not having the ethical 
standards to remain in practice. This kind of 
policing is within reach of bank regulators, but 
has rarely been used. One major NY hedge fund 
owner has been allowed to continue investing on 
his own account even after his firm and several 
of his top associates pled guilty to insider trading 
and other financial crimes. Another major firm, 
J.P. Morgan, has paid around $35 billion in 
fines37 to the US government during the period 
2011-14 for a large number of financial abuses, 
yet the senior management has stayed in place 
and has continued to receive enormous bonuses.
Sixth, a focused effort to reduce public-sector 
corruption could help to rebuild social capital, 
for the same reasons as just outlined. We have 
noted repeatedly that high-trust societies are also 
low-corruption societies. Rothstein, Knack and 
Zak, and others have argued that causation runs 
from the rule of law to interpersonal trust.38
Seventh, public policies to narrow income and 
wealth inequalities could raise social capital on 
the grounds that class inequalities are a major 
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